Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

General Motors challenged the district court's order granting in part a motion for class certification in an action brought by plaintiffs under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), Fla. Stat. 501.201 et seq. The district court certified a class consisting of all Florida purchasers and lessees of 2014 Cadillac CTS sedans. In this case, the district court found the predominance requirement to be satisfied by an essential question common to each class member: whether the inaccurate Monroney sticker provided by General Motors constituted a misrepresentation prohibited by FDUTPA. The court concluded that, by inaccurately communicating that the 2014 Cadillac CTS had attained three perfect safety ratings, General Motors plainly obtained enhanced negotiating leverage that allowed it to command a price premium. The size of that premium represents the damages attributable to that theory of liability. Because that theory is consistent for all class members, the predominance requirement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) is satisfied. This consistency is also sufficient to establish the commonality requirement under Rule 23(a)(2). Because common questions of law and fact predominate, class-wide adjudication appropriately conserves judicial resources and advances society’s interests in judicial efficiency. Finally, the court rejected General Motor's contention that plaintiff failed to prove that she can fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Carriuolo v. General Motors Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a retired bank manager, filed suit against Nationstar under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., a consumer-protection statute geared toward mortgagors. Plaintiff claimed that her mortgage payment incorrectly increased after Nationstar began servicing the loan. The district court granted Nationstar's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Nationstar did not offer a written explanation stating the reason or reasons for its determination, in violation of section 2605(e)(2)(B) and 12 C.F.R. 1024.35(e)(1)(i)(B); that this failure indicated Nationstar's investigation was unreasonable; and that Nationstar’s unreasonable investigation prevented it from discovering and appropriately correcting the account error. The court concluded that the district court improperly elevated Nationstar's allegations over those of plaintiff at the motion-to-dismiss stage, and that plaintiff adequately pleaded damages. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Renfroe v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Collectors, alleging that the debt collection letter they sent her violated section 1692(g) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692(g), by failing to notify her of the "in writing" requirement. Plaintiff also alleged that omitting the “in writing” requirement violated section 1692e, which prohibits using “false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court joined the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits in holding that a debt collection notice sent to a consumer’s attorney is an “indirect” communication with the consumer; the court rejected the notion that section 1692g gives debt collectors discretion to omit the “in writing” requirement or cure improper notice by claiming waiver; the FDCPA already specifies a remedy for violations of section 1692g and the court will not judicially fashion a waiver remedy for violations of section 1692g when the FDCPA identifies civil liability as the remedy for noncompliance; and the communication alleged in this case states a claim for “false, deceptive, or misleading” behavior under section 1692e where neither the “competent lawyer” nor the “least sophisticated consumer” could be said to have notice of the “in writing” requirement after receiving a letter like the one alleged. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Bishop v. Ross Earle & Bonan, P.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, consumers from California and Texas, filed class actions against Electrolux, the manufacturer of front-loading washing machines, alleging warranty and consumer claims. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the rubber seal on the front door of the machines retains water, allowing mildew to grow, causing stains on clothing, and creating a foul odor. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in assessing predominance and therefore vacated the class certification. On remand, the district court should revisit Electrolux's argument that the consumer claims do not satisfy predominance because plaintiffs cannot prove causation on a classwide basis, and the district court abused its discretion by certifying the warranty claims without first resolving preliminary questions of state law that bear on predominance. The court further concluded that plaintiffs' damages do not necessarily defeat predominance, and Electrolux's defense of misuse does not necessarily defeat predominance. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Brown v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the assignee of his mortgage after his servicer failed to provide a payoff balance. The Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1641(e)(1)(A), creates a cause of action against an assignee for a violation that is “apparent on the face of the disclosure statement provided in connection with [a mortgage] transaction pursuant to this subchapter.” The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's amended complaint because the failure to provide a payoff balance is not a violation apparent on the face of the disclosure statement. View "Evanto v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated individuals, alleging that Capital One violated certain provisions of the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692–1692p, by attempting to collect on defaulted or delinquent credit card accounts that Capital One had acquired from HSBC. The district court dismissed plaintiff's amended complaint. The court concluded that it need look no further than the statutory text to conclude that, under the plain language of the FDCPA, a bank (or any person or entity) does not qualify as a “debt collector” where the bank does not regularly collect or attempt to collect on debts “owed or due another” and where “the collection of any debts” is not “the principal purpose” of the bank’s business, even where the consumer’s debt was in default at the time the bank acquired it. In this case, the amended complaint’s factual matter establishes that Capital One’s collection efforts in this case related only to debts owed to it and that debt collection is only some part of, and not the principal purpose of, Capital One’s business. Therefore, Capital One's activity, as alleged by plaintiff, is not the activity of a “debt collector” under the FDCPA, and plaintiff cannot state a claim under the Act. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Davidson v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against DCI, alleging that DCI violated the Telephone Communications Practice Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, by sending plaintiff two text messages. The court concluded that plaintiff gave his prior express consent to be contacted by voluntarily providing his cell phone number to DCI. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims because plaintiff’s complaint alleges, on its face, facts that demonstrate prior express consent. View "Murphy v. DCI Biologicals Orlando, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a wood manufacturer, alleging that wood he bought for a fence at his home was not properly pressure-treated and that it prematurely rotted. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims under the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), Ala. Code 8-19-5(5), (7), and for breach of express warranty. The court held that where a conflict exists between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which authorizes class actions including for consumer claims of this kind, and the ADTPA, which creates a private right of action but forbids private class actions, Rule 23 controls. The court also concluded that Alabama law allows a consumer to recover for breach of an express warranty, even in the absence of privity, in some circumstances. In this case, the court held that the complaint adequately alleges the required circumstances and thus states an express warranty claim on which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Lisk v. Lumber One Wood Preserving" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, debt-collection attorneys for non-party Publix, under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692-1692p. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim. At issue was whether representations made by an attorney in court filings during the course of debt-collection litigation are actionable under the FDCPA. The court found that the plain language of the FDCPA, other persuasive decisions interpreting that language, and the purpose underlying the Act mandate a finding that the FDCPA applies to attorneys, like defendants, who regularly engage in debt collection activity, even when that activity includes litigation and even when the attorneys’ conduct is directed at someone other than the consumer. The court further concluded that absent a statutory exception, documents filed in court in the course of judicial proceedings to collect on a debt, like defendants' sworn reply, are subject to the FDCPA. However, because the court agreed with the district court’s finding that plaintiff failed to state a claim under the FDCPA, the court affirmed the dismissal of his complaint. View "Miljkovic v. Shafritz and Dinkin, P.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against ISPC, alleging that ISPC violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1635, 1637, by failing to disclose examples of minimum payments and the maximum repayment period, as well as failing to properly delay performance to allow plaintiffs to rescind the contract. The court concluded that ISPC did not take the requisite interest in plaintiffs’ primary residence to trigger the TILA protections on which plaintiffs rely. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. View "Lankhorst v. Indep. Savings Plan Co." on Justia Law