Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Police arrested the defendant after stopping a car in which he was a passenger and finding a loaded handgun, drugs, and cash. Subsequent searches yielded further incriminating evidence, including text messages, videos, and images related to drug trafficking on his cellphone, as well as additional firearms, ammunition, and drugs at his apartment. Officers also discovered a large quantity of marijuana in his girlfriend’s car. The government charged him with five counts: two related to drug distribution, two for illegal firearm possession, and one for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama conducted a jury trial. The government introduced all seized evidence, including digital content and rap music videos. The prosecutor, during closing argument, referred jurors to an exhibit containing Instagram messages that had not been admitted into evidence. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, with a 45-year sentence imposed, including a 30-year mandatory minimum for the firearm-in-furtherance count. The defendant appealed, raising issues of insufficient evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, the improper admission of rap videos, improper comment on his invocation of Miranda rights, and cumulative error.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the prosecutor’s reference to the unadmitted exhibit during closing argument constituted plain error that affected the defendant’s substantial rights. The court vacated the conviction and sentence on the count for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime (Count 3) and remanded for a new trial on that count. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment on all other counts, finding no reversible error regarding sufficiency of the evidence, admission of the rap videos, the Miranda issue, or cumulative error. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was charged with multiple crimes related to the production, possession, and distribution of child pornography involving her fourteen-year-old sister. Law enforcement initially investigated the defendant’s husband, but their attention turned to the defendant after she admitted to possibly sending inappropriate photos of her sister to her husband. Subsequent forensic analysis uncovered additional incriminating evidence. Both the sister and husband testified regarding the abuse. The defendant’s primary defense was that she acted under duress due to severe abuse by her husband.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, the defendant sought to introduce statements she made to a psychologist, Dr. Reynolds, as part of her duress defense. Dr. Reynolds, who had not practiced clinical work in a decade and was retained specifically to evaluate the defendant in anticipation of litigation, diagnosed her with a dissociative disorder. The government moved to exclude as hearsay those statements made by the defendant to Dr. Reynolds concerning her husband's alleged abuse, arguing that they did not meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4). The district court agreed, finding the statements were not made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, but rather to prepare for trial. The court alternatively excluded the statements under Rule 403 due to prejudicial effect. After this ruling, the defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving her right to appeal the evidentiary ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion and its factual findings for clear error. The Eleventh Circuit held that statements made to a medical expert retained for litigation, not for genuine medical diagnosis or treatment, do not qualify for the hearsay exception under Rule 803(4). The court found no error in the district court’s exclusion of the statements and affirmed the lower court’s decision. View "USA v. Keegan" on Justia Law

Victor Yoel Perez Cremades was indicted for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and possession with intent to distribute, large quantities of methamphetamine and fentanyl. Law enforcement intercepted a FedEx package containing nearly four pounds of methamphetamine and over 1,200 fentanyl-laced pills, addressed to a Tampa residence linked to Cremades. Upon searching the home, agents found additional drugs, cash, receipts for wire transfers to Nogales, Arizona (the package's origin), and a handwritten note referencing the transfer. Most identifying documents and mail within the house belonged to Cremades, and only he and his daughter were known to reside there.Following trial in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, the jury found Cremades guilty on both counts. The district court denied his motion for judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence and sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently. Cremades appealed, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the district court abused its discretion by admitting a “drug ledger” into evidence without proper foundation or relevance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. Applying the de novo standard for sufficiency of evidence and abuse of discretion for evidentiary rulings, the court held that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to convict Cremades on both possession and conspiracy counts. The court further determined that, even if admitting the drug ledger was error, it was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed both convictions and the district court’s rulings. View "USA v. Cremades" on Justia Law

The case concerns a federal prisoner who was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. He pleaded guilty to all counts. In preparing for sentencing, the presentence investigation report classified him as a career offender, which increased his guideline sentencing range. At sentencing, the district court imposed a sentence below the career-offender guideline range—414 months in total, including a mandatory minimum of 384 months for the firearm offenses.After his conviction, the defendant sought to vacate his sentence in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the career-offender classification. The district court found that the presentence report had mistakenly listed his robbery offenses as controlled substance offenses, but determined that, at the time, binding precedent permitted Hobbs Act robbery to be used as a predicate for the career-offender enhancement. The court concluded that counsel was not ineffective for failing to anticipate later precedent, and also found that the defendant had not suffered prejudice because an objection would have been overruled. The district court denied the motion and a certificate of appealability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability limited to the ineffective assistance issue. Reviewing the case, the Eleventh Circuit held that, even if counsel’s performance was deficient, the defendant could not show prejudice. The court found that the sentencing judge had imposed a sentence based on factors independent of the erroneous guideline calculation, and explained his reasoning in detail. Because there was no reasonable probability that the sentence would have been different absent the alleged error, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to vacate. View "Buckner v. USA" on Justia Law

Karen Perez and Jovan Rivera Rodriguez were indicted and convicted for their involvement in a conspiracy to distribute large quantities of fentanyl in the Orlando area. Both played minor roles but were responsible for distributing several kilograms of fentanyl, which subjected them to a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years in prison under federal law. After pleading guilty, both defendants sought sentences below the statutory minimum, citing general sentencing factors and their cooperation with authorities.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida received government motions under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and Sentencing Guidelines § 5K1.1 to reduce the sentences based on substantial assistance provided by Perez and Rivera Rodriguez. The government requested modest reductions limited to the assistance factors, but the district court granted further reductions based on the general sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), ultimately sentencing Perez to 66 months and Rivera Rodriguez to 60 months in prison. The government appealed, arguing the reductions should have been based solely on assistance-related considerations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the legality of the sentences de novo. The court held that departures from statutory minimum sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) must be based exclusively on substantial-assistance factors, not on the general sentencing factors in § 3553(a). The court found that the district court exceeded its authority by considering non-assistance factors in its downward departures. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit vacated both sentences and remanded the cases with instructions to resentence the defendants in accordance with its opinion, limiting any downward departure to substantial assistance only. View "USA v. Perez" on Justia Law

A pharmacist in Florida, serving as the pharmacist-in-charge at a pharmacy called NH Pharma, was indicted for conspiracy to commit health-care fraud and several counts of health-care fraud. The indictment alleged that he defrauded Medicare by billing for drugs different than those he dispensed and for prescriptions never filled. The pharmacy’s owner cooperated with the government after pleading guilty to conspiracy. At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that the pharmacist and the owner prepared compounded medications using unreimbursable ingredients while billing Medicare for more expensive, reimbursable ones, and attempted to cover up the discrepancies during audits. There was also evidence, including video and witness testimony, that the pharmacist had stolen about $200,000 in cash from the pharmacy. Three Medicare beneficiaries testified that they never received or believed they were prescribed the medications billed in their names.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida admitted evidence of the uncharged cash theft, ruling it was intrinsic to the case. The court also excused a potential defense witness, a part-owner and pharmacy technician, from testifying after she invoked her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and declined to recommend immunity for her. After a jury found the pharmacist guilty on all counts, he moved for a new trial based on statements made by the pharmacy owner in her own sentencing memorandum, arguing they constituted newly discovered evidence. The district court denied this motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a new trial because the statements were not new evidence, nor material, nor likely to produce a different result. The appellate court also found no abuse of discretion in admitting the theft evidence, declining to compel witness immunity, and not conducting an in-camera hearing, and rejected constitutional claims raised by the defendant. View "USA v. Beasley" on Justia Law

A police officer responded to a complaint of littering at a McDonald’s parking lot in DeFuniak Springs, Florida, where he encountered John Thomas in a gray Acura matching the reported description. Thomas admitted to littering, exited his vehicle to pick up the trash, and then returned to the driver’s seat. When asked for identification, Thomas produced a Louisiana driver’s license that appeared false, given the age discrepancy. After confirming with the dispatcher that the license information did not match, the officer attempted to arrest Thomas, who resisted, pepper-sprayed the officer, and fled. Thomas abandoned his car nearby and was later apprehended. Police obtained a search warrant for the car, discovering methamphetamine, counterfeit bills, and numerous fraudulent identification documents.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida denied Thomas’s motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his car. Thomas argued the warrant was based on information obtained during an illegal stop, asserting that Florida law does not permit officers to detain someone for a noncriminal violation such as littering. The district court found the initial stop lawful, reasoning that the officer had authority to detain Thomas based on the littering complaint and to request identification. It further held that the subsequent arrest for providing false identification was supported by probable cause, validating the search warrant and denying suppression.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the initial encounter was consensual and did not implicate the Fourth Amendment, and that the officer had probable cause to arrest Thomas for possession of a fraudulent driver’s license under Florida law. Therefore, the evidence obtained from the car search was admissible, and Thomas’s conviction was affirmed. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Donald J. Trump filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against dozens of defendants, including Hillary Clinton, the Democratic National Committee, several law firms, and individuals, alleging that they conspired to spread false claims of his collusion with Russia during the 2016 presidential campaign. Trump asserted multiple claims, including two under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and three under Florida law, such as injurious falsehood and conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution. He alleged that these actions caused him substantial financial harm and loss of business opportunities.After extensive pleadings, the district court dismissed Trump’s amended complaint with prejudice, holding that his federal racketeering claims were untimely and legally insufficient, and that his state law claims either failed to state a claim or were also untimely. The court found the complaint to be a “shotgun pleading” and cited numerous factual inaccuracies and implausible legal theories. The court also dismissed claims against certain defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, but did so with prejudice. Subsequently, the district court imposed sanctions on Trump and his attorneys for filing frivolous claims and pleadings, based both on its inherent authority and Rule 11, and denied Trump’s motions for reconsideration and to disqualify the judge.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed most of the district court’s orders. The appellate court held that Trump’s racketeering claims were untimely and meritless, and that his state law claims failed for both procedural and substantive reasons. However, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over one defendant, Orbis, and therefore vacated the dismissal with prejudice as to Orbis, remanding with instructions to dismiss those claims without prejudice. The sanctions orders and other rulings were affirmed, and requests for appellate sanctions were denied. View "Trump v. Clinton" on Justia Law

A nurse practitioner working in Georgia became involved in a nationwide Medicare fraud scheme between 2018 and 2019. She took part-time telemedicine jobs and reviewed patient charts for durable medical equipment (DME) prescriptions, such as neck and knee braces. The scheme involved submitting thousands of DME orders to Medicare for patients who had not actually been examined or treated as required by law. Federal investigators discovered she was signing orders, attesting to patient assessments and medical necessity, despite never contacting or examining the patients. Several orders were found to be fraudulent, such as prescribing braces to deceased or bedridden patients, or to patients with amputated limbs. She received compensation per chart reviewed, and her records indicated knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the activity.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia presided over her trial, where she was charged with conspiracy, health care fraud, making false statements, aggravated identity theft, and related offenses. The jury found her guilty on sixteen counts but acquitted her of conspiracy to commit health care fraud. At sentencing, the district court applied a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice based on perjury, citing her false testimony and inconsistencies. Her motion for a new trial was denied as untimely; the court rejected her claim of excusable neglect due to her attorney’s actions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed four main issues: sufficiency of evidence, the lack of a deliberate ignorance jury instruction, the sentencing enhancement for perjury, and the denial of her new trial motion. The appellate court found sufficient evidence for all convictions, held that the absence of the deliberate ignorance instruction did not prejudice her substantial rights, affirmed the obstruction of justice enhancement, and found no abuse of discretion in the denial of the new trial motion. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed her convictions and sentence. View "USA v. Beaufils" on Justia Law

Jason Starr, following a contentious divorce from his ex-wife Sara Starr, was required to pay substantial monthly support and other financial obligations. Evidence showed Jason was deeply frustrated by these requirements and expressed anger in personal writings. After Sara moved out, she confided to a friend that she feared Jason would kill her. Prior to the murder, Jason suggested to a friend that his brother Darin could “take care of” marital problems for a fee. Darin, living in Texas, purchased a motorcycle with Jason’s financial assistance and received additional payments from Jason through a third party. Cell-site data and witness testimony placed Darin near Sara’s Alabama residence in the days leading up to her murder. Sara was shot and killed outside her home, and surveillance footage showed a motorcycle leaving the scene shortly after. Darin returned to Texas the same day. Later, while in jail for an unrelated offense, Darin made statements implying Jason owed him a significant favor.A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama indicted Jason and Darin Starr for using interstate commerce facilities in the commission of a murder-for-hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958. At trial, the government presented circumstantial evidence linking both brothers to the crime. The jury convicted both Jason and Darin, and the district court imposed mandatory life sentences.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed claims that the district court erred by excluding alternate perpetrator evidence, admitting certain hearsay and investigative testimony, and that the evidence was insufficient to support conviction. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court properly excluded speculative alternate perpetrator evidence, correctly admitted the challenged statements under evidentiary rules, and found the evidence sufficient for conviction. The court affirmed both convictions and sentences. View "USA v. Starr" on Justia Law