Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-appellant Patricia Clements refinanced a mortgage with Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., which hired LSI Title Agency, Inc. to provide mortgage refinancing services for the transaction. Because Georgia law required all closing services to be performed by a licensed attorney, LSI contracted with the Law Offices of William E. Fair, LLC to provide a closing attorney, and the Law Offices arranged for Sean Rogers to serve in that capacity. After the refinancing, Clements filed a putative class action in a state court against LSI, the Law Offices, Fair, and other unnamed defendants. Clements alleged that LSI routinely had non-attorneys prepare all of the documents for the closing and that the Law Offices and Fair arranged for a licensed attorney, Rogers, to witness the signing of the documents, in violation of Georgia law. This appeal presented three questions to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for review: (1) whether an allegation that a lender charged a borrower for unearned fees conferred standing on the borrower; (2) whether a mortgage service provider performs only nominal services when it procures a closing attorney; and (3) whether a mortgage service provider "give[s or] . . . accept[s] any portion, split, or percentage of any [settlement] charge" when it marks up the price of a third-party service. Clements alleged two violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and three violations of Georgia law. The district court dismissed the amended complaint for lack of standing. Although the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Clements had standing to sue, the Court affirmed in part the dismissal of her federal claims for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and vacated in part and remanded for the district court to decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her claims under Georgia law. View "Clements v. LSI Title Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

DVI Receivables XIV, LLC; DVI Receivables XVI, LLC; DVI Receivables XVII, LLC; DVI Receivables XVIII, LLC; DVI Receivables XIX, LLC; DVI Funding, LLC (collectively, the "DVI Entities"); Lyon Financial Services, Inc. d/b/a U.S. Bank Portfolio Services ("Lyon"); and U.S. Bank, N.A. ("USB") (collectively, "Appellants") appealed a district court decision to affirm a bankruptcy court's final order awarding appellee Maury Rosenberg attorney's fees and costs. The DVI Entities filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against appellee Rosenberg. After the bankruptcy court dismissed the petition, the court awarded attorney's fees and costs to appellee Rosenberg. The bankruptcy court granted Rosenberg's motion and dismissed the involuntary petition with prejudice. The bankruptcy court found, inter alia, that the DVI Entities were not eligible creditors of Rosenberg because his 2005 guaranty did not run to the DVI Entities. The DVI Entities therefore lacked standing as a matter of law to file an involuntary petition against Rosenberg. In his adversary complaint, Rosenberg asserted federal claims to recover attorney's fees, costs, and damages he incurred because of the filing of the involuntary petition, which the bankruptcy court had dismissed. After careful review of the record and the parties' briefs, and following oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's award of the following three categories of attorney's fees and costs: (1) fees to obtain the dismissal, (2) appellate fees, and (3) fees on fees. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's award of the fourth category of fees and costs, those incurred to prosecute Rosenberg's bad-faith claims for damages, as prematurely entered. The case was remanded back to the district court: (1) to deduct from the total award the limited amount of fees and costs that were incurred solely for the legal work done to prosecute Rosenberg's bad-faith claims for damages; and (2) to reconsider that deducted fee and cost amount along with the motion to supplement. View "DVI Receivables XIV, LLC, et al. v. Rosenberg" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of Florida law to the Florida Supreme Court. Two cases before the Eleventh Circuit involved three Stranger-Originated Life Insurance (STOLI policies). Wells Fargo, N.A., the present owner of a STOLI policy on the life of Arlene Berger, appealed a district court's final judgment, entered in favor of Pruco Life Insurance Company, invalidating this policy. Regarding the second appeal, Pruco appealed a different district court's order dismissing its claim seeking the invalidation of two STOLI policies issued on the life of Rosalind Guild. The insurance company contended that, as with most STOLI policies, there was no such interest when these policies were issued, which the company says entitled it to have the policies declared void. Undermining the insurance company's argument, however, was another Florida statute requiring all insurance policies to include a clause providing that the policy is incontestable after it has been "in force" for two years. The policies at issue here contained such a clause, and the insurance company clearly failed to contest the policies within that two-year window. Thus, the question before the Eleventh Circuit was which statute controlled. Federal district courts have disagreed when asked how to interpret Florida law in this regard. View "Pruco Life Insurance Company v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a breach of contract claim against Zenith after Santana Morales, Jr. was crushed to death by a palm tree while working as a landscaper for Lawns. The Florida Supreme Court answered the following certified questions in the affirmative: (1) Does the estate have standing to bring its breach of contract claim against Zenith under the employer liability policy? (2) If so, does the provision in the employer liability policy which excludes from coverage "any obligation imposed by workers' compensation... law" operate to exclude coverage of the estate's claim against Zenith for the tort judgment? and (3) If the estate's claim is not barred by the workers' compensation exclusion, does the release in the workers' compensation settlement agreement otherwise prohibit the estate's collection of the tort judgment? The court concluded that, given the Florida Supreme Court's resolution of the certified issues, the district court correctly determined that the workers' compensation exclusion in Part II of the policy barred Zenith's coverage of the tort judgment against Lawns. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Zenith. View "Morales v. Zenith Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a law student, filed a breach of contract suit against a lawyer who extended a "million-dollar challenge" on national television while representing a client accused of murder. The lawyer denied payment, claiming that he did not make a serious offer. The court concluded that the district court properly applied Florida law to plaintiff's claim. The court did not find that the lawyer's statements were such that a reasonable, objective person would have understood them to be an invitation to contract, regardless of whether the court looks to the unedited interview or the edited television broadcast seen by plaintiff. Neither the content of the lawyer's statements, nor the circumstances in which he made them, nor the conduct of the parties reflects the assent necessary to establish an actionable offer. The court found no genuine issue as to whether the parties' conduct implied a contractual understanding where the lawyer's spoken words, the circumstances in which those words were said, and the parties' conduct are all undisputed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Kolodziej v. Mason" on Justia Law

Zaki filed suit against ANI for breach of contract and conversion, among other things, after ANI sold Zaki's aircraft parts without properly accounting for the sales proceeds, charging Zaki for inflated storage expenses, and failing to return the parts after Zaki terminated the consignment agreement. Zaki also requested an accounting. The court held that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to grant Zaki an accounting; the district court failed to recognize the fiduciary nature of the relationship between the parties alone constituted sufficient grounds for an accounting under Florida law and erroneously concluded that an action for damages afforded an adequate alternative; and, therefore, the court reversed and remanded. View "Zaki Kulaibee Establishment v. McFliker, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose from contracts to purchase real estate. On appeal, Inlet Beach and others challenged the district court's order entering final judgment in favor of the FDIC-R. The court concluded that Inlet Beach's contract claims are barred by the Inlet Beach Contract's remedies limitation provision. Despite Inlet Beach's argument to the contrary, the remedies limitation provision does not lack mutuality and is therefore enforceable. The court affirmed the judgment as to that issue and also affirmed the district court's dismissal of the other claims. View "Inlet Beach Capital Investments LLC v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation" on Justia Law

Valensa filed suit against Cyanotech for tortious interference with contract and breach of a confidentiality agreement. Cyanotech then moved to compel arbitration based on two contracts between the parties. The district court denied the motion. The court reversed and remanded where the district court erred when it refused to allow an arbitrator to decide whether their dispute is arbitrable under one of the parties' contracts because the parties clearly and unmistakably incorporated the rules of the American Arbitration Association into their arbitration provisions. View "U.S. Nutraceuticals, LLC v. Cyanotech Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Chase, alleging violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2605(e); conversion; breach of contract; wrongful attempted foreclosure; and trespass. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Chase on all of plaintiff's claims. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on the breach of contract claims where, although the court recognized that HUD regulations are enforceable terms of the contract, plaintiff failed to put forward any evidence of damages caused by the purported breach of these contract terms or seek any cognizable relief; plaintiff's trespass claim failed because plaintiff was admittedly in default and any visits by Chase's agents to the property at issue were permitted; plaintiff's wrongful attempted foreclosure claim failed where Chase believed it was entitled to foreclose on the property at the time and plaintiff attributed the problems with Chase only to its inability to fully keep track of her payments and communicate her payment status to her; and plaintiff's RESPA claim failed where Chase's response to plaintiff's requests was adequate and there were no damages as a matter of law from an inadequate response. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Chase on all claims. View "Bates v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a class of firefighters whose pension contribution rate was raised from 6% to 8.5%, filed suit alleging that the City's actions impaired the terms of their employment contracts in violation of the United States Constitution and the Alabama Constitution. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to demonstrate that any contractual right had been impaired. The court concluded that plaintiffs have no basis upon which to challenge a violation of the Contract Clause where, without passing any law, the City, at bottom, was doing nothing different from what a private party does. The City was free to amend the employee contribution rate without constitutional consequence. Even assuming the existence of a contractual provision not to raise the employee contribution rate, plaintiffs still cannot succeed on their Contract Clause challenge because, at most, the City has breached a contract, not impaired one. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Taylor, et al. v. City of Gadsden, et al." on Justia Law