Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After perpetrating elaborate bank and credit card fraud, Petitioner “embarked upon a new scheme . . . to ensnarl the proceedings against him” through obstructionist and disruptive behaviors “so that he might avoid trial altogether.” His scheme, however, did not end at trial or even when the jury issued its guilty verdict. Rather, it continued through sentencing. Now, on a motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, Petitioner advances two claims: a substantive competency due process claim, contending that he was not competent at the time of sentencing, and an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. The district court denied his Section 2255 motion.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Petitioner’s substantive due process rights were not violated when the district court denied his motion for a competency hearing. Nor did Petitioner receive constitutionally deficient performance from court-appointed counsel when they failed to request his medical records or request a mental health evaluation. Even if such failures constituted deficient performance, Petitioner has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced as a result. Thus, the district court did not err in denying Perkins’s Section 2255 motion. View "Jean-Daniel Perkins v. USA" on Justia Law

Defendant who pleaded guilty to illegally possessing a firearm in violation of federal law, was sentenced to 60 months in prison based on a Guidelines range of 70–87 months. In calculating Defendant’s range, though, the district court concluded that an earlier Alabama youthful-offender adjudication constituted an “adult” conviction within the meaning of the applicable Guidelines provisions. Defendant contends that the court erred in doing so.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court held that Defendant’s Alabama YO adjudication wasn’t “adult” under either U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1 or Section 4A1.2. His Guidelines range of 70–87 months was thus wrong in two respects. The court explained that the Pinion factors favor Defendant, indicating that his YO adjudication wasn’t “adult.” The sentence-length and time-served factors, the court held, yield to the stronger indications of the classification and nature factors: Because of the defendant’s age, Alabama law doesn’t even treat YO adjudications as convictions, let alone adult convictions. And the law further shields YOs “from the stigma and practical consequences of a conviction for a crime.” Alabama’s YO system differs from the adult system from stem to stern, in both substance and procedure. View "USA v. Deunate Tarez Jews" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty in 2005 to possessing 50 grams or more of cocaine base (i.e., crack cocaine) with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(iii). The district court sentenced him to 240 months in prison and 120 months of supervised release. In 2014, the district court reduced Defendant’s term of imprisonment to 151 months pursuant to the government’s substantial assistance motion. In 2015, the district court reduced Defendant’s term of imprisonment to 76 months under 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(2). In April 2019, Defendant, proceeding pro se, sought to modify his 57-month sentence under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act. He argued that his original narcotics conviction was now classified as a Class B felony instead of a Class A felony, and as a result, his maximum prison term for a violation of supervised release was three years rather than five. The government opposed a reduction under the First Step Act.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court here did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s requested sentence reduction because it provided a brief statement of reasons that was clear and supported by the record (explaining that Defendant’s conduct while he was in prison and while on supervision, which involved drug offenses and numerous incidences of insubordination, demonstrated an unwillingness or an inability to abide by the law). As a result, the district court’s explanation of its refusal to reduce Defendant’s sentence due to his “continued lawless behavior” did not violate Concepcion. View "USA v. Antonio Soul Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Petitioner is an Alabama prisoner serving a death sentence following his jury convictions on four counts of capital murder. After pursuing a direct appeal and post-conviction relief in the Alabama state courts, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. Petitioner appealed the district court’s denial of his federal habeas petition, arguing that the district court did not apply the proper standard for intellectual disability as required by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and erred in finding Petitioner was not intellectually disabled. He also contends that the state court’s determination that his counsel was not ineffective during the pretrial and penalty phases was an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668 (1984).   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s habeas petition. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Petitioner was not intellectually disabled. The court also found that the ACCA’s determination that Petitioner’s counsel was not ineffective was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. The court explained that the trial judge “was well aware of the mitigation evidence presented at trial” yet found that the circumstances of Petitioner’s childhood did not amount to a mitigating factor given his age, marriage, and employment. In light of the trial court’s determination, the court explained it cannot find the ACCA unreasonably applied Strickland by concluding that Petitioner did not provide enough evidence to undermine the ACCA’s confidence in the trial judge’s decision to override the jury’s recommendation of life. View "Thomas Dale Ferguson v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged his drug- and firearm-related convictions as well as his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Defendant argued that insufficient evidence supports two of his convictions and that he is entitled to a new trial based on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences. The court explained that sufficient evidence supports Defendant’s convictions. He has also not established that it is reasonably probable that a new trial would result in a different outcome as required by Brady, nor has he provided any evidence of perjured testimony as required by Giglio. Finally, Defendant argued for the first time on appeal that the district court erroneously sentenced him because his earlier cocaine conviction under Florida law does not constitute a serious drug offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Further, Defendant identified no precedent that would make it “‘obvious’ or ‘clear under current law’” that the Florida definition of cocaine is overbroad. Thus, the court held that the district court did not plainly err in sentencing him. View "USA v. Clifford Laines, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Georgia prisoner sentenced to death, appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner contends that the Georgia courts unreasonably adjudicated his objection that the prosecutor exercised discriminatory strikes during jury selection, unreasonably concluded that Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel in the investigation and presentation of his mental health and mitigation evidence, and unreasonably rejected his challenge to the procedure for establishing intellectual disability in capital cases. Petitioner also argued that the district court erred when it ruled that he forfeited any further claim based on his alleged intellectual disability.   The Eleventh Circuit denied his petition. The court held that the state court did not apply the wrong standard. Counsel’s investigation before trial “need not be exhaustive” but only “adequate.” Raulerson, 928 F.3d at 997. So “to determine whether trial counsel should have done something more in their investigation, we first look at what the lawyers did in fact.” The superior court correctly considered Petitioner’s criticisms of his counsel’s performance in the light of counsel’s actions and not based on Petitioner’s suggestions of an ideal trial strategy. Further, the court held that contrary to Petitioner’s argument, the superior court did not reach its conclusion based on an unreasonable categorical rule against affidavit evidence. The court weighed those affidavits against the live testimony of Petitioner’s counsel that they could not have secured further mitigation or mental-illness witnesses and chose to give trial counsel’s testimony greater weight. View "Warren King v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of thirteen counts of Hobbs Act robbery and associated firearm offenses for his involvement in robbing nine establishments in the greater Atlanta area: three spas, four massage parlors, a nail salon, and a restaurant. He was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, Defendant presented three challenges to his conviction and one to his sentence: that the district court erred (1) by not holding a formal Daubert hearing; (2) by admitting lay identification testimony by two FBI case agents; (3) by instructing the jury on flight and concealment; and (4) by applying the bodily restraint sentencing enhancement.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed both his convictions and sentence. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not holding a formal Daubert hearing before allowing the Government’s fingerprint expert to testify, in admitting the agents lay identification testimony, or in instructing the jury on flight or concealment. The court also held that the district court did not err in applying the physical restraint sentencing enhancement to the Lush Nails & Spa, Royal Massage, and BD Spa robberies. The court wrote that it has found the physical restraint enhancement to apply where a defendant “creates circumstances allowing [his victims] no alternative but compliance.” The court noted that at the BD Spa and Wellness Massage robbery, Defendant forced an employee down the hall of the establishment at gunpoint. Just as Defendant tying the victim up and carrying her down the hallway would have constituted restraint, so does his forcing her down the hallway with the point of his gun. View "USA v. Dravion Sanchez Ware" on Justia Law

Defendant, a physician assistant, evaluated patients and prescribed their physical therapy. The clinics where Defendant worked then billed the patients' health insurance both for the evaluations and for the subsequent physical therapy. The problem—for Defendant and for the health-insurance company—was that the “patients” didn’t really need the physical therapy and didn’t actually receive any treatment. When the health insurance company grew suspicious of the abnormally high rate of physical-therapy prescriptions from the clinics, it cooperated with an FBI investigation into the clinics. That investigation led a grand jury to indict Defendant on eight healthcare fraud-related charges. After a trial, a jury convicted Defendant on three counts. On appeal, Defendant raised several challenges to his conviction—sufficiency, evidentiary, and instructional—and to his sentence.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that sufficient evidence allowed the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knew the bills were fraudulent. Moreover, the court wrote that the minimal leading questions Defendant points to here do not allow Defendant to overcome the overwhelming evidence of his guilt at trial. Moreover, the court reasoned that here, the district court sentenced Defendant to 48 months— below his Guidelines range of 51–63 months. Given that Defendant had previously participated in very similar schemes, been investigated by the Florida regulatory board for similar conduct, and had attempted to defraud the victim of millions of dollars, the court could not say that the 48-month sentence the district court imposed—slightly below the Guidelines range—was an abuse of discretion. View "USA v. Carlos Alfredo Verdeza" on Justia Law

Defendant confessed to a murder, but he offered two conflicting versions of the crime. At first, he said that he watched the victim’s murder. Then, he said that he participated but that he didn’t intend to kill the victim. A grand jury in Mobile County eventually indicted Defendant for capital murder. The case went to trial, and the jury found Defendant guilty. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Defendant is intellectually disabled and therefore granted his habeas petition. At issue on appeal is whether the district court clearly erred by finding that Defendant is intellectually disabled and, as a result, that his sentence violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.     The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and held that the district court did not clearly err. The court explained that the district court did not err by turning to evidence of Defendant’s adaptive functioning after finding that his IQ score could be as low as 69. Further, the court reasoned that it cannot say that the district court clearly erred by finding that Defendan satisfied the adaptive-functioning prong. The record contains evidence “that would support a finding of fact that Defendant had significant limitations in at least two” domains. Further, the court wrote that the record supports the district court’s conclusion that Defendant’s deficits in intellectual and adaptive functioning “were present at an early age.” As a result, the court wrote that it cannot say that the district court clearly erred by finding that Defendant satisfied the final prong of his Atkins claim. View "Joseph Clifton Smith v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Defendant, a pardoned felon, appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to expunge the records of his criminal conviction. Defendant argued that the district court erred in concluding that (1) it lacked jurisdiction over his claim; and (2) even if it had jurisdiction, the merits of his motion did not warrant expungement. Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that his request is for a constitutional expungement.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Defendant’s motion. However, because the district court assumed that it had jurisdiction and evaluated and denied Defendant’s motion on the merits, the court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court applied Kokkonen to Defendant’s request for a constitutional expungement. Since the proceedings from Defendant’s underlying tax offense—the offense for which Defendant brings his expungement claim—concluded more than a decade ago, the invocation of ancillary jurisdiction for an expungement of his record so that he can more easily donate to charity is not necessary “to permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent,” nor is it necessary for the court to “manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.” Accordingly, the court held that although the district court correctly noted that it lacked the requisite ancillary jurisdiction to hear Defendant’s expungement motion, it ultimately impermissibly evaluated and denied the motion on the merits. View "USA v. James Batmasian" on Justia Law