Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner sits on death row in Georgia following his convictions for kidnapping with bodily injury and armed robbery. He appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court and the Eleventh Circuit granted Petitoner’s certificates of appealability on nine combined issues.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded. The court explained that a review of the record compels the conclusion that Petitioner is entitled to relief on Claim II of his First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court explained that after reviewing the entire record, the court has more than a “grave doubt” that the Sabel error had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s death sentence. At trial, the mitigation evidence centered on the argument that Petitioner’s crimes were completely out of character and that a death sentence would have an adverse impact on his family. But the expert-related evidence developed during the habeas proceeding provided different and powerful mitigation arguments. In particular, once Petitioner’s postconviction counsel no longer feared the inequities that the Sabel rule imposed, they were able to procure critical expert evidence about Petitioner’s mental-health deficiencies and present that evidence to the state habeas court. View "Demarcus Sears v. Warden GDCP" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of attempted second-degree murder, and he was sentenced to forty years in prison. Defendant claimed that the jury instructions on attempted voluntary manslaughter were incomplete because they lacked an explanation of “excusable homicide.” At issue is whether Defendant was prejudiced when his appellate counsel failed to make a particular argument. The district court recognized the change in the law and rejected Defendant’s Lucas-based arguments. When Defendant appealed, the Eleventh Circuit granted him a certificate of appealability on this issue. As stated by Defendant, “the determinative fact for this Court to consider is the applicability of Lockhart v. Fretwell” to his claim.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of his Section 2254 petition. The court explained that Fretwell establishes that the result of a defendant’s proceeding is neither unfair nor unreliable in the present when current law does not provide the right that the defendant seeks to vindicate. Further, both the Supreme Court and the court have reaffirmed Fretwell post-AEDPA with no mention of overruling or modification. Accordingly, the court held that the district court correctly applied Fretwell to this case. View "Pablo Guzman v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant, together with three others, conspired to rob a cocaine stash house. They did not know that the conspiracy was part of a reverse sting operation administrated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”). Before Defendant and his co-conspirators could carry out the robbery, ATF apprehended them, confiscating a firearm from Garrison in the process. A jury convicted Defendant of conspiring to use and use a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c), among other crimes. At issue is whether the district court erred in denying Defendant’s Section 2255 motion.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that although Defendant’s Section 924(c) conviction had three possible predicate offenses—one of which is now invalid in light of Davis— he is not entitled to relief. The predicate offenses are so inextricably intertwined that the jury could not have based the Section 924(c) conviction on the invalid predicate without having also based it on the valid drug trafficking predicate offenses. In other words, the Stromberg error that occurred below was harmless, and thus Defendant is not entitled to relief. View "Sean Garrison v. USA" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of healthcare fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering in a trial that took place during the initial days of the coronavirus pandemic. Defendant appealed his conviction, raising a number of constitutional, evidentiary, and procedural challenges. Defendant argued that he was deprived of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because, among other things, his lawyer, fearing coronavirus exposure, refused to visit him in jail throughout the trial. He also posits that the government committed prosecutorial misconduct by improperly questioning one of his witnesses. On top of all that, Defendant contends that the district court abused its discretion and violated his right to present a defense by making erroneous evidentiary rulings. Defendant believes the district court’s cumulative errors denied him a fundamentally fair trial.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there is no evidence on this record that Defendant’s lawyer “actually intended to confer” with his client during the overnight recess, irrespective of the pandemic concerns. For instance, Defendant’s lawyer also told the district court that he did not have time to visit the jail. The court noted that the district court went to great lengths to facilitate communication between Defendant and his lawyer. It allowed them to communicate in writing during the trial and while Defendant was incarcerated at the county jail. And nothing precluded Defendant’s lawyer from attempting to communicate electronically or via telephone with his client. Finally, the court noted that Defendant has not established a single error, let alone the aggregation of many errors. Thus, his cumulative error claim lacks merit. View "USA v. Sebastian Ahmed" on Justia Law

Defendant, a pimp, transported three young women from Connecticut to Miami, Florida, for his prostitution business shortly before Super Bowl LIV. Following a jury trial, Walker was convicted of three sex-trafficking-related crimes: (1) sex trafficking of an adult by coercion (Count 1); (2) sex trafficking of a person (A.H.) who is a minor and alternatively of a person (A.H.) by coercion (Count 2); and (3) transporting a person to engage in sexual activity (Count 3). In a special verdict form as to A.H., the jury found Defendant guilty on Count 2 on both of the alternative liability theories: minor status and coercion. On appeal, Defendant challenged his convictions on Counts 1 and 2 but not on Count 3.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded (1) there was ample evidence to support Defendant’s coercion conviction in Count 1, and (2) as to Count 2, Defendant did not challenge the government’s amended notice of its expert testimony in the district court, plain error review thus applies, and Defendant has not shown any alleged error in the notice prejudiced him on the coercion conviction. The court explained that a reasonable jury could conclude from the evidence that (1) A.H.’s young, runaway background and dependent circumstances made her particularly susceptible to sex trafficking and (2) A.H. feared that stopping the prostitution would result in serious harm in the form of losing Walker’s emotional, psychological, and financial support. View "USA v. Edward Walker" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder by an Alabama jury. The jury recommended death by execution, and the trial judge imposed the death penalty. Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the Northern District of Alabama, alleging—as relevant to this appeal—that trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase of his trial for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence. The district court initially denied habeas relief on all claims, and Petitioner appealed. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded to the district court to determine whether Petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing and to reconsider his failure-to-investigate claims de novo. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted habeas relief. The State of Alabama (State) appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the failure-to-investigate claims, made extensive factual findings based on evidence that had not been presented during Petitioner’s penalty phase, and concluded that Petitioner was entitled to habeas relief. The court concluded that Petitioner has established Strickland prejudice. Thus, Petitioner “has met the burden of showing that the decision reached [at the penalty phase] would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.” View "Marcus Bernard Williams v. State of Alabama" on Justia Law

After perpetrating elaborate bank and credit card fraud, Petitioner “embarked upon a new scheme . . . to ensnarl the proceedings against him” through obstructionist and disruptive behaviors “so that he might avoid trial altogether.” His scheme, however, did not end at trial or even when the jury issued its guilty verdict. Rather, it continued through sentencing. Now, on a motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, Petitioner advances two claims: a substantive competency due process claim, contending that he was not competent at the time of sentencing, and an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. The district court denied his Section 2255 motion.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Petitioner’s substantive due process rights were not violated when the district court denied his motion for a competency hearing. Nor did Petitioner receive constitutionally deficient performance from court-appointed counsel when they failed to request his medical records or request a mental health evaluation. Even if such failures constituted deficient performance, Petitioner has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced as a result. Thus, the district court did not err in denying Perkins’s Section 2255 motion. View "Jean-Daniel Perkins v. USA" on Justia Law

Defendant who pleaded guilty to illegally possessing a firearm in violation of federal law, was sentenced to 60 months in prison based on a Guidelines range of 70–87 months. In calculating Defendant’s range, though, the district court concluded that an earlier Alabama youthful-offender adjudication constituted an “adult” conviction within the meaning of the applicable Guidelines provisions. Defendant contends that the court erred in doing so.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court held that Defendant’s Alabama YO adjudication wasn’t “adult” under either U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1 or Section 4A1.2. His Guidelines range of 70–87 months was thus wrong in two respects. The court explained that the Pinion factors favor Defendant, indicating that his YO adjudication wasn’t “adult.” The sentence-length and time-served factors, the court held, yield to the stronger indications of the classification and nature factors: Because of the defendant’s age, Alabama law doesn’t even treat YO adjudications as convictions, let alone adult convictions. And the law further shields YOs “from the stigma and practical consequences of a conviction for a crime.” Alabama’s YO system differs from the adult system from stem to stern, in both substance and procedure. View "USA v. Deunate Tarez Jews" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty in 2005 to possessing 50 grams or more of cocaine base (i.e., crack cocaine) with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(iii). The district court sentenced him to 240 months in prison and 120 months of supervised release. In 2014, the district court reduced Defendant’s term of imprisonment to 151 months pursuant to the government’s substantial assistance motion. In 2015, the district court reduced Defendant’s term of imprisonment to 76 months under 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(2). In April 2019, Defendant, proceeding pro se, sought to modify his 57-month sentence under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act. He argued that his original narcotics conviction was now classified as a Class B felony instead of a Class A felony, and as a result, his maximum prison term for a violation of supervised release was three years rather than five. The government opposed a reduction under the First Step Act.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court here did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s requested sentence reduction because it provided a brief statement of reasons that was clear and supported by the record (explaining that Defendant’s conduct while he was in prison and while on supervision, which involved drug offenses and numerous incidences of insubordination, demonstrated an unwillingness or an inability to abide by the law). As a result, the district court’s explanation of its refusal to reduce Defendant’s sentence due to his “continued lawless behavior” did not violate Concepcion. View "USA v. Antonio Soul Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Petitioner is an Alabama prisoner serving a death sentence following his jury convictions on four counts of capital murder. After pursuing a direct appeal and post-conviction relief in the Alabama state courts, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. Petitioner appealed the district court’s denial of his federal habeas petition, arguing that the district court did not apply the proper standard for intellectual disability as required by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and erred in finding Petitioner was not intellectually disabled. He also contends that the state court’s determination that his counsel was not ineffective during the pretrial and penalty phases was an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668 (1984).   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s habeas petition. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Petitioner was not intellectually disabled. The court also found that the ACCA’s determination that Petitioner’s counsel was not ineffective was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. The court explained that the trial judge “was well aware of the mitigation evidence presented at trial” yet found that the circumstances of Petitioner’s childhood did not amount to a mitigating factor given his age, marriage, and employment. In light of the trial court’s determination, the court explained it cannot find the ACCA unreasonably applied Strickland by concluding that Petitioner did not provide enough evidence to undermine the ACCA’s confidence in the trial judge’s decision to override the jury’s recommendation of life. View "Thomas Dale Ferguson v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, et al" on Justia Law