Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, sentenced to death for committing murder, appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he was deprived of a fair trial where his counsel provided ineffective assistance during the penalty phase of his trial. The court concluded that the Supreme Court of Georgia' denial of the petition was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States where reasonable jurists could rule that the additional mitigation evidence was largely cumulative of the other evidence of petitioner's neglectful childhood. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of the petition. View "Wilson, Jr. v. Warden" on Justia Law

The district court denied defendant's motion to set aside his conviction nunc pro tunc and his request for a certificate certifying his conviction had been set aside as required by the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. 5021. Defendant then petitioned the district court for a writ of error coram nobis, which the court denied. In this appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his petition. The court concluded that the district court effectively revised defendant's initial sentence to leave the Parole Commission out of the picture entirely; instead, it simply required that the Bureau of Prisons release defendant on December 1, 1983. Because the district court determined defendant's discharge in this way, it was obligated under section 5021(b) to issue the certificate stating that his conviction had been set aside. Therefore, the court issued a writ of mandamus directing the district court to issue a certificate stating that defendant's conviction was automatically set aside on December 1, 1983. View "United States v. Cruanes" on Justia Law

Defendant was committed to the custody of the Alabama State Department of Mental Health in 2012. In 2013, a federal grand jury indicted defendant for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person under 18 U.S.C. 922(g), which criminalizes the possession of a firearm by any person "who has been committed to a mental institution." The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment where defendant was afforded the formal process required by Ala. Code 22-52-1 et seq. when he was formally committed under Ala. Code 22-52-10.1, and it was not an emergency hospitalization under Ala. Code 22-52.7. View "United States v. McIlwain" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to eight counts of possession and receipt of child pornography. On appeal, defendant challenged his 240-month sentence. Among other things, defendant obsessed with neighborhood children and had an escalating interest in the sexual molestation, murder, and cannibalism of children. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse his discretion considering the totality of the circumstances and giving due deference to the judge's determination that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors justified the upward variance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. The court reversed for the limited purpose of correcting a scrivener's error. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of murder, appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition. The court concluded that the Florida Supreme Court's conclusion that trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to compartmentalize petitioner's experts is well within the bounds of reasonableness under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), and petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice. The court also concluded that petitioner failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington where there is not a reasonable probability that investigating and presenting evidence of petitioner's XYY genetic abnormality would have led to a different result; where counsel failed to present the testimony of a mental health expert and provide the expert with a videotape of petitioner's testimony; and where counsel failed to present additional mitigating witnesses. The court also rejected petitioner's Brady claim where petitioner failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of his proceeding would have been different had the jury heard about his XYY abnormality. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of habeas relief. View "Tanzi v. Secretary, FL DOC" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the denial of his second motion for a sentence reduction based on Amendment 750 of the Sentencing Guidelines pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The district court's jurisdiction was not limited by the strictures of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 after it entered its orders. The court concluded that any error on the part of the district court was harmless where defendant offered no justification to depart from this court's previous order affirming the district court's finding that Amendment 750 does not apply to reduce defendant's guidelines range because his conviction involved at least 15 kilograms of crack cocaine. The court held that this is the law of the case and it need not address the merits of defendant's claim any further. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to distributing cocaine and subsequently moved to vacate his sentence for an alleged error in the application of the advisory guidelines. Defendant argued that an intervening Supreme Court decision, Begay v. United States, makes clear that the district court and this court erroneously classified him as a career offender based on a prior conviction for felony child abuse. The court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to vacate his sentence where he cannot collaterally attack his sentence based on a misapplication of the advisory guidelines. Defendant's sentence falls below the statutory maximum and his prior conviction for felony child abuse has not been vacated. Accordingly, defendant's sentence was and remains lawful. View "Spencer v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner, sentenced to death for his role in three murders, appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The court rejected petitioner's claim that counsel was ineffective where he failed to establish prejudice under Strickland v. Washington because the state court reasonably concluded that additional expert testimony would not likely have led to the suppression of his confession, and because a reasonable state court could have rejected petitioner's argument that counsel was ineffective for failing to present all of the available evidence concerning his social history mitigation. The court rejected petitioner's Brady v. Maryland claim where petitioner cannot show prejudice because there is no reasonable probability that an eyewitness's testimony would have affected the outcome. Further, petitioner was not deprived of a fair trial and the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jurors that each mitigating factor need not be found unanimously. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Lucas v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of malice murder and armed robbery, appealed the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition as untimely. The court concluded that the district court correctly determined that the petition was untimely under section 2244(d)(1)(D), and that petitioner failed to show that learning of his Boykin rights from an overheard conversation of an inmate librarian was an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling for his delayed filing of his habeas petition for more than fifteen years from the expiration of his statute of limitations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Cole v. Georgia SP Warden" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal from the IJ's order of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Petitioner argued that his Florida state conviction for aggravated fleeing was not an aggravated felony. The court concluded that, under relevant Florida law and considering the factual circumstances of the proceedings related to petitioner's aggravated fleeing offense, the probation revocation and resentencing resulted in a prison term of at least one year, in satisfaction of the aggravated felony statute, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F). Further, the Florida state conviction was a crime of violence where, by fleeing from law enforcement, defendant has already resorted to an extreme measure to avoid arrest, signaling that he is likely prepared to resort to the use of physical force. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Dixon v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law