Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion SummariesArticles Posted in Contracts
Genworth Life and Annuity Insurance Co. v. TVPX ARS, Inc.
In 2018, TVPX filed an amended class action complaint in the Eastern District of Virginia against Genworth, alleging that Genworth violated the terms of one of its life insurance policies by imposing inflated "cost of insurance" (COI) charges on its insureds. Genworth brought this action in district court seeking to enjoin TVPX's Virginia lawsuit, arguing that TVPX's claims were barred by a 2004 agreement settling a prior class action about the same life insurance policies. The district court then granted Genworth's motion to enjoin TVPX's Virginia action, finding that TVPX's complaint was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's order enjoining TVPX's Virginia lawsuit. Although the primary right and duty at issue in TVPX's complaint were also at issue in the settlement, the court held that the record does not support the district court's finding that Genworth's "cost of insurance" (COI) practices remain unchanged since the settlement. The court remanded to the district court for limited discovery on whether Genworth has in any way changed how it calculates and charges COI since the settlement. Finally, the court held that, when read in its entirety, the Pre-Settlement Policy Administration does not constitute a preservation of rights, but instead clarifies that Genworth may continue administering its policies in the same manner that it did before the settlement. View "Genworth Life and Annuity Insurance Co. v. TVPX ARS, Inc." on Justia Law
Robinson v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
Plaintiffs filed suit against Liberty Mutual for breach of contract and bad faith under Alabama law after the insurer denied coverage for an infestation of brown recluse spiders in plaintiffs' home. The court held that the homeowners insurance policy excluded coverage for property damage caused by insects or vermin, and that brown recluse spiders are both "insects" and "vermin" under the ordinary meaning of those terms. Furthermore, the district court did not err by consulting dictionaries to determine these legislative facts. View "Robinson v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law
Bearden v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Co.
At issue was the word "retirement" in the Award Terms of stock options granted to plaintiff by his employer E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company. Under the terms of the award, an employee who leaves the company "due to retirement" keeps the original expiration date of his stock options, but an employee who leaves for other reasons must exercise his stock options by his last day of employment. Applying Delaware law, the Eleventh Circuit held that an employee is eligible for retirement within the meaning of the Award Terms only upon satisfying both the age and years-of-service requirement. Therefore, plaintiff's 10 years of service with DuPont fell short of the years-of-service requirements within Section IV of the Pension Plan. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to DuPont. View "Bearden v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Co." on Justia Law
Geico Marine Insurance Co. v. Shackleford
Geico Marine filed suit seeking a declaration that a navigational limit in the policy with defendant that required the vessel to be north of Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, during hurricane season barred coverage. The district court ruled against Geico Marine and declared that the policy covered the loss. The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the navigational limit barred coverage. In this case, the policy was not ambiguous about whether it contained a navigational limit when the loss occurred, and the plain language of the policy contained a navigational limit. Because the navigational limit was dispositive where the vessel suffered damage while outside the covered navigational area, the court need not address the breach of a duty of uberrimae fidei. View "Geico Marine Insurance Co. v. Shackleford" on Justia Law
Tims v. LGE Community Credit Union
Plaintiff filed suit against LGE, alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA). The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and held that the two parties' agreements unambiguously permitted LGE to assess overdraft fees using the available balance calculation method. The Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that the agreements were ambiguous as to whether LGE could rely on an account's available balance, rather than its ledger balance, to assess overdraft fees. Therefore, the court held that plaintiff properly pleaded a claim for breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court also held that plaintiff alleged a claim under the EFTA because the Opt-In Agreement could describe either the available or the ledger balance calculation method for unsettled debts; plaintiff had no reasonable opportunity to affirmatively consent to LGE's overdraft services; and LGE was not protected from liability by the safe harbor. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Tims v. LGE Community Credit Union" on Justia Law
Dear v. Q Club Hotel, LLC
A class of condo owners and Q Club, the entity that operates the condominium-hotel, dispute the meaning of the "Declaration" that governs the parties' relationship. The owners alleged that Q Club's new methodology used to calculate the shared costs breached the Declaration as applied both retroactively and prospectively. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court properly concluded that the Declaration does not permit back-charging; the district court did not reversibly err in submitting the shared costs issue to the jury or in the way that it instructed the jury; and plaintiff has not met his burden for requesting a new trial because the new evidence would not likely produce a different result. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Dear v. Q Club Hotel, LLC" on Justia Law
Pier 1 Cruise Experts v. Revelex Corp.
Pier 1 filed suit against Revelex, alleging claims of breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the Scope of Work exists independently of the Service Agreement on the ground that Revelex has waived any argument to the contrary; affirmed the district court's decision that Pier 1's lost profits claim failed as a matter of law and that Revelex is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that claim; and held that Pier 1 was not entitled to recover attorneys' fees. Finally, the court certified the following questions to the Florida Supreme Court: Is a contractual "exculpatory clause" that purports to insulate one of the signatories from "any … damages regardless of kind or type … whether in contract, tort (including negligence), or otherwise" enforceable? Or, alternatively, does the clause confer such sweeping immunity that it renders the entire contract in which it appears illusory? Or, finally, might the clause plausibly be construed so as to bar some but not all claims and thus save the contract from invalidation? View "Pier 1 Cruise Experts v. Revelex Corp." on Justia Law
Posted in: Contracts
Dye v. Tamko Building Products, Inc.
Where a roofing shingle manufacturer displays on the exterior wrapping of every package of shingles the entirety of its product-purchase agreement—including, as particularly relevant here, a mandatory-arbitration provision— homeowners whose roofers ordered, opened, and installed the shingles are bound by the agreement's terms. The Eleventh Circuit held that the manufacturer's packaging in this case sufficed to convey a valid offer of contract terms, that unwrapping and retaining the shingles was an objectively reasonable means of accepting that offer, and that the homeowners' grant of express authority to their roofers to buy and install shingles necessarily included the act of accepting purchase terms on the homeowners' behalf. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision to grant the manufacturer's motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss the homeowners' complaint. View "Dye v. Tamko Building Products, Inc." on Justia Law
Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada v. Imperial Premium Finance, LLC
These appeals relate to life insurance policies that were issued by Sun Life to non-parties and that were subsequently acquired by Imperial. The district court dismissed all claims in both cases. The Eleventh Circuit held that Sun Life waived its opportunity to rely on non-forum law to interpret the policies at issue and thus interpreted the relevant policies under Florida law. In regard to Sun Life's complaint, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the fraud conspiracy and declaratory judgment counts; and vacated the dismissal of the RICO, RICO conspiracy, fraud, aiding and abetting fraud, and tortious interference with contractual relations counts. In regard to Imperial's complaint, the court affirmed the breach of contract count to the extent it asserted a breach of the rights-and-privileges clause. The court vacated the district court's dismissal of the breach of contract count to the extent it asserted a breach of the incontestability clause. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada v. Imperial Premium Finance, LLC" on Justia Law
The Estate of Caldwell Jones, Jr. v. Live Well Financial, Inc.
12 U.S.C. 1715z-20(j) can not be read to prevent foreclosure pursuant to a reverse-mortgage contract that, by its terms, permits the lender to demand repayment immediately following a borrower's death, even if his or her non-borrowing spouse continues to live in the mortgaged property. The Eleventh Circuit held that the statute addressed and limited only the Secretary's authority—specifying the types of mortgages that HUD "may not insure"—and thus did not alter or affect the rights that a lender independently possessed under a reverse-mortgage contract. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of Live Well's motion to dismiss because, even if HUD should not have insured the mortgage at issue, section 1715z-20(j) did not alter or limit Live Well's right to foreclose under the terms of its valid mortgage contract. View "The Estate of Caldwell Jones, Jr. v. Live Well Financial, Inc." on Justia Law