Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants, three excess liability insurers, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiffs on their breach of contract claims. The district court concluded that Georgia's uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM) statute imposed upon defendants an unconditional obligation to provide UM coverage to the insured as if they were primary insurers, and that defendants' failure to tender payment amounted to a breach of contract. The court held that Georgia's UM statute, Ga. Code Ann. 33-7-11, applies to defendants' excess liability policies; defendants' excess liability policies contain vertical exhaustion requirements; and section 33-7-11 does not supersede the vertical exhaustion requirements in defendants' excess liability policies. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Coker v. American Guarantee and Liability Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Patterson and Breedlove filed suit against Mortgage Systems, seeking to enforce a contract between Patterson and CitiMortgage for the sale of Breedlove’s home to Patterson for a bargain basement price. CitiMortgage contends that the sale price stated in its offer letter to Patterson was an obvious clerical error and that the contract should be rescinded for that reason. Because of the clerical error, the letter actually said that CitiMortgage wanted a net payout amount of $113,968.45, instead of the “corrected” net payout amount was $423,940. Because that letter did not lead to formation of a valid contract based on CitiMortgage's unilateral mistake that plaintiffs knew or should have known about, CitiMortgage did not have any duty not to foreclose on the property. Therefore, the wrongful foreclosure claim fails and the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for CitiMortgage and Mortgage Systems. View "Patterson v. CitiMortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants, retirees of the ACC, alleged that the ACC breached contractual obligations to provide health benefits to eligible retirees. The district court granted the ACC's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. At issue is whether the contract between the ACC and the appellants is entire or divisible. The court concluded that the contract is divisible because it involved successive payments of an uncertain amount for an indefinite period of time and does not allow a plaintiff to recover the entirety of the breaching party's obligation. Accordingly, the statute of limitations “runs separately as to each payment [of healthcare premiums and cost indemnification] when it becomes due.” Therefore, appellants may pursue contract claims for each alleged breach occurring within the limitations period. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wood v. Unified Gov't of Athens-Clarke Cnty." on Justia Law

The court originally remanded this case to the district court for additional fact-finding to establish complete diversity of citizenship between all plaintiffs and all defendants with instructions to reenter summary judgment if federal subject-matter jurisdiction could be properly established. After dismissing a nondiverse plaintiff it found was not a real party in interest to this case, the district court reentered its earlier grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurer on all claims. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of PMI Delaware and its grant of summary judgment to Lexington. The court concluded that the district court's dismissal of PMI Delaware pursuant to FRCP 21 as a "nominal or formal party" was proper because the district court found that though PMI Delaware was a named insured on the Insurance Policy, PMI Delaware would not be entitled to any portion of a successful judgment against Lexington because PMI Florida, not PMI Delaware, was the party against whom Blue Cross had filed suit and PMI Florida, not PMI Delaware, was the only party that made a claim for coverage to Lexington. Further, PMI Delaware was not even a party to the underlying Blue Cross contract, which provided healthcare coverage only to PMI Florida’s leased employees. Further, the court affirmed the district court's holding that Lexington owed no coverage to PMI Florida. Here, the court saw no contractual ambiguity; the Insurance Policy issued by Lexington explicitly excludes the coverage sought by PMI Florida. Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Lexington on PMI Florida’s claims for breach of contract and declaratory judgment. Finally, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Lexington on its claim of negligent misrepresentation where no jury could reasonably find that Yoohoo justifiably relied on the statement at issue as an indication that there would be coverage under the policy. View "Payroll Mgmt., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Institute filed the underlying complaint, alleging claims for unjust enrichment, right of publicity, and misappropriation under Michigan common law for Target’s sales of all items using the name and likeness of Rosa Parks. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court concluded that Target's use of Rosa Parks’s name and likeness in the books, movie, and plaque is necessary to chronicling and discussing the history of the Civil Rights Movement. These matters are quintessentially embraced and protected by Michigan’s qualified privilege. Michigan law does not make discussion of these topics of public concern contingent on paying a fee. Therefore, all six books, the movie, and the plaque are protected under Michigan’s qualified privilege protecting matters of public interest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rosa and Raymond Parks Inst. for Self Dev. v. Target Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants Fabec and Lalo Scrolling Media for breach of contract, conversion, unjust enrichment, and related claims. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's grant of default judgment against them. The court concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction where plaintiffs satisfied the amount in controversy requirement; the district court acted well within its discretion in concluding that Fabec’s noncompliance with the district court’s pretrial instructions justified the entry of a default judgment; but because Fabec was denied the opportunity to cross-examine plaintiffs' counsel, the court reversed that portion of the default judgment awarding plaintiffs $43,500 in attorney’s fees and remanded the case to the district court to hold a hearing on the amount and reasonableness of the fees. The court otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "Giovanno v. Fabec" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a wood manufacturer, alleging that wood he bought for a fence at his home was not properly pressure-treated and that it prematurely rotted. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims under the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), Ala. Code 8-19-5(5), (7), and for breach of express warranty. The court held that where a conflict exists between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which authorizes class actions including for consumer claims of this kind, and the ADTPA, which creates a private right of action but forbids private class actions, Rule 23 controls. The court also concluded that Alabama law allows a consumer to recover for breach of an express warranty, even in the absence of privity, in some circumstances. In this case, the court held that the complaint adequately alleges the required circumstances and thus states an express warranty claim on which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Lisk v. Lumber One Wood Preserving" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Dominican Republic and INDRHI for breach of contract and unjust enrichment related to an irrigation project in the Dominican Republic. After the district court entered a default judgment in favor of plaintiffs, defendants moved to vacate the default judgment. The district court denied the motion and defendants appealed. While that appeal was pending, the Dominican Republic moved to vacate the default judgment for voidness under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). The district court denied the motion on the merits, finding that the Dominican Republic had waived its sovereign immunity. The Dominican Republic appealed. In these consolidated appeals, the court concluded that the district court erred by denying the Dominican Republic’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate for voidness the default judgment entered against the foreign nation because at least one statutory exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602-1611, applies; the district court abused its discretion by denying the Dominican Republic and INDRHI’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion to vacate for excusable neglect the default judgment entered against them because the factual findings underlying the district court's decision were unsupported by the record; and therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Architectural Ingenieria Siglo XXI v. Dominican Republic" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against ISPC, alleging that ISPC violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1635, 1637, by failing to disclose examples of minimum payments and the maximum repayment period, as well as failing to properly delay performance to allow plaintiffs to rescind the contract. The court concluded that ISPC did not take the requisite interest in plaintiffs’ primary residence to trigger the TILA protections on which plaintiffs rely. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. View "Lankhorst v. Indep. Savings Plan Co." on Justia Law

Drivers working for FedEx in Florida filed suit alleging a number of statutory and common-law claims against the company. At issue was whether FedEx properly classified the drivers as independent contractors. Applying Florida law, the court determined that several factors support the conclusion that the Florida drivers are independent contractors: the Operating Agreement itself identifies the drivers as independent contractors; FedEx pays the Florida drivers on a "settlement" basis; and the drivers can sell part or all of their service areas with notice or they can acquire service areas from other drivers. However, the court concluded that these contractual terms are not dispositive where, inter alia, other provisions of the Operating Agreement, together with FedEx's standard practices and procedures, seem to belie the creation of the status agreed to by the parties. Therefore, the court reversed the MDL court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of FedEx on the drivers’ employment status where there are genuine issues of matter fact as to whether the drivers are employees or independent contractors. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of FedEx on the individual claims of Plaintiff Mosher and Harting. View "Carlson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc." on Justia Law