Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued the Union for damages caused by a work stoppage conducted by the Union in alleged violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The district court entered summary judgment without reaching the merits holding that the dispute was subject to arbitration under the contract. Plaintiff appealed. The court held that, in this case, the employee oriented grievance machinery in the parties' contract qualified and limited the universe of claims and grievances subject to arbitration, and the language negated the intention that the employer's claim for damages must be submitted to arbitration. Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

This case stemmed from a controversy between the insured and their insurer over whether the insurer breached its obligations under a commercial general liability insurance policy that the insureds had with the insurer at the time of the accident. The coverage dispute arose out of a personal injury lawsuit filed against the insured by an injured homeowner. Because the case involved unanswered questions of Florida law that were central to the appeal and because these questions were determinative of the cause in this case and there were no controlling precedents from the Supreme Court of Florida, the court certified these questions for resolution.

BKR appealed the entry of summary judgment against it in its action for breach of contract against Four Winds, tortious interference with a contractual relationship against Phaunos, deceptive and unfair trade practices and civil conspiracy against FourWinds and Phaunos, and unjust enrichment against Phaunos. The district court held that BKR could not prevail on its contract claim and that all the other claims failed as a result. The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to FourWinds on BKR's contract claim because whether FourWinds pursued an investment opportunity that BKR introduced was a question of fact for a jury. The court also held that the district court's grant of summary judgment to FourWinds on BKR's non-contract theories of relief depended on the district court's erroneous view that BKR's contract claim was precluded as a matter of law. Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment to FourWinds was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

This appeal was the consolidation of four appeals brought by objectors to a class action settlement. The underlying case involved allegations that AHS engaged in a pattern of wrongfully denying claims under its home warranty contracts. Two class action lawsuits resulted from these allegations: the first was brought in California state court (Edleson Action) and this case, originally filed in the Northern District of Alabama. After the California court rejected a proposed settlement in the Edleson Action, the parties in this case reached a settlement agreement, which the district court approved. Four sets of objectors appealed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the reference to the Edleson agreement and the other information at issue provided reasonable notice under the circumstances. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it reviewed the validity of the settlement action and rejected objectors' claims to the contrary. The court finally held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

This case involved a dispute over the proper interpretation under Georgia law of a real property insurance contract between plaintiff and defendant. The insurance policy provided coverage for "direct physical loss of or damage to" a building plaintiff owned in the Buckhead area of Atlanta. At issue was whether the Georgia courts would hold that the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Mabry rule extended to standard insurance contracts for buildings. Because this was an important unsettled question of state law, and there was no controlling precedent from the Georgia state courts, the court certified the question to the Supreme Court of Georgia.

This case stemmed from plaintiff's allegations that, while she was employed with defendant on one of its cruise ships, she was drugged by other employees, raped, and physically injured while she was unconscious, and when she reported to officials of the cruise line what had happened to her, they treated her with indifference and even hostility, failed to provide her with proper medical treatment on board, and interfered with her attempts to obtain medical treatment and counseling ashore. Plaintiff subsequently asserted five claims against defendant involving violations of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, or the general maritime law applicable to the Seaman's Wage Act, 46 U.S.C. 10313. Plaintiff's remaining five claims involved common law tort claims. At issue was whether plaintiff's claims fell within the scope of the arbitration clause in the crew agreement. The court held that the district court did not err in holding that Counts VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X of plaintiff's complaint did not fall within the scope of the arbitration provision where all five of these claims involved factual allegations about how the cruise line and its officials treated plaintiff after learning that she had been raped, including allegations that she was kept on the ship against her will, that she was prevented from getting medical attention off the ship, that her rape kit was destroyed in the incinerator, and that her confidentiality as a rape victim was intentionally violated. The court held, however, that the remaining five counts arose directly from her undisputed status as a "seaman" employed by defendant and fell within the scope of the arbitration provision. Therefore, the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to compel arbitration for Counts I, II, III, IV, and V.

DynaVision (X) sued Brenda Smith, Robert Thomas, and Bryan Ownbey, (Y) alleging that they breached a fiduciary duty to tell X that Shelby Peeples (Z) had financed the purchase of its interest and moreover, that Y's failure to disclose Z's involvement fraudulently induced X to sell its interest to Y. X also brought suit against Z, the case before the court, alleging that Z violated federal securities law, state securities law, and state common law by denying involvement in the transaction and causing X to sell its interest to Y. X lost both cases on summary judgment because Y's alleged misrepresentation about Z's involvement in the buy-out did not cause X to sell its interest. Rather, X sold because it was in X's economic self-interest to do so. X needed Y's skills; had X purchased Y's interest, it would have had no one to run the carpet factory or to market its product. X therefore had no economically viable option but to sell. After assessing the merits of X's claims, the court affirmed the judgment granting summary judgment.

This consolidated appeal arose from a contract dispute between Douglas Asphalt Company (Douglas) and the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT) where GDOT had awarded Douglas two paving contracts to mill and resurface certain stretches of interstate highway. GDOT subsequently retained QORE, Inc., an engineering and materials testing company, to remove asphalt samples from the first project site and conduct tests to determine the samples' lime content. QORE retained, at GDOT's direction, Applied Technical Services, Inc. (ATS), to perform a test that GDOT developed, called an atomic absorption test. QORE and ATS sent the data that those tests produced to GDOT for its analysis and consideration and GDOT concluded from those data that the asphalt that Douglas had laid did not contain enough hydrated lime; GDOT then relied, in part, on those test results to justify its decision to place Douglas in default on both highway contracts. Douglas responded by filing this action against QORE, ATS, and several individual GDOT officials. On appeal, Douglas contended that the district court erred by dismissing its Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, claims and by granting summary judgment for QORE on its claims for defamation and negligence. ATS maintained that the district court erroneously failed to grant its motions for judgment as a matter of law on both the defamation and negligence claims. The court held that the district court did not err in dismissing Douglas's RICO claim and that QORE and ATS were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both the defamation and negligence claims. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated the judgment against ATS, and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of ATS.

Trailer Bridge appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Illinois National on Trailer Bridge's complaint, alleging that Illinois National failed to defend Trailer Bridge in an underlying antitrust action and thereby breached its commercial general liability insurance policy issued to Trailer Bridge for the year July 2004 to July 2005. The central issue on appeal was whether the CEO's statement triggered the duty to defend under the "personal and advertising injury" provision in the policy. After review and oral argument, the court held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Illinois National for the reasons set forth in the district court's order, which the court adopted as its own. In particular, the court agreed with the district court's rejection of Trailer Bridge's argument that the CEO's statement deployed the advertising idea of "another." The court rejected Trailer Bridge's contention that the use of a co-defendant's idea could qualify as an "offense" under the policy. The underlying plaintiffs sought only antitrust damages; they did not seek to impose any legal obligations upon the insured to pay them damages "because of . . . advertising injury." No facts were alleged in the underlying complaint on the basis of which the underlying plaintiffs might have recovered damages "because of . . advertising injury"; and the underlying plaintiffs could not have recovered such damages because the allegedly misappropriated "advertising idea" was not that of the underlying plaintiffs, but rather was alleged to have been the advertising idea of other parties altogether.

Several purchasers of condominium units sued developer Harborage Cottages-Stuart, LLLP (Harborage), alleging that Harborage violated the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (ILSFDA), 15 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., and several Florida statutes. Central to this appeal was whether Harborage violated section 1703(a)(1)(B) by failing to provide the purchasers with a property report prior to their signing the purchase agreements. The court held that Harborage failed to prove that it was entitled to an exemption from the ILFSDA and its admitted failure to provide the report violated the ILFSDA. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their claim under section 1703(a)(1)(B) and (C). The court also affirmed the district court's award of damages and attorney's fees under section 1709; affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Gentry-Hunt on the claim that Harborage violated Fla. Stat. 718.506 and vacated the judgment in favor of the Stones on the section 718.506 claim; and vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on the claim that Harborage violated the anti-fraud provision of the ILSFDA and the claim asserted under Fla. Stat. 501.204(1).