Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case arose out of a dispute over the construction of a yacht where the parties subsequently entered into binding arbitration pursuant to their own written agreement. At issue was whether the arbitrators "exceeded their powers" - thereby justifying vacatur of their award under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(4) - when they purportedly failed to provide a "reasoned award" as agreed to by the parties. The court concluded that three validly-appointed arbitrators oversaw a five day hearing and rendered a thoughtful, reasoned award. The court declined to narrowly interpret what constituted a reasonable award to overturn an otherwise apparently seamless procedure. The parties received precisely what they bargained for and to vacate the award and remand for an entirely new proceeding would insufficiently respect the value of the arbitration and inject the courts further into the arbitration process than Congress had mandated. Accordingly, the court held that the award should be confirmed and the judgment of the district court was reversed and remanded for reinstatement the award.

Plaintiff's suit concerning purchase of an aircraft claimed specific performance; and, in the alternative, breach of contract; breach of the covenants of good faith and fair dealing; and breach of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), Fla. Stat. 501.2105. The district court rejected the claims; proceeded under the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, as requested by plaintiff; ruled in favor of defendant, but refused to award attorney fees under FDUPTA. After concluding that FDUTPA and its fee award provision are applicable as substantive law of the forum state, the Eleventh Circuit certified questions to the Florida Supreme Court: Whether an offer of judgment may be viable when it purports to settle "all claims," even though it does not explicitly state whether the proposal includes attorneys' fees and whether fees are part of the legal claim; Whether the fee provision applies to a lawsuit seeking damages or, in the alternative, specific performance; Whether the fee-shifting provision applies to an action with the case's unique procedural history; and Whether the provision applies only to fees incurred during the seven months before the FDUTPA claim was defeated at summary judgment, or also to fees incurred during subsequent litigation.

Kurt R. Ward, Attorney at Law, LLC, appealed the district court's order denying its motion for judgment on the pleadings and granting the Plan Parties' (the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, the Retirement Board of the Plan, and the Bank of New York Mellon Corporation) cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings. Both parties' motions sought a declaration about whether the Plan Parties had to pay the disability benefits of two of the Ward Firm's retired NFL player clients into the firm's client trust account pursuant to state court jurisdiction for unpaid attorney's fees despite a provision in the Plan prohibiting any "benefit under the Plan" from being assigned or reached by creditors through legal process. The court held that its prior panel precedent held that bargained-for provisions barring assignments in ERISA welfare benefits were valid and enforceable and that the Ward Firm had not directed the court's attention to any such intervening en banc or Supreme Court decision. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and held that the district court did not err in declaring that the spendthrift provision in the Plan prevented the Plan Parties from depositing the disability benefits owned by two retired NFL players into the Ward Firm's trust account.

The union contracts state that a cost-of-living allowance will be applied to offset health insurance costs for hourly-rated employees and not be applied to hourly wage rates. The contracts state that the COLA will be equal to 1¢ per hour for each full 0.3 of a point change in the Consumer Price Index calculation. An employer was calculating the COLA on a weekly basis and maintained that the adjustment was only $0.08 per week; the union argued that the adjustment should be calculated at $3.20 per week ($0.08 x 40 hours per week). In November 2008, an arbitrator rejected management's argument that the contracts included a scrivener's error and that the COLA should be calculated on a weekly, rather than hourly basis.The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the unions. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, preempts employers' state law fraud counterclaims. An attempt to assert a federal common law "fraudulent procurement" defense was barred by the three-month limitations period for challenging the arbitrator's award.

This case involved a residential construction scheme, which required the investor, the mortgage broker, the builder, and the bank providing the builder with the funds to construct the house to enter into certain independent contractual arrangements. Petitioners, investors whose builders went under and left them with unfinished houses or vacant lots, sought a writ of mandamus asking the court to order the district court to require respondent, the bank's executive vice-president for mortgage lending, to make a restitution in an amount equivalent to one point of their construction loans. The court held that the cause of petitioners' loss was not respondent, but the fact that the builders became insolvent and were unable or unwilling to complete their work. Therefore, the writ of mandamus was denied where petitioners assumed the risk that the builder might walk off the job; that if it did, the bank would declare the construction loan in default; and that, as the bank's borrower, they would be liable for the draws the builders had received plus interest.

Hollywood Mobile Estates Limited ("Hollywood") filed a complaint in district court against the Seminole Tribe of Florida ("Tribe") where the Tribe and the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") approved a lease assignment between Hollywood and the Tribe. At issue was whether Hollywood alleged an injury fairly traceable to the Secretary or redressable by the district court in a complaint that alleged that the Tribe had threatened to repossess tribal property in violation of the lease. Also at issue was whether the interests of Hollywood were within the zone of interests protected by the Indian Long-Term Leasing Act, 25 U.S.C. 415, and its accompanying regulations. The court held that Hollywood lacked constitutional standing to maintain its complaint and therefore, vacated in part the judgment entered by the district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court also held that Hollywood lacked prudential standing to sue the Secretary and therefore, affirmed the denial of the motion for leave to amend the complaint as futile.