Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Following proceedings in district court, the trial court t entered a final judgment, finding Defendant liable, ordering him to disgorge over $4,000,000 in funds, and placing two of his entities under receivership in order to sell and reorganize assets to repay investors. Later, a federal grand jury sitting in Miami returned a superseding indictment that described consistent with the district court’s findings of fact.   After an extradition request was filed by the United States, the Supreme Court of Brazil allowed him to be extradited. He returned to the United States, and on the eve of trial, following over a year of pretrial proceedings, Defendant entered into a plea agreement, agreeing to plead guilty to one count of mail fraud. The district court later sentenced Defendant to 220 months’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay $169,177,338 in restitution.   On appeal, Defendant broadly argues: (1) that the custodial sentence imposed and the order of restitution violate the extradition treaty; and (2) that his guilty plea was not made freely and voluntarily. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court fully satisfied the core concerns of Rule 11, and the court could discern no reason to conclude that the district court plainly erred in finding that Defendant’s guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. The court explained that in this case, the record fully reflects that Defendant agreed to be sentenced subject to a 20-year maximum term, and his 220-month sentence is near the low end of his agreed-upon 210-to-240-month range. View "USA v. John J. Utsick" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Colombian native, was arrested in Colombia on drug trafficking charges and ultimately convicted in federal court. Petitioner now appeals the denial of both his amended 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion to vacate his convictions and sentence and his subsequent motion to alter or amend the judgment. He claims that one of his pre-extradition attorneys was ineffective due to a conflict of interest. According to Petitioner, his attorney tried to convince him to pay a thirty-million-dollar bribe or kickback as part of a plea agreement, which would redound to the benefit of one of Petitioner’s other clients. But Petitioner was represented by other attorneys, and he does not allege that they were conflicted or otherwise deficient in pursuing legitimate plea agreements on Petitioner’s behalf. The district court held that the allegations in Petitioner’s motion would not establish a Sixth Amendment violation even if true.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even assuming a conflict of interest existed, Petitioner’s claim ultimately fails because he does not sufficiently allege that the “conflict adversely affected his representation.” Although Petitioner criticizes his attorney, he does not allege that his other attorneys suffered under a conflict of interest. The Sixth Amendment ensures the right to effective assistance of “an attorney.” The Sixth Amendment does not include the right to receive good advice from every lawyer a criminal defendant consults about his case. Further, the court wrote, that because it concluded that Petitioner’s claim fails on the merits, it cannot say the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing. View "Fabio Ochoa v. USA" on Justia Law

Petitioner participated in several shootings as a member of MS-13, a violent gang. He was convicted of one count of conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). He was also convicted of four counts under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Act (VICAR), 18 U.S.C. Section 1959(a). Because he used a gun in committing those offenses, he was also convicted of four corresponding counts of using a firearm in relation to each “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). For these nine convictions, he is serving three concurrent life sentences plus eighty-five years. His eighty-five-year sentence is based exclusively on the four firearms convictions.   Petitioner filed a 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion to vacate his firearms convictions and his eighty-five-year sentence. The district court denied the motion. At issue on appeal is whether his four firearms convictions are unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis, 588 U.S.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court. The court held that Petitioner’s VICAR convictions (Counts Two, Four, Eight, and Ten), predicated on his commission of murder and attempted murder, qualify as crimes of violence under Section 924(c)’s elements clause. That means that his corresponding firearms convictions (Counts Three, Five, Nine, and Eleven) are still valid after Davis’s holding that the residual clause is unconstitutional. And that means that, after Petitioner completes his three concurrent life sentences, he will still have a consecutive eighty-five-year sentence left to serve. View "Miguel Alvarado-Linares v. USA" on Justia Law

Defendant filed various false liens against John Koskinen, the former Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, and Jacob Lew, the former Secretary of the Treasury. There is no dispute that Pate filed the false liens to retaliate against Lew and Koskinen for acts they performed as part of their official duties. Defendant filed the false liens after Lew and Koskinen had left their positions with the federal government.The Eleventh Circuit was therefore presented d with the following question: Does Section 1521 apply to false liens filed against former federal officers and employees for official actions they performed while in service with the federal government? The court concluded that the answer to this question is yes—the plain language of Section 1521 covers both current and former federal officers and employees. The court explained that a reading of the statute’s plain language—“any person assisting such an officer or employee in the performance of such duties or on account of that assistance”—does not suggest that its protection ends at some ascertainable point in time. Like the language regarding a federal officer or employee, the language regarding a person who lends assistance to a federal officer or employee has both a temporal qualification on liability. Thus, the court affirmed Defendant’s convictions predicated on violations of Section 1521. View "USA v. Timothy Jermaine Pate" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted tried, convicted, and sentenced to 28 months imprisonment for her part in a broader scheme to defraud the federal government out of relief funds intended for farmers affected by drought and fire. She challenged both her conviction and her sentence. As to her conviction, she contends that the evidence preponderated against a guilty verdict such that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for a new trial. As to her sentence, she asserts that her bottom-of-the-Guidelines term of imprisonment is substantively unreasonable.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial. Neither did it abuse its discretion when it imposed a bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence of 28 months’ imprisonment. The court explained that allowing the verdict to stand in the face of an arguable inconsistency—of which the jury was made aware, and which doesn’t bear on an element of the conviction—is not a miscarriage of justice. Further, the court reasoned that the weight of the evidence does not preponderate against a guilty verdict in this case. Finally, the court explained that Defendant never mentioned the Section 3553(a) factors or explains how the court committed reversible error when it considered them. Accordingly, she has failed to carry her burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in the light of both the record and the factors in Section 3553(a). View "USA v. Danyel Michelle Witt" on Justia Law

In this action brought by a group of pre-trial detainees challenging the constitutionality of the Cullman County bail system, the court reversed the district court's finding that the system discriminated against indigent defendants and deprived pretrial detainees of procedural due process. View "Bradley Hester v. Matthew Gentry, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant’s plea agreement included a “waiver of appeal” giving up “the right to appeal his conviction and sentence and the right to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence in any post-conviction proceeding (including, but not limited to, motions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255).” After the Eleventh Circuit joined several other circuits in holding that “conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a ‘crime of violence”, the district court denied Defendant’s second motion. At issue on appeal is “whether a valid waiver of collateral attack forecloses habeas relief based on a new retroactive constitutional rule?”   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order holding that a valid waiver of collateral attack forecloses habeas relief based on a new retroactive constitutional rule. The court explained that forcing constitutional claims into the statutory maximum exception would render the promise of waiver virtually meaningless, robbing defendants of a powerful bargaining tool. Defendants who agree to waive their appeals receive the immediate benefit of reduced penalties in return—as Defendant’s case shows. But if that waiver becomes contingent, whether the defendant wishes it to be or not, a bargain will be much harder to strike. View "Deandre Markee King v. USA" on Justia Law

An assistant district attorney (the “DA”) in Fulton County, Georgia obtained a material witness warrant requiring Plaintiff to appear as a witness at trial. Plaintiff voluntarily appeared at trial, making execution of the warrant unnecessary. After the trial ended, the DA failed to inform the trial judge that the warrant needed to be recalled. A few months later, a police officer arrested Plaintiff and placed him in jail because of the outstanding warrant. A judge eventually ordered Plaintiff’s release.   Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action alleging, among other things, that the DA’s failure to initiate the warrant’s cancelation violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The DA moved to dismiss the suit arguing that as a prosecutor she was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. The district court agreed and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against her.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that absolute prosecutorial immunity does not extend to DA’s failure to take action to cancel the warrant. The district court thus erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint.   The court wrote that determining whether prosecutorial immunity applies requires the court to take a fact-specific functional approach. Here, the court found that applying Third Circuit precedent from Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2008), results in the conclusion that the DA is not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. Thus the DA has failed to show that absolute immunity protects her post-trial conduct here. View "Kidanemariam Kassa v. Antionette Stephenson" on Justia Law

A federal grand jury returned a sealed indictment against Defendant (“Senior”) and co-Defendant, his son, (“Junior”). The jury convicted Senior on all counts and Junior on counts one (conspiracy) and two (wire fraud). Both Senior and Junior again filed motions seeking a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, a new trial. The district court denied the motions.   Both Senior and Junior appealed on various grounds. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendants’ motions. The court held that the district court committed no reversible error nor did it abuse its discretion.   The court first considered whether the evidence was sufficient to support Senior and Junior’s convictions for wire fraud. The court explained that to be convicted of wire fraud, a person must “(1) intentionally participate in a scheme or artifice to defraud another of money or property and (2) use or ‘cause’ the use of the mails or wires for the purpose of executing the scheme or artifice.” The court held that here the Government presented substantial evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Junior knowingly and intentionally participated in Senior’s fraudulent scheme.   Further, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Senior’s proposed jury instructions on the “intent to harm” element of the wire and bank fraud charges. The District Court’s instruction addressed the substance of the instruction in its charge and Senior’s ability to present an effective defense was in no way impaired by the district court’s refusal to use his proposed instruction. View "USA v. Donald Watkins, Jr., et al." on Justia Law

On appeal, Defendant challenged his convictions for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and possessing with intent to distribute. Defendant’s four claims on appeal focused on three discrete portions of his criminal proceeding: the initial arrest, the jury selection, and the trial itself. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence.   Defendant contended that the collateral estoppel doctrine precluded the federal government from relitigating the legality of the traffic stop and the subsequent search of the Suburban as that identical issue was already decided in state court. The court held that because the federal and state governments were not in privity in this case, the federal government was not estopped from relitigating the legality of the traffic stop, the search, and Defendant’s arrest.   Next, Defendant argued that the district court (1) abused its discretion by striking Juror 13 for cause; and (2) erred in sustaining the government’s Batson challenge and seating Juror 11 over Defendant’s peremptory strike. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking Juror 13 for cause during the voir dire stage of Defendant’s case. Juror 13 never confirmed that she felt capable of following the law and the court’s instructions, thus the district court acted within its wide discretion in striking Juror 13 for cause. Moreover, the court concluded that the district court’s finding of discriminatory intent in the peremptory strike of Juror 11 was not clearly erroneous. Further, any error in excluding evidence relating to why the state court prosecution ended did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights. View "USA v. Alfonzo Lewis" on Justia Law