Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against DCI, alleging that DCI violated the Telephone Communications Practice Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, by sending plaintiff two text messages. The court concluded that plaintiff gave his prior express consent to be contacted by voluntarily providing his cell phone number to DCI. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims because plaintiff’s complaint alleges, on its face, facts that demonstrate prior express consent. View "Murphy v. DCI Biologicals Orlando, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a wood manufacturer, alleging that wood he bought for a fence at his home was not properly pressure-treated and that it prematurely rotted. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims under the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), Ala. Code 8-19-5(5), (7), and for breach of express warranty. The court held that where a conflict exists between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which authorizes class actions including for consumer claims of this kind, and the ADTPA, which creates a private right of action but forbids private class actions, Rule 23 controls. The court also concluded that Alabama law allows a consumer to recover for breach of an express warranty, even in the absence of privity, in some circumstances. In this case, the court held that the complaint adequately alleges the required circumstances and thus states an express warranty claim on which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Lisk v. Lumber One Wood Preserving" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, debt-collection attorneys for non-party Publix, under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692-1692p. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim. At issue was whether representations made by an attorney in court filings during the course of debt-collection litigation are actionable under the FDCPA. The court found that the plain language of the FDCPA, other persuasive decisions interpreting that language, and the purpose underlying the Act mandate a finding that the FDCPA applies to attorneys, like defendants, who regularly engage in debt collection activity, even when that activity includes litigation and even when the attorneys’ conduct is directed at someone other than the consumer. The court further concluded that absent a statutory exception, documents filed in court in the course of judicial proceedings to collect on a debt, like defendants' sworn reply, are subject to the FDCPA. However, because the court agreed with the district court’s finding that plaintiff failed to state a claim under the FDCPA, the court affirmed the dismissal of his complaint. View "Miljkovic v. Shafritz and Dinkin, P.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against ISPC, alleging that ISPC violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1635, 1637, by failing to disclose examples of minimum payments and the maximum repayment period, as well as failing to properly delay performance to allow plaintiffs to rescind the contract. The court concluded that ISPC did not take the requisite interest in plaintiffs’ primary residence to trigger the TILA protections on which plaintiffs rely. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. View "Lankhorst v. Indep. Savings Plan Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Patricia Clements refinanced a mortgage with Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., which hired LSI Title Agency, Inc. to provide mortgage refinancing services for the transaction. Because Georgia law required all closing services to be performed by a licensed attorney, LSI contracted with the Law Offices of William E. Fair, LLC to provide a closing attorney, and the Law Offices arranged for Sean Rogers to serve in that capacity. After the refinancing, Clements filed a putative class action in a state court against LSI, the Law Offices, Fair, and other unnamed defendants. Clements alleged that LSI routinely had non-attorneys prepare all of the documents for the closing and that the Law Offices and Fair arranged for a licensed attorney, Rogers, to witness the signing of the documents, in violation of Georgia law. This appeal presented three questions to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for review: (1) whether an allegation that a lender charged a borrower for unearned fees conferred standing on the borrower; (2) whether a mortgage service provider performs only nominal services when it procures a closing attorney; and (3) whether a mortgage service provider "give[s or] . . . accept[s] any portion, split, or percentage of any [settlement] charge" when it marks up the price of a third-party service. Clements alleged two violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and three violations of Georgia law. The district court dismissed the amended complaint for lack of standing. Although the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Clements had standing to sue, the Court affirmed in part the dismissal of her federal claims for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and vacated in part and remanded for the district court to decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her claims under Georgia law. View "Clements v. LSI Title Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Experian under the Fair Crediting Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681i(a), alleging that Experian negligently and willfully violated its duty under the Act to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation of disputed information contained in his credit file. At issue was whether an allegation of a violation of section 1681i(a) requires the consumer reporting agency to have disclosed the consumer's credit report to a third party in order for a consumer to recover actual damages. The court concluded that, looking to the plain language of the Act, a consumer's credit report need not be published to a third party in order to entitle the consumer to actual damages under section 1681i(a). Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's conclusion otherwise. View "Collins v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought to rescind a loan she entered into with the trustee of a mortgage investment trust, and the district court granted rescission, finding that the mortgaged property was plaintiff's "principal dwelling" and the trustee failed to give plaintiff adequate notice of her right to rescind. In this case, the trustee failed to comply with two requirements of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1635, and a related regulation where he instructed plaintiff to sign simultaneously the loan documents and a postdated waiver of her right to rescind the transaction and the trustee failed to give plaintiff two copies of the notice of her right to rescind. The court concluded that the record fairly supports the district court's findings of fact; plaintiff was entitled to rescission because the trustee failed to give plaintiff clear and conspicuous notice of her right to rescind; but the district court lacked the discretion to deny plaintiff statutory damages, attorney's fees, and costs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a determination of the amounts owed. View "Harris v. Schonbrun" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a proposed class action in Florida state court against BLP, alleging that BLP sent unsolicited faxes in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(C), and its implementing regulations. BLP removed to federal court and BLP served each named plaintiff an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. BLP then moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that the unaccepted Rule 68 offers rendered the case moot. The court concluded that a plaintiff's individual claim is not mooted by an unaccepted Rule 68 offer of judgment, and a proffer that moots a named plaintiff's individual claim does not moot a class action in circumstances like those presented in this case, even if the proffer comes before the plaintiff has moved to certify the class. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the action. View "Jeffrey M. Stein D.D.S., et al. v. Buccaneers Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action suit against a law firm for violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. The district court granted the firm's motion to dismiss, reasoning that the letter to plaintiff was not an initial communication as defined by the Act, and that the alleged error in the letter was not misleading. The court affirmed, holding that the letter, which was an initial communication, would not mislead the sophisticated consumer. View "Caceres v. McCalla Raymer, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Chase, alleging violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2605(e); conversion; breach of contract; wrongful attempted foreclosure; and trespass. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Chase on all of plaintiff's claims. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on the breach of contract claims where, although the court recognized that HUD regulations are enforceable terms of the contract, plaintiff failed to put forward any evidence of damages caused by the purported breach of these contract terms or seek any cognizable relief; plaintiff's trespass claim failed because plaintiff was admittedly in default and any visits by Chase's agents to the property at issue were permitted; plaintiff's wrongful attempted foreclosure claim failed where Chase believed it was entitled to foreclose on the property at the time and plaintiff attributed the problems with Chase only to its inability to fully keep track of her payments and communicate her payment status to her; and plaintiff's RESPA claim failed where Chase's response to plaintiff's requests was adequate and there were no damages as a matter of law from an inadequate response. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Chase on all claims. View "Bates v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA" on Justia Law