Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In an insurance coverage dispute, the court was required to determine, under Florida law, what constituted "property damage" under a post-1986 standard form commercial general liability (CGL) policy with products-completed operations hazard (PCOH) coverage. Specifically, whether such a policy issued to a general contractor for damage to the part of the completed project performed by a subcontractor, but not to any other project component, caused by a subcontractor's defective work. In light of Florida precedent addressing the scope of similar CGL policies, the court concluded that the policy provided no coverage in this case. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the damage at issue was not covered under the policy. View "Amerisure Mutual Ins. Co., et al. v. Amelia Island Co." on Justia Law

Regions appealed the denial of their renewed motion to compel plaintiffs to arbitrate their complaint against Regions. Plaintiffs sued regions for allegedly violating federal and state law by collecting overdraft charges under its deposit agreement, and Regions moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in that agreement. The district court denied the motion to compel on the ground that the arbitration clause was substantively unconscionable because it contained a class action waiver, but the court vacated that ruling and remanded for further consideration in light of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. On remand, Regions renewed its motion to compel, which the district court denied on the ground that the arbitration clause was substantively unconscionable under Georgia law because a provision granting Regions the unilateral right to recover its expenses for arbitration allocated disproportionately to plaintiffs the risks of error and loss inherent in dispute resolution. Because the reimbursement provision was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable under Georgia law, the court reversed the order denying the renewed motion to compel Regions and remanded with instructions to compel arbitration. View "Hough, et al. v. Regions Financial Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are personal investment holding corporations owned by two related Panamanian shareholders. Defendants, of who there are two distinct groups, are (1) a related group of banking corporations operating under the umbrella of Banco Santander, which provide banking, investment, and other financial management services; and (2) certain individual officers/employees of Santander. This dispute arose from plaintiff's investment of an undisclosed sum of money with defendants. At issue was whether a district court, having found a valid contract containing an arbitration clause existed, was also required to consider a further challenge to that contract's place within a broader, unexecuted agreement. Having considered those circumstances in light of Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters and other relevant precedent, the court found that the district court properly construed the law regarding arbitrability in dismissing plaintiff's suit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Solymar Investments, Ltd., et al. v. Banco Santander S.A., et al." on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between plaintiff and other class members (insureds) and Pioneer, which was succeeded in this action by Washington National. The controversy was over the proper interpretation of certain similar insurance contracts under Florida law. Washington National appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the insureds. The court agreed with the district court and held that the policies in question were ambiguous, but concluded that Florida law was unsettled on the proper way to resolve the ambiguity. To establish the proper approach to take under Florida law in interpreting ambiguity, the court certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida: In this case, does the Policy's "Automatic Benefit Increase Percentage" apply to the dollar values of the "Lifetime Maximum Benefit Amount" and the "Per Occurrence Maximum Benefit"? View "Ruderman, et al. v. Washington Nat'l Ins." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the President of Valdosta State University, claiming that under the Due Process Clause, he was due notice of the charges, and a hearing to answer them, prior to his removal from campus. Plaintiff, a student, was removed on the ground that he presented a "clear and present danger" to the campus. Plaintiff joined the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia as a defendant, claiming against the Board a state-law breach of contract claim for damages. Plaintiff claimed that the student handbook and contracts for student housing established binding agreements between the Board and the university students and the Board breached these agreements by failing to afford plaintiff the due process prior to his removal from campus. The court held that the district court properly denied the President's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity where plaintiff had a constitutional right to process before he was removed from the university and plaintiff's constitutional rights were clearly established. The court held, however, that the district court erred in failing to dismiss plaintiff's breach of contract claim against the Board as barred by the Eleventh Amendment where Georgia had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity for breach of contract actions. View "Barnes v. Zaccari, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the Union for damages caused by a work stoppage conducted by the Union in alleged violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The district court entered summary judgment without reaching the merits holding that the dispute was subject to arbitration under the contract. Plaintiff appealed. The court held that, in this case, the employee oriented grievance machinery in the parties' contract qualified and limited the universe of claims and grievances subject to arbitration, and the language negated the intention that the employer's claim for damages must be submitted to arbitration. Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

This case stemmed from a controversy between the insured and their insurer over whether the insurer breached its obligations under a commercial general liability insurance policy that the insureds had with the insurer at the time of the accident. The coverage dispute arose out of a personal injury lawsuit filed against the insured by an injured homeowner. Because the case involved unanswered questions of Florida law that were central to the appeal and because these questions were determinative of the cause in this case and there were no controlling precedents from the Supreme Court of Florida, the court certified these questions for resolution.

BKR appealed the entry of summary judgment against it in its action for breach of contract against Four Winds, tortious interference with a contractual relationship against Phaunos, deceptive and unfair trade practices and civil conspiracy against FourWinds and Phaunos, and unjust enrichment against Phaunos. The district court held that BKR could not prevail on its contract claim and that all the other claims failed as a result. The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to FourWinds on BKR's contract claim because whether FourWinds pursued an investment opportunity that BKR introduced was a question of fact for a jury. The court also held that the district court's grant of summary judgment to FourWinds on BKR's non-contract theories of relief depended on the district court's erroneous view that BKR's contract claim was precluded as a matter of law. Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment to FourWinds was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

This appeal was the consolidation of four appeals brought by objectors to a class action settlement. The underlying case involved allegations that AHS engaged in a pattern of wrongfully denying claims under its home warranty contracts. Two class action lawsuits resulted from these allegations: the first was brought in California state court (Edleson Action) and this case, originally filed in the Northern District of Alabama. After the California court rejected a proposed settlement in the Edleson Action, the parties in this case reached a settlement agreement, which the district court approved. Four sets of objectors appealed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the reference to the Edleson agreement and the other information at issue provided reasonable notice under the circumstances. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it reviewed the validity of the settlement action and rejected objectors' claims to the contrary. The court finally held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

This case involved a dispute over the proper interpretation under Georgia law of a real property insurance contract between plaintiff and defendant. The insurance policy provided coverage for "direct physical loss of or damage to" a building plaintiff owned in the Buckhead area of Atlanta. At issue was whether the Georgia courts would hold that the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Mabry rule extended to standard insurance contracts for buildings. Because this was an important unsettled question of state law, and there was no controlling precedent from the Georgia state courts, the court certified the question to the Supreme Court of Georgia.