Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Joff Stenn Wroy Philossaint pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering. These charges stemmed from his involvement in a scheme to fraudulently obtain Paycheck Protection Plan (PPP) and Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) loans. He was sentenced to 50 months in prison, followed by supervised release, and ordered to pay $3.85 million in restitution. Additionally, a forfeiture judgment of $673,210 was entered against him. On appeal, Philossaint contested the forfeiture amount, arguing it was miscalculated.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially handled the case. Philossaint pled guilty to the wire fraud and money laundering conspiracy charges, and the court accepted a factual proffer detailing his role in the fraudulent loan scheme. The presentence investigation report (PSI) provided additional details, including the specific companies involved and the amounts of the fraudulent loans. The government moved for a preliminary order of forfeiture, but miscalculated the amount by assuming Philossaint received a 10% kickback on every loan funded, which was incorrect.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had committed a clear error in determining the forfeiture amount due to the government's miscalculation. The correct amount of forfeiture should have been $549,226.30, based on the accurate figures of the loan proceeds and kickbacks Philossaint received. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the forfeiture order and remanded the case for further proceedings, noting that the district court did not make any factual findings about whether Philossaint was a leader or mastermind of the scheme, which could affect the forfeiture amount under the Honeycutt v. United States hypothetical. View "USA v. Philossaint" on Justia Law

In March 1988, Isaiah Harris, a sheriff in Montgomery County, Alabama, was killed. His wife, Louise, was having an affair and conspired with her lover, Lorenzo McCarter, to have Harris killed for insurance money. McCarter recruited Michael Sockwell and Alex Hood to carry out the murder. Sockwell was later convicted of capital murder for pecuniary gain and sentenced to death.Sockwell appealed his conviction, arguing that the prosecution used peremptory strikes to exclude Black jurors in a discriminatory manner, violating Batson v. Kentucky. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA) affirmed his conviction, finding no clear error in the trial court’s denial of the Batson challenge. The Alabama Supreme Court also affirmed, stating that the prosecutor’s identification of a juror’s race was merely descriptive and not a race-based reason for the strike.Sockwell then filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, which was denied. The district court found the strike of a Black juror, Eric Davis, problematic but concluded that the Alabama Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Batson. The district court granted a certificate of appealability on the Batson issue, and Sockwell appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.The Eleventh Circuit held that the Alabama Supreme Court unreasonably applied federal law by not properly considering all relevant circumstances under Batson’s third step. The court found that the prosecutor’s history of Batson violations, statistical evidence of disproportionate strikes against Black jurors, and the comparison of Davis to similarly situated white jurors indicated purposeful discrimination. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and directed it to issue a writ of habeas corpus, allowing Alabama the right to retry Sockwell. View "Sockwell v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Shadon Edwards was suspected of being a high-level organizer in a drug-trafficking organization in South Florida. After obtaining an arrest warrant, law enforcement officials observed Edwards driving, followed him, and arrested him. A search incident to his arrest revealed a loaded Glock 43 nine-millimeter semi-automatic pistol. Edwards was indicted for knowingly possessing a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He filed a motion to suppress the gun and ammunition, which the district court denied. Edwards then pleaded guilty without expressly preserving or waiving his right to appeal.The district court for the Southern District of Florida accepted Edwards's guilty plea and sentenced him to 180 months in prison, applying an enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on three prior convictions. Edwards did not object to the ACCA enhancement at sentencing. He later sought to appeal the denial of his suppression motion and the ACCA enhancement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. Edwards argued that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he was not informed that he would waive his right to appeal the suppression motion. The court found no plain error, noting that there was no indication during the plea hearing that Edwards misunderstood the consequences of his plea. Edwards also contended that the ACCA enhancement was improper because the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his prior offenses occurred on different occasions, as required by Erlinger v. United States. The court held that Edwards failed to show a reasonable probability that a jury would have found the offenses occurred on the same occasion, thus not meeting the plain-error standard.Lastly, Edwards challenged the constitutionality of § 922(g) under the Commerce Clause. The court reaffirmed its precedent that § 922(g) is constitutional both facially and as applied, given the firearm and ammunition had moved in interstate commerce. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

Matthew A. Zayas was indicted on three counts of money laundering and one count of causing or attempting to cause a domestic financial institution to fail to file a currency transaction report under 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(1). After a jury trial, Zayas was acquitted of the money laundering counts but convicted of violating 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(1). The case involved Zayas making three cash withdrawals from his Wells Fargo account, each below the $10,000 reporting threshold, within a short period, which the government argued was an attempt to evade the bank's reporting requirements.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Zayas's motions for a mistrial and judgment of acquittal. Zayas argued that the government constructively amended the indictment by presenting evidence and arguments related to structuring under § 5324(a)(3) instead of the charged § 5324(a)(1). The district court also provided jury instructions that included a definition of "structuring," which Zayas contended was inappropriate for the charge under § 5324(a)(1).The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court held that the government's evidence was consistent with a violation of § 5324(a)(1), as it demonstrated that Zayas made multiple withdrawals exceeding $10,000 in one business day, triggering the bank's duty to file a currency transaction report. The court found that the district court's jury instructions, while including a definition of "structuring," correctly conveyed the elements of § 5324(a)(1). The court also determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in responding to a jury question during deliberations by referring the jury back to the original instructions, which accurately stated the law. View "USA v. Zayas" on Justia Law

Javarese Holmes was identified as a suspect in an arson and drug dealing case. Police stopped him while driving and found a gun and drugs in his car. They obtained a warrant to search a residence they believed was his, finding another gun, ammunition, and drug paraphernalia. Holmes was charged and convicted of possessing controlled substances with intent to distribute, illegally possessing firearms as a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug crimes.In the district court, Holmes moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his car and the residence, arguing the searches were unlawful. The court denied the motions, ruling the car search was a permissible inventory search and the residence search warrant was valid. At trial, the court admitted text messages from Holmes’s phone under Rule 404(b) and allowed a drug enforcement agent to testify as an expert on firearm usage among street-level dealers. Holmes was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to 240 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the inventory search of Holmes’s car was valid despite not being completed, as the initial search was reasonable and within department policy. The court also found the search warrant for the residence was supported by probable cause, linking Holmes to the residence and criminal activity. The text messages were deemed admissible under Rule 404(b) as they were relevant to Holmes’s intent and not unduly prejudicial. The expert testimony was allowed, as the agent was qualified and his testimony was helpful to the jury. Finally, the court found sufficient evidence to support Holmes’s convictions for the firearm offenses. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Holmes" on Justia Law

Law enforcement used a specialized software tool, Torrential Downpour, to download files containing child pornography from a specific IP address associated with the defendant. Torrential Downpour is designed to force a single-source download from a user on the BitTorrent peer-to-peer network, allowing officers to link specific files to a particular IP address. After obtaining these files, police secured a warrant and seized the defendant’s computer and other devices, which contained additional child pornography. The defendant argued that he did not knowingly share files and that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the files downloaded by law enforcement.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida held an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, considering expert testimony about BitTorrent’s functionality. The court found the government’s expert more credible and determined that the defendant had made the files available to the public. The court concluded that the use of Torrential Downpour did not access any information not already publicly shared and denied the motion to suppress. The court also denied a motion in limine to prevent the government from showing child pornography images to the jury, finding that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, especially since the defendant did not object to specific images.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the use of Torrential Downpour to download files from a peer-to-peer network did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment because the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in files he made publicly available. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the government to show a representative sample of images to the jury without first reviewing specific images, given the lack of specific objections. View "USA v. Ewing" on Justia Law

The defendants in this case challenged the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, which criminalizes unlawfully reentering the United States after a prior removal. They argued that the statute violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by discriminating against Mexican and other Latin American immigrants. Their theory was that the statute’s predecessor, the Undesirable Aliens Act of 1929, was enacted with discriminatory intent, and that § 1326, first codified in 1952 and amended several times thereafter, perpetuates that taint.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss their indictments. The court assumed without deciding that the Arlington Heights framework applied but concluded that the defendants had failed to establish a discriminatory purpose behind § 1326’s enactment. The court also concluded that the statute easily satisfied rational-basis review. The defendants then entered conditional guilty pleas or proceeded to a stipulated bench trial, reserving their rights to appeal the constitutional issue. The District Court sentenced the defendants to varying terms of imprisonment and supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the District Court’s decision. The court found no clear error in the District Court’s conclusion that the defendants had not shown that § 1326 was enacted or maintained for a discriminatory purpose. The court noted that the defendants’ evidence, including historical context, statements by public officials, and statistical disparities, was insufficient to establish that the 1952 Congress acted with discriminatory intent. The court also emphasized that laws do not carry forward “taint” through reenactment unless the later legislature acted with the same constitutionally impermissible purpose. The judgments of the District Court were affirmed. View "USA v. Ferretiz-Hernandez" on Justia Law

DeShawn Gervin was on probation in Georgia with the sole condition that he not return to the South Georgia Judicial Circuit. He moved to North Carolina but was later imprisoned there for various crimes. A Georgia probation officer, Pamela Florence, learned of his North Carolina offenses and sought a warrant for his arrest in Georgia, falsely claiming he had violated probation by failing to report. Gervin was arrested in North Carolina and extradited to Georgia, where he spent 104 days in jail before a court found he had not violated his probation and ordered his release.Gervin sued Florence and another probation officer, Tandria Milton, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia granted summary judgment for the defendants on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims but denied it on the Fourth Amendment claim, characterizing it as a malicious-prosecution claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. The court held that Gervin presented enough evidence to support his Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim. The court found that Florence and Milton recklessly made false statements and omissions that led to Gervin's arrest and prolonged detention, violating his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court also concluded that the probation officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because the constitutional violations were clearly established at the time of their actions. View "Gervin v. Florence" on Justia Law

John Doe, using multiple aliases, had a long history with U.S. immigration authorities dating back to 1985. He was twice caught trying to enter the U.S. with fraudulent documents and was deported. In 1988, he was found in Texas and deported again. In 2018, he was detained in Florida, and despite a final deportation order, he refused to cooperate with immigration officials, leading to his indictment on three counts of willfully failing to leave the U.S. under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1).The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied Doe's request for a jury instruction that would require the government to prove he had been lawfully admitted to the U.S. to convict him under § 1253(a)(1). The court also denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the same grounds. Doe was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 51 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that § 1253(a)(1) does not require a noncitizen to have been lawfully admitted to the U.S. to be subject to its penalties. The court found that the statutory text and context did not support Doe's interpretation that only admitted noncitizens could be penalized under § 1253(a)(1). The court affirmed the district court's decisions, upholding Doe's convictions and sentence. View "USA v. Doe" on Justia Law

Sonny Ramdeo, while working as a payroll director for Promise Healthcare, recommended the company hire PayServ Tax, which he falsely claimed was a subsidiary of Ceridian Corporation. In reality, PayServ was Ramdeo’s own company, and he diverted over $20 million from Promise to fund a charter airline service. After Promise’s auditors discovered discrepancies, Ramdeo was arrested and pled guilty to wire fraud and money laundering. He was sentenced to twenty years in prison, followed by three years of supervised release, and ordered to pay $21,442,173 in restitution.Ramdeo challenged his conviction and restitution amount on direct appeal, which was unsuccessful. He then sought a writ of audita querela to contest the restitution amount, which the district court recharacterized as a petition for coram nobis and subsequently denied. The Eleventh Circuit declined to address the merits of his claim. Ramdeo also filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition, which the district court denied as frivolous and meritless. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed this decision. Ramdeo later filed a pro se petition for a writ of error coram nobis, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and new financial evidence. The district court denied the petition, stating that prisoners in federal custody are ineligible for coram nobis relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and determined that being in custody does not categorically bar a petitioner from seeking coram nobis relief for non-custodial aspects of their sentence, such as restitution. The court vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings, emphasizing that coram nobis is an extraordinary remedy available when no other remedy is available, and the petitioner presents sound reasons for not seeking relief earlier. View "Ramdeo v. United States" on Justia Law