Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Florida jury convicted Defendant of first-degree murder, burglary of a dwelling, and sexual battery. He was sentenced to death for the murder, 15 years imprisonment for the burglary, and 27 years for the sexual battery. After exhausting state remedies, Defendant sought habeas corpus relief in federal court, alleging (as relevant here) various evidentiary errors at his trial. The district court denied Defendant’s habeas petition, and he appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court correctly held that the state didn’t violate Brady, that Defendant’s trial counsel didn’t provide ineffective assistance at trial—for failing to move for hearings under either Frye or Richardson—and that Miranda doesn’t require suppressing Defendant’s statement to the officer. The court explained that it rejected Defendant’s ineffective assistance claim predicated on his trial counsel’s failure to move for a Frye hearing on the ground that any deficiency wasn’t prejudicial.   Further, the court reasoned that Defendant likely wouldn’t have won a Richardson motion because, as a matter of state law, the state’s discovery violation—if there was one—didn’t harm or prejudice him. As an initial matter, the alleged violation likely wasn’t willful. Moreover, the alleged violation wasn’t “substantial,” nor did it affect Defendant’s ability to prepare for trial. View "Steven Richard Taylor v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant, a real-estate developer, was convicted on multiple counts arising out of his alleged complicity in the bribery of Tallahassee City Commissioner Scott Maddox. On appeal, Defendant challenged his bribery-based convictions on several grounds, two of which required the Eleventh Circuit to carefully examine the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550 (2016), which explained—and by all accounts narrowed to some degree—the category of “official acts” that can support a federal bribery charge. Defendant separately contests his conviction for making false statements to federal agents during the course of their investigation.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held it needn’t decide whether the district court erred in instructing the jury regarding the meaning and application of the term “official act,” as used in 18 U.S.C. Section 201(a)(3) and interpreted in McDonnell, because (1) Defendant invited one of the errors that he now alleges and (2) he failed to object to the other and hasn’t shown that it affected his substantial rights. Further, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that Defendant assisted in bribing Maddox in connection with a Section 201(a)(3)-qualifying “official act”. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence pertaining to an FBI agent’s conduct during the undercover investigation. And any error that the court might have committed in admitting the agent’s testimony that Defendant had made “false exculpatory statements” was harmless. Finally, the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that Defendant made actionable false statements to FBI agents. View "USA v. John Thomas Burnette" on Justia Law

A federal grand jury indicted Defendant for two counts of distribution of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2252A(a)(2) and (b)(1) (“Counts One and Two”), and five counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a)1 and (e) (“Counts Three through Seven”). At issue on appeal is whether an adult who films himself exposing his genitals and masturbating in the presence of a child where the child is the object of sexual desire in the film “uses” that child to engage in sexually explicit conduct for purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a).   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that Defendant’s conduct falls within the scope of the conduct prohibited by 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a). The court explained that here, Defendant used the presence of his eleven-year-old daughter as the object of his sexual desire as he engaged in sexually explicit conduct by masturbating in her presence. He recorded this conduct and distributed it over the internet. He does not challenge the district court’s finding that the child was under eighteen years old or that the visual depictions were transported or transmitted in interstate commerce. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal. Further, the court found that the rule of lenity does not apply. View "USA v. Edgar John Dawson, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant, a class C felon, violated the conditions of his supervised release. After revoking his supervised release, the district court sentenced Defendant to the statutory maximum of two years imprisonment and added one year of home confinement with location monitoring. This appeal presented a question of first impression about supervised release and home confinement.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence to the extent it imposed a term of home confinement and remanded for resentencing. The court held that because the district court sentenced Defendant to the statutory maximum term of two years imprisonment, it lacked authority to impose an additional year of home confinement with electronic monitoring “as an alternative to incarceration.” The court noted that as the Fifth Circuit has explained, a court cannot “impose the maximum term of incarceration under subsection (e)(3) and also impose a period of home confinement under (e)(4).” The reason is that incarceration beyond the statutory maximum term is not an option available to a district court. Because the district court did not have the option to impose imprisonment, it lacked authority to impose home confinement. The court explained that whether it views Defendant’s term of home confinement as a special condition of supervised release under Section 3563(b)(19) or as a stand-alone punishment under Section 3583(e)(4), a court may impose it “only as an alternative to incarceration.” The ordinary meaning of these provisions is that the district court erred by imposing a term of home confinement when it could not have imposed the same term of imprisonment. View "USA v. Rondell Hall" on Justia Law

After he pleaded guilty to several counts, including two violations of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g), the district court sentenced Defendant to the mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. In doing so, the court concluded that Defendant’s two prior convictions for selling cocaine in violation of Florida Statutes Section 893.13(1)(a) were “serious drug offense[s]” that Penn “committed on occasions different from one another.” Defendant appealed both determinations. Defendant contends that his sale-of-cocaine offenses were not serious drug offenses under ACCA.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that it disagreed with Defendant’s contentions. Both of his arguments for why his sale-of-cocaine offenses are not serious drug offenses fail. The court reasoned that its precedent squarely forecloses his mens rea argument about the need to prove knowledge of the controlled substance’s illicit nature. And attempted transfers of a controlled substance are “distributing,” as ACCA uses the term. Likewise, his argument that his sale-of-cocaine offenses did not occur on separate occasions fails because he committed the crimes thirty days apart. View "USA v. Keith A. Penn" on Justia Law

Pardoned felon Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to expunge the records of his criminal conviction. Defendant argued that the district court erred in concluding that (1) it lacked jurisdiction over his claim; and (2) even if it had jurisdiction, the merits of his motion did not warrant expungement. After oral argument and consideration of the record below, we conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Defendant’s motion.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that although the district court correctly noted that it lacked the requisite ancillary jurisdiction to hear Defendant’s expungement motion, it ultimately impermissibly evaluated and denied the motion on the merits. The court reasoned that no court has ever recognized ancillary jurisdiction over a constitutional expungement where the alleged constitutional violation was the natural result of an otherwise valid arrest or conviction. Thus, the court found it does not have ancillary jurisdiction over his expungement claim. View "USA v. James Batmasian" on Justia Law

In 2019, Defendant sought a further reduction under the First Step Act. By that time, he had completed four of the sentences—including all three marijuana-only sentences. The district court initially denied relief, holding that even Defendant’s crack-related convictions weren’t “covered offenses.” Defendant appealed, the government confessed error, and the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The district court then reduced Defendant’s sentences to time served on the eleven crack-related convictions but held that, under Denson’s interpretation of Section 404(b), it lacked authority to modify his sentences on the three non-covered powder-related offenses.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held (1) that the Eleventh Circuit’s statement in Denson that a district court “is permitted to reduce a defendant’s sentence” under the First Step Act “only on a ‘covered offense’” and “is not free . . . to change the defendant’s sentences on counts that are not ‘covered offenses,’” was a holding; (2) that Concepcion did not abrogate that holding; and (3) that the prior-panel-precedent rule obliges the court to follow it. View "USA v. Michael Jerome Files" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of cocaine possession. During Defenant's direct examination, he testified that he did not conspire with a co-defendant. In response, the district court held a sidebar conference, at which the prosecution requested the court instruct the jury on the elements of conspiracy. The court provided the instruction to the jury, and the jury convicted Defendant.On appeal, Defendant challenged the court's clarifying instruction to the jury regarding conspiratorial liability as well as the sufficiency of the evidence. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it intervened to prevent a misunderstanding of the law of conspiracy that Defendant's counsel invited. Further the court held that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Defendant possessed the necessary men's rea to commit the offense. View "USA v. Francisco Morel" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for a 2004 conviction for possessing cocaine base. At the time, Defendant's sentence was the statutory maximum for his crime because he had a prior conviction for a drug felony. Since then, Congress passed the First Step Act, which raised the threshold quantity required to authorize a sentence of life imprisonment. Thus, under the Fair Sentencing Act, Defendant's current maximum sentence would be 30 years. However, Defendant did not appeal his sentence on that ground because it complied with the statutory maximum at the time.In 2012, the Supreme Court held in Dorsey v. United States that defendants who had been convicted but not sentenced before the Fair Sentencing Act should be sentenced in accordance with the Act. Defendant filed a motion to vacate but failed to cite the Dorsey opinion.In 2018, Defendant filed a motion for a reduced sentence under the First Step Act of 2018. The district court denied relief. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion because the First Step Act never requires that a Defendant receive a reduced sentence. The court also held that the district court gave an adequate “brief statement of reasons” for the exercise of its discretion. View "USA v. Patrick Frederick Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the denial of his First Step Act motion to reduce his sentence. The district court considering Defendant’s motion concluded that it was bound by the sentencing court’s drug-quantity finding when determining what his statutory penalties would have been under the Fair Sentencing Act. And because that drug quantity would still trigger a mandatory life sentence after the Fair Sentencing Act, the district court also concluded that it could not reduce Defendant’s sentence under the First Step Act.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court correctly used the 15-kilogram finding to determine what the statutory penalty would have been for Defendant under the Fair Sentencing Act. And because this finding would have compelled the sentencing court to impose the same mandatory life sentence even if the Fair Sentencing Act had been in effect at the time, the district court correctly concluded that it could not reduce Defendant’s sentence under the First Step Act.   The court explained Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act to reduce disparities between prison sentences for future offenses involving crack cocaine and powder cocaine. And in the First Step Act, Congress decided to extend the same reduction in sentencing disparities to past offenses. The language of that statute is straightforward—eligible crack offenders can now be resentenced “as if” the Fair Sentencing Act had already been in place during their original sentencing. What Congress did not do is offer a sentence reduction below the statutory minimum under the Fair Sentencing Act, or vacate drug-quantity findings that would have triggered that minimum at the time of the movant’s offense. View "USA v. Pinkney Clowers, III" on Justia Law