Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant challenged the district court's decision to apply the one year delay contemplated by U.S.S.G. 1B1.10(e) to his motion for a sentence reduction. The court held that the district court did not err when it applied section 1B1.10(e) to the motion for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 782 filed by defendant. The court concluded that there was no imposition or lengthening of defendant's sentence; section 1B1.10(e) is binding on the courts; the adoption of section 1B1.10(e) did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq.; and the limitation on retroactive application of Amendment 782 imposed by section 1B1.10(e) does not violate the separation of powers principle. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Maiello, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of three counts of tax evasion and two counts of structuring a currency transaction. The court concluded that defendant is not entitled to relief on his claim that the indictment is defective; the indictment properly charges him with structuring in violation of 31 U.S.C. 5324(a)(3), and although there is a factual error in the indictment, he has not shown that the error affected his substantial rights; and defendant’s claim that the order of forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment also lacks merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Sperrazza" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks an application for leave to file a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a federal sentence. At issue was whether the decision of the Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States established “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.” The court denied the application, holding that Johnson did not establish a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. The new rule announced in Johnson neither prohibits Congress from punishing a criminal who has a prior conviction for attempted burglary nor prohibits Congress from increasing that criminal’s sentence because of his prior conviction. View "In re: Gilberto Rivero" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, appealed his sentence of 288 months in prison as substantively unreasonable. The court subsequently granted defendant's motion to file a supplemental brief on the constitutionality of the Armed Career Criminal Act's (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), residual clause. The court held that where precedent that is binding in this circuit is overturned by an intervening decision of the Supreme Court, the court will permit an appellant to raise in a timely fashion thereafter an issue or theory based on that new decision while his direct appeal is still pending in this court. In this case, the intervening decision is Johnson v. United States, which addresses whether the residual clause of the ACCA is unconstitutionally vague. View "United States v. Durham" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, defendants challenged their convictions resulting from the first of two trials involving the same indictment and the same Medicare fraud conspiracy charges. Defendant Dr. Ward appeals her conviction resulting from the second trial. The court reversed the conviction of Dr. Abreu because no reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Dr. Abreu falsified patient eligibility records as alleged in the indictment. Therefore, the court vacated her sentence entered a judgment of acquittal. The court affirmed the convictions of Defendants Ayala, Morris, and Wilner. View "United States v. Willner, M.D." on Justia Law

Petitioner, sentenced to death for murdering his wife, appealed the district court's denial of his federal habeas petition. The district court held that the petition was untimely, but that petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling in light of his attorney’s egregious misconduct. However, the district court denied relief on the merits. The Attorney General filed a motion to limit briefing to the question of equitable tolling. Petitioner filed a motion to stay the current briefing schedule until the resolution of the AG's motion. The court concluded, sua sponte, that the proper course is to remand this case to the district court to make additional and detailed findings of fact concerning petitioner's claim to equitable tolling, including exactly what may have happened and, most importantly, why counsel did not timely file this section 2254 petition. The court directed the district court to apply these findings of fact to the changing landscape in the law of equitable tolling. Accordingly, the court denied as moot the state's motion to limit briefing before the court to equitable tolling and the petitioner's motion to stay the current briefing schedule. View "Thomas v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted of terrorism-related charges for his involvement in the transfer of money to members of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, a foreign terrorist organization. The jury convicted defendant of conspiring to provide (Count 1), and providing or attempting to provide (Count 3), material support to terrorists; and conspiring to provide (Count 2), and providing or attempting to provide (Count 4), material support to a foreign terrorist organization. Defendant appealed his convictions.The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the government translator to add bracketed words when translating defendant’s conversations; the district court did not abuse its discretion in several rulings it made during the direct and cross-examination of the Government's lead witness; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant a continuance or a mistrial after the Internet connection supporting live video teleconferencing from Pakistan failed midtrial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions. View "United States v. Khan" on Justia Law

Defendant signed a plea agreement and pled guilty to narcotics and money laundering conspiracies. Defendant subsequently appealed, alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel, that the district court violated Rule 11, and that the government breached the plea agreement. In this case, the plea agreement contained a "limited" appeal waiver which prohibited defendant from appealing or collaterally attacking his conviction and sentence "on any ground," unless the government appealed or the sentence was based on an upward departure, or variance. The court joined its sister circuits and held that defendant's claims are not barred by the appeal waiver. However, on the merits, the court concluded that defendant is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Puentes-Hurtado" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a death row inmate, appealed the denial of his petitions for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The court could not say that the Florida Supreme Court was unreasonable when it determined that its confidence in the sentence imposed was not undermined by any alleged deficient performance by petitioner's counsel based upon the events and facts of this case, the fact that the aggravating circumstances would have still greatly outweighed any mitigating circumstances, and a unanimous jury recommendation. The court further concluded that to the extent a state witness's testimony constituted nonstatutory aggravation, there is no reasonable probability that its omission would have changed the outcome of the penalty phase given the unanimous jury verdict for death, five valid and weighty aggravating circumstances, and minimal mitigating evidence supporting the sentence. Accordingly, the court could not say that the Florida Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington’s prejudice prong when it determined that counsel’s failure to cross-examine the witness did not prejudice petitioner. The court also rejected petitioner's claims under Giglio v. United States; petitioner's claim of childhood abuse as a mitigating factor; and petitioner's claim that he was mentally a minor at the time he committed the murder. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Barwick v. Secretary, FL DOC" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a death row inmate, filed a motion for a certificate of appealability (COA), arguing that jurists of reason could debate whether the district court properly denied the motions he filed under Rules 60(b) and 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner contended that, based on intervening decisions by the Supreme Court and this court, petitioner should be able to revive the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that he procedurally defaulted in his state post-conviction proceedings. The court rejected petitioner's arguments that no COA is required and concluded that petitioner has not made the required showing for an issuance of a COA on any of petitioner's issues. The court concluded that Martinez v. Ryan did not permit him to raise his procedurally defaulted ineffective-assistance claims where Arthur v. Thomas foreclosed such an argument. Because any relief for petitioner is ultimately predicated on his ability to raise his admittedly defaulted ineffective-assistance claims, and Arthur squarely forecloses that possibility, his allegations cannot entitle him to relief. So the correctness of the denial of an evidentiary hearing is not debatable among reasonable jurists. Finally, the denial of that Rule 59(e) motion is not debatable among reasonable jurists. Accordingly, the court denied the application for a COA. View "Hamilton v. Secretary, FL DOC" on Justia Law