Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). ACCA imposes a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence on violators of Section 922(g)(1) if they have three previous qualifying felonies. Because Defendant has two other qualifying felonies, Defendant’s eligibility for ACCA’s mandatory minimum turns on whether his Florida conviction for unlawful possession of a listed chemical is a “serious drug offense” because it “involves manufacturing . . . a controlled substance.” The district court counted the Florida conviction and sentenced Defendant to the mandatory minimum sentence.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded this case for resentencing. The court held that a conviction under Florida Statutes Section 893.149(1) for possessing a listed chemical with reasonable cause to believe it will be used to manufacture a controlled substance is not a “serious drug offense” under ACCA. The court explained that possessing one ingredient to make a controlled substance with “reasonable cause to believe” that some person will use it to manufacture a controlled substance is too far removed from the conduct of manufacturing itself to satisfy the “necessarily entails” standard. View "USA v. Christopher E. Miles" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were arrested by Sheriff’s deputies for stashing their client’s cell phone in a bag only minutes before the police executed a search warrant for child pornography on that phone.  Plaintiffs alleged that District Attorney and Assistant District Attorney ordered the arrest. Following the arrest, the DA, in a statement to the press, and ADA, on the courthouse steps, publicly accused Plaintiffs of concealing evidence of a crime and knowingly possessing child pornography. After Plaintiffs were acquitted they filed this federal lawsuit for unlawful arrest. The district court entered judgment against the Deputies and denied the DA’s and ADA’s motion for summary judgment on the false arrest claim. The district court also denied the district attorneys’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ defamation claims.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded to the district court with instructions to enter judgment for Defendants on Plaintiffs’ false arrest claims. The court wrote that on remand, the district court should determine whether to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the defamation claims. The court held that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because they had arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs. The court explained it believes “a reasonable officer, looking at the entire legal landscape at the time of the arrests, could have interpreted the law as permitting the arrests here.” However, even if Defendants made their allegedly defamatory statements as part of their official duties, the Supreme Court of Alabama has held that state-agent immunity does not protect against intentional defamation. View "Megan Garcia, et al v. Pamela Casey, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner an Alabama prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. The district judge granted a Certificate of Appealability (COA) on whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to convey to Petitioner a favorable plea offer of thirty years’ imprisonment during his capital murder trial.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s habeas petition and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. The court found that Petitioner has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the state habeas court’s determinations that Petitioner would not have accepted the plea offer and that the state trial court would not have accepted an agreement between Petitioner and the District Attorney were unreasonable. The court also found that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeal’s (ACCA’s) determination that Petitioner received the plea offer was unreasonable. Because the court found that the state habeas court’s factual determinations were unreasonable, it held that Petitioner has cleared the hurdle created by AEDPA. Accordingly, because Petitioner cleared the AEDPA hurdle, the court found it best for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s claim. View "Brandon Washington v. Attorney General of the State of Alabama, et al" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling sentencing Defendant to 180 months e for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e). A federal grand jury indicted Defendant for unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e). In May 2021, Defendant pleaded guilty. Defendant’s PSR assigned him a base offense level of 24 pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(a)(2). Defendant appealed his 180-month sentence arguing that his sentence was erroneously enhanced because his prior conviction for aggravated assault under Florida law does not qualify as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. Section 924(e).   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that Defendant’s aggravated assault conviction under Fla. Stat. Section 784.021(1)(b) categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA because, as our precedent in Somers III confirmed, Florida’s aggravated assault statute requires an intentional threat to use violence against another person, regardless of whether it is committed under Section 784.021(1)(a) or (b). See id. at 892, 894, 896. Therefore, Defendant has the requisite three predicate offenses under the ACCA, and the district court did not err in sentencing him as an armed career criminal. View "USA v. Larry Lynn Gary" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is an Alabama death row inmate scheduled to be executed by lethal injection on July 20, 2023. Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 complaint asserting that the manner in which Alabama executes its lethal injection protocol violates the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, he takes issue with the manner in which the execution team attempted to secure IV access in the inmates during the preceding three executions that occurred in 2022. Relatedly, Plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Alabama from executing him by any method other than nitrogen hypoxia. Plaintiff appealed the denial of that motion.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.  The court focused its analysis on whether the district court clearly erred in determining that Plaintiff did not show that he faces a “substantial risk of serious harm” if executed by lethal injection. Plaintiff argued that Nance does not control and that the court should instead follow its unpublished decision in Smith. The court explained that the evidence established that since the allegedly “botched” executions, ADOC conducted a full review of its execution processes and procedures, and determined that no deficiencies existed with the protocol itself. Accordingly, based on the evidence presented, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the intervening changes made by the ADOC “have disrupted the pattern discussed in Smith,” rendering Plaintiff’s claim that the same pattern would continue to occur purely speculative. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Plaintiff did not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim. View "James Edward Barber v. Governor of the State of Alabama, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner sits on death row in Georgia following his convictions for kidnapping with bodily injury and armed robbery. He appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court and the Eleventh Circuit granted Petitoner’s certificates of appealability on nine combined issues.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded. The court explained that a review of the record compels the conclusion that Petitioner is entitled to relief on Claim II of his First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court explained that after reviewing the entire record, the court has more than a “grave doubt” that the Sabel error had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s death sentence. At trial, the mitigation evidence centered on the argument that Petitioner’s crimes were completely out of character and that a death sentence would have an adverse impact on his family. But the expert-related evidence developed during the habeas proceeding provided different and powerful mitigation arguments. In particular, once Petitioner’s postconviction counsel no longer feared the inequities that the Sabel rule imposed, they were able to procure critical expert evidence about Petitioner’s mental-health deficiencies and present that evidence to the state habeas court. View "Demarcus Sears v. Warden GDCP" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of attempted second-degree murder, and he was sentenced to forty years in prison. Defendant claimed that the jury instructions on attempted voluntary manslaughter were incomplete because they lacked an explanation of “excusable homicide.” At issue is whether Defendant was prejudiced when his appellate counsel failed to make a particular argument. The district court recognized the change in the law and rejected Defendant’s Lucas-based arguments. When Defendant appealed, the Eleventh Circuit granted him a certificate of appealability on this issue. As stated by Defendant, “the determinative fact for this Court to consider is the applicability of Lockhart v. Fretwell” to his claim.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of his Section 2254 petition. The court explained that Fretwell establishes that the result of a defendant’s proceeding is neither unfair nor unreliable in the present when current law does not provide the right that the defendant seeks to vindicate. Further, both the Supreme Court and the court have reaffirmed Fretwell post-AEDPA with no mention of overruling or modification. Accordingly, the court held that the district court correctly applied Fretwell to this case. View "Pablo Guzman v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant, together with three others, conspired to rob a cocaine stash house. They did not know that the conspiracy was part of a reverse sting operation administrated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”). Before Defendant and his co-conspirators could carry out the robbery, ATF apprehended them, confiscating a firearm from Garrison in the process. A jury convicted Defendant of conspiring to use and use a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c), among other crimes. At issue is whether the district court erred in denying Defendant’s Section 2255 motion.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that although Defendant’s Section 924(c) conviction had three possible predicate offenses—one of which is now invalid in light of Davis— he is not entitled to relief. The predicate offenses are so inextricably intertwined that the jury could not have based the Section 924(c) conviction on the invalid predicate without having also based it on the valid drug trafficking predicate offenses. In other words, the Stromberg error that occurred below was harmless, and thus Defendant is not entitled to relief. View "Sean Garrison v. USA" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of healthcare fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering in a trial that took place during the initial days of the coronavirus pandemic. Defendant appealed his conviction, raising a number of constitutional, evidentiary, and procedural challenges. Defendant argued that he was deprived of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because, among other things, his lawyer, fearing coronavirus exposure, refused to visit him in jail throughout the trial. He also posits that the government committed prosecutorial misconduct by improperly questioning one of his witnesses. On top of all that, Defendant contends that the district court abused its discretion and violated his right to present a defense by making erroneous evidentiary rulings. Defendant believes the district court’s cumulative errors denied him a fundamentally fair trial.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there is no evidence on this record that Defendant’s lawyer “actually intended to confer” with his client during the overnight recess, irrespective of the pandemic concerns. For instance, Defendant’s lawyer also told the district court that he did not have time to visit the jail. The court noted that the district court went to great lengths to facilitate communication between Defendant and his lawyer. It allowed them to communicate in writing during the trial and while Defendant was incarcerated at the county jail. And nothing precluded Defendant’s lawyer from attempting to communicate electronically or via telephone with his client. Finally, the court noted that Defendant has not established a single error, let alone the aggregation of many errors. Thus, his cumulative error claim lacks merit. View "USA v. Sebastian Ahmed" on Justia Law

Defendant, a pimp, transported three young women from Connecticut to Miami, Florida, for his prostitution business shortly before Super Bowl LIV. Following a jury trial, Walker was convicted of three sex-trafficking-related crimes: (1) sex trafficking of an adult by coercion (Count 1); (2) sex trafficking of a person (A.H.) who is a minor and alternatively of a person (A.H.) by coercion (Count 2); and (3) transporting a person to engage in sexual activity (Count 3). In a special verdict form as to A.H., the jury found Defendant guilty on Count 2 on both of the alternative liability theories: minor status and coercion. On appeal, Defendant challenged his convictions on Counts 1 and 2 but not on Count 3.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded (1) there was ample evidence to support Defendant’s coercion conviction in Count 1, and (2) as to Count 2, Defendant did not challenge the government’s amended notice of its expert testimony in the district court, plain error review thus applies, and Defendant has not shown any alleged error in the notice prejudiced him on the coercion conviction. The court explained that a reasonable jury could conclude from the evidence that (1) A.H.’s young, runaway background and dependent circumstances made her particularly susceptible to sex trafficking and (2) A.H. feared that stopping the prostitution would result in serious harm in the form of losing Walker’s emotional, psychological, and financial support. View "USA v. Edward Walker" on Justia Law