Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of producing and possessing child pornography. On appeal, he challenged his convictions on three grounds. First, he argued that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to satisfy Section 2251(a)’s interstate commerce element. Second, he contended that the district court reversibly erred when it discharged an impaneled-but-not-yet-sworn jury in his absence. Third, he asserts that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish production under Section 2251(a) because of what he calls a “factual impossibility.”   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions. The court held that from the evidence, a jury could have reasonably concluded that Defendant had the requisite intent to “produce” child pornography when he originally captured the photos of the victim. Further, here, Defendant’s initial jury was impaneled, but not sworn. In fact, the record shows that both parties agreed not to swear the jury given the impending storm—and, further, that once the storm had made landfall, Defendant’s lawyer admitted that he was “glad the jury wasn’t sworn” because it gave the court the necessary flexibility to make new trial arrangements. Because the jury wasn’t sworn, jeopardy never attached. And absent jeopardy, Defendant had no right to have his case decided by the particular jury that the judge had initially impaneled. Accordingly, the district court did not err when it discharged the entire panel. Moreover, the court found that Defendant’s s constitutional arguments are unavailing because he has failed to show any error—plain or otherwise—under either the Fifth or Sixth Amendment. View "USA v. Clark Downs" on Justia Law

Defendant found in possession of a firearm, was charged with violating Section 922(g)(9) based on a previous misdemeanor conviction for battery under the Georgia Family Violence Act. The district court granted his pretrial motion to exclude evidence of that previous conviction after determining that his waiver of a jury trial in the earlier state proceeding resulting in the conviction had not been knowing and intelligent. Because that pretrial ruling left the government without any evidence to prove the prior qualifying conviction element of the charged Section 922(g)(9) offense, the government filed this appeal.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. The court explained that it disagreed with the district court’s statement that there was “no evidence” that Defendant understood he had the right to a jury trial or that he knowingly and intelligently waived that right. There is at least some evidence going both ways, and, if anything, the evidence showing a knowing and intelligent wavier is stronger than that indicating the absence of one. When the evidence is unclear or evenly balanced, or the inferences that can be drawn from it are ambiguous, the party with the burden of persuasion loses. View "USA v. Idris Shamsid-Deen" on Justia Law

Defendant, a convicted felon, was indicted for possessing three firearms. The jury found Defendant guilty as charged, and the district court sentenced him to a prison term of ten years. Defendant appealed his conviction. He raised one issue. It involves the expert opinion testimony the Government presented in its case in chief over his objection to disprove his allegation that he was insane when he committed the Section 922(g)(1) offense.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that it agreed with Defendant that the district court abused its discretion in overruling his objection and admitting the testimony. However, the court determined that under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the error is harmless because it did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights. The court explained that to establish a legally sufficient Section 17 insanity defense, Defendant had to prove that on November 8, 2018, he had a severe mental disease or defect capable of causing him to possess the firearms even though he knew that he could not do so. His right to present the defense constituted his “substantial rights” under Rule 52(a). He introduced nothing to prove his defense other than his girlfriend’s testimony and his behavior. And the treating psychologist did not diagnose him with a qualifying “severe mental disease or defect” under Section 17(a). So, the erroneous admission of the psychologist’s opinions about his mental state did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights. View "USA v. Jessie James Turner, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for 27 counts of aiding and abetting the acquisition of controlled substances by deception and 102 counts of unlawfully dispensing controlled substances. On appeal, Defendant argued that the jury instructions were improper and his statute of conviction, 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a), was unconstitutionally vague. Defendant argued that the district court erred because its jury instruction used “or,” instead of “and,” in setting forth the elements of Section 841(a) offense.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed and found that Section 841(a) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to physicians. The court reasoned that in Ruan, the defendant physicians were convicted of violating Section 841(a)(1) by “dispensing controlled substances not ‘as authorized.’” Here similarly, the jury was instructed that “whether Defendant dispensed the controlled substances ‘outside the usual course of professional practice’ is to be judged objectively.” Because this instruction allowed the jury to convict Defendant without considering whether he knowingly or intentionally issued prescriptions outside the usual course of professional practice, it was erroneous under Ruan. However, the court concluded that it is satisfied that (1) this evidence extensively proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant subjectively knew his prescriptions were issued outside the usual course of professional practice, and (2) a jury would have found Defendant guilty absent the error. Further, the court rejected Defendant’s argument that Section 841 is unconstitutionally vague because the CSA does not define the phrases “legitimate medical purpose” and “usual course of professional practice.” These phrases do not require statutory or regulatory definitions. View "USA v. Dr. James Heaton" on Justia Law

Petitioner pled guilty to a charge of lewd or lascivious conduct and was sentenced to five years of sexual offender probation. The terms of that probation provided that he “qualified and shall register with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement as a sexual offender pursuant to Section 943.0435.” Petitioner—proceeding pro se—sought federal habeas corpus relief from his conviction pursuant to Section 2254. The state moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction because he was not “in custody” under Section 2254(a). The state argued that Petitioner was not in its physical custody at the time he filed his petition. Petitioner responded that his lifetime sex offender registration, “along with all the other restrictions that come with being a registered sex offender,” significantly restrained his individual liberty such that he was “in custody” for purposes of Section 2254(a). The district court dismissed Petitioner’s Section  2254 petition for lack of jurisdiction.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court found that Florida’s registration and reporting requirements for sex offenders do not render those offenders “in custody” within the meaning of Section 2254(a). The court reasoned that the proper inquiry here is under Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) and its progeny. First, he is not at the beck and call of state officials. Second, Petitioner is not required to live in a certain community or home and does not need permission to hold a job or drive a car. Third, Petitioner has to provide in-person advance notice of trips outside the state and outside the country, but the trips themselves do not require permission or approval by state officials. View "Louis Matthew Clements v. State of Florida, et al." on Justia Law

A grand jury charged Defendant with one count of possessing with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine. The district court found that the offense involved 287 grams of crack cocaine. Based on this drug-quantity finding and after applying a sentencing enhancement for three prior felony drug convictions, the district court imposed a statutorily mandated sentence of life imprisonment. In 2019, Defendant moved to reduce his sentence under the First Step Act. Defendant argued he was eligible for a sentence reduction because a judge, not a jury, made the drug-quantity finding that increased his statutory range. In October 2022, the Supreme Court granted Defendant’s petition. This appeal on remand from the Supreme Court required the Eleventh Circuit to reconsider, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022), whether the district court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for a reduced sentence under the First Step Act of 2018.   The Eleventh Circuit reinstated its prior decision and affirmed the denial of relief. The court concluded that Concepcion did not abrogate the reasoning of the court’s decision in United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2020), which forecloses Defendant’s claim for relief. The court also disagreed with the parties that Defendant is entitled to relief because his original sentence was pending on direct appeal when the Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). View "USA v. Warren Lavell Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 36-month prison sentence imposed upon revocation of his supervised release. He argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because (1) his conduct did not constitute a new criminal offense; (2) he accepted responsibility for his actions; and (3) he was less than a year away from completing his supervised release.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, Defendant’s above-the-guideline range sentence of 36 months was substantively reasonable. The district court acted within its discretion in giving greater weight to the nature and frequency of Defendant’s violations of the conditions of his supervisory release—including his continual methamphetamine use, failure to attend substance abuse treatment programs, and failure to report to his probation officer—than to his admission of the violations, lack of new criminal charges, and near completion of the term of the release. View "USA v. Eric King" on Justia Law

After a five-day trial, a jury convicted Defendant of healthcare fraud, conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, paying kickbacks in connection with a federal healthcare program, and conspiracy to pay and receive healthcare kickbacks. The district court sentenced him to 120 months in prison. On appeal, Defendant challenged his healthcare fraud convictions—but not his kickback convictions—on a number of grounds. The charges arose out of Defendant’s involvement in the submission of claims to Medicare for genetic cancer-screening (CGx) tests for beneficiaries who did not have cancer or familial history of cancer and that were not ordered by the beneficiaries’ primary care physicians.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that given the statutory and regulatory landscape, it agreed with the district court that the indictment was sufficient to charge Defendant with healthcare fraud. The indictment charged that CGx tests in question were not for beneficiaries who were being treated for cancer or who had a familial history of cancer and were not ordered by the beneficiaries’ treating physicians. Moreover, the government did not need to present evidence excluding every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or that was wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, provided that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. View "USA v. Ivan Andre Scott" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine, and one count of carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. Before his sentencing, a probation officer prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”). The PSR reported that Defendant had two previous convictions for controlled substance offenses. The PSR considered Defendant’s Section 846 conspiracy conviction to be his third controlled substance offense. Together, these three offenses qualified Defendant for the career offender enhancement under Section 4B1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines. On appeal, Defendant renewed his argument that his Section 846 conspiracy conviction did not count as a controlled substance offense. Defendant petitioned for, and the Eleventh Circuit granted, rehearing en banc to revisit its precedent.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded to the district court for resentencing. The court concluded that the text of Section 4B1.2(b) unambiguously excludes inchoate crimes. Under Kisor, that concluded the court’s analysis. Accordingly, the court wrote that it has no need to consider, much less defer to, the commentary in Application Note 1. Thus, the court held that Defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine in violation of Section 846 is not a controlled substance offense because the plain text of Section 4B1.2(b) unambiguously excludes inchoate crimes. Accordingly, Defendant must be resentenced without application of the career offender enhancement. View "USA v. Brandon Romel Dupree" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence of 36 months imprisonment for wire fraud, which is an upward variance from the guidelines range of 8 to 14 months. The district court imposed that sentence after Defendant pleaded guilty to providing false information to obtain an $85,000 Economic Injury Disaster Loan under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act. He challenged the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court appropriately considered the relevant Sections 3553(a) factors, provided a sufficiently compelling justification for varying from the guidelines range, and imposed a sentence that is both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The court explained that the district court was not required to state on the record that it explicitly considered each Section 3553(a) factor or to discuss each factor. It is enough that the record reflects the court’s consideration of the sentencing factors and the parties’ arguments. Further, the court held that the district court did not rely on any clearly erroneous facts in making its decision and adequately explained why it didn’t consider this to be a mine-run case, particularly because Defendant used his education and ability to exploit a government relief program. Moreover, the court wrote that the record shows that the district court considered the importance of deterrence along with other Section 3553(a) factors in varying upward. Those factors included the applicable guidelines range, Defendant’s history and characteristics, the seriousness of his crime, the nature and circumstances of it, and the need to promote respect for the law and to provide just punishment. View "USA v. Vinath Oudomsine" on Justia Law