Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2019, Defendant sought a further reduction under the First Step Act. By that time, he had completed four of the sentences—including all three marijuana-only sentences. The district court initially denied relief, holding that even Defendant’s crack-related convictions weren’t “covered offenses.” Defendant appealed, the government confessed error, and the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The district court then reduced Defendant’s sentences to time served on the eleven crack-related convictions but held that, under Denson’s interpretation of Section 404(b), it lacked authority to modify his sentences on the three non-covered powder-related offenses.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held (1) that the Eleventh Circuit’s statement in Denson that a district court “is permitted to reduce a defendant’s sentence” under the First Step Act “only on a ‘covered offense’” and “is not free . . . to change the defendant’s sentences on counts that are not ‘covered offenses,’” was a holding; (2) that Concepcion did not abrogate that holding; and (3) that the prior-panel-precedent rule obliges the court to follow it. View "USA v. Michael Jerome Files" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of cocaine possession. During Defenant's direct examination, he testified that he did not conspire with a co-defendant. In response, the district court held a sidebar conference, at which the prosecution requested the court instruct the jury on the elements of conspiracy. The court provided the instruction to the jury, and the jury convicted Defendant.On appeal, Defendant challenged the court's clarifying instruction to the jury regarding conspiratorial liability as well as the sufficiency of the evidence. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it intervened to prevent a misunderstanding of the law of conspiracy that Defendant's counsel invited. Further the court held that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Defendant possessed the necessary men's rea to commit the offense. View "USA v. Francisco Morel" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for a 2004 conviction for possessing cocaine base. At the time, Defendant's sentence was the statutory maximum for his crime because he had a prior conviction for a drug felony. Since then, Congress passed the First Step Act, which raised the threshold quantity required to authorize a sentence of life imprisonment. Thus, under the Fair Sentencing Act, Defendant's current maximum sentence would be 30 years. However, Defendant did not appeal his sentence on that ground because it complied with the statutory maximum at the time.In 2012, the Supreme Court held in Dorsey v. United States that defendants who had been convicted but not sentenced before the Fair Sentencing Act should be sentenced in accordance with the Act. Defendant filed a motion to vacate but failed to cite the Dorsey opinion.In 2018, Defendant filed a motion for a reduced sentence under the First Step Act of 2018. The district court denied relief. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion because the First Step Act never requires that a Defendant receive a reduced sentence. The court also held that the district court gave an adequate “brief statement of reasons” for the exercise of its discretion. View "USA v. Patrick Frederick Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the denial of his First Step Act motion to reduce his sentence. The district court considering Defendant’s motion concluded that it was bound by the sentencing court’s drug-quantity finding when determining what his statutory penalties would have been under the Fair Sentencing Act. And because that drug quantity would still trigger a mandatory life sentence after the Fair Sentencing Act, the district court also concluded that it could not reduce Defendant’s sentence under the First Step Act.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court correctly used the 15-kilogram finding to determine what the statutory penalty would have been for Defendant under the Fair Sentencing Act. And because this finding would have compelled the sentencing court to impose the same mandatory life sentence even if the Fair Sentencing Act had been in effect at the time, the district court correctly concluded that it could not reduce Defendant’s sentence under the First Step Act.   The court explained Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act to reduce disparities between prison sentences for future offenses involving crack cocaine and powder cocaine. And in the First Step Act, Congress decided to extend the same reduction in sentencing disparities to past offenses. The language of that statute is straightforward—eligible crack offenders can now be resentenced “as if” the Fair Sentencing Act had already been in place during their original sentencing. What Congress did not do is offer a sentence reduction below the statutory minimum under the Fair Sentencing Act, or vacate drug-quantity findings that would have triggered that minimum at the time of the movant’s offense. View "USA v. Pinkney Clowers, III" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of producing and possessing child pornography. On appeal, he challenged his convictions on three grounds. First, he argued that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to satisfy Section 2251(a)’s interstate commerce element. Second, he contended that the district court reversibly erred when it discharged an impaneled-but-not-yet-sworn jury in his absence. Third, he asserts that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish production under Section 2251(a) because of what he calls a “factual impossibility.”   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions. The court held that from the evidence, a jury could have reasonably concluded that Defendant had the requisite intent to “produce” child pornography when he originally captured the photos of the victim. Further, here, Defendant’s initial jury was impaneled, but not sworn. In fact, the record shows that both parties agreed not to swear the jury given the impending storm—and, further, that once the storm had made landfall, Defendant’s lawyer admitted that he was “glad the jury wasn’t sworn” because it gave the court the necessary flexibility to make new trial arrangements. Because the jury wasn’t sworn, jeopardy never attached. And absent jeopardy, Defendant had no right to have his case decided by the particular jury that the judge had initially impaneled. Accordingly, the district court did not err when it discharged the entire panel. Moreover, the court found that Defendant’s s constitutional arguments are unavailing because he has failed to show any error—plain or otherwise—under either the Fifth or Sixth Amendment. View "USA v. Clark Downs" on Justia Law

Defendant found in possession of a firearm, was charged with violating Section 922(g)(9) based on a previous misdemeanor conviction for battery under the Georgia Family Violence Act. The district court granted his pretrial motion to exclude evidence of that previous conviction after determining that his waiver of a jury trial in the earlier state proceeding resulting in the conviction had not been knowing and intelligent. Because that pretrial ruling left the government without any evidence to prove the prior qualifying conviction element of the charged Section 922(g)(9) offense, the government filed this appeal.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. The court explained that it disagreed with the district court’s statement that there was “no evidence” that Defendant understood he had the right to a jury trial or that he knowingly and intelligently waived that right. There is at least some evidence going both ways, and, if anything, the evidence showing a knowing and intelligent wavier is stronger than that indicating the absence of one. When the evidence is unclear or evenly balanced, or the inferences that can be drawn from it are ambiguous, the party with the burden of persuasion loses. View "USA v. Idris Shamsid-Deen" on Justia Law

Defendant, a convicted felon, was indicted for possessing three firearms. The jury found Defendant guilty as charged, and the district court sentenced him to a prison term of ten years. Defendant appealed his conviction. He raised one issue. It involves the expert opinion testimony the Government presented in its case in chief over his objection to disprove his allegation that he was insane when he committed the Section 922(g)(1) offense.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that it agreed with Defendant that the district court abused its discretion in overruling his objection and admitting the testimony. However, the court determined that under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the error is harmless because it did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights. The court explained that to establish a legally sufficient Section 17 insanity defense, Defendant had to prove that on November 8, 2018, he had a severe mental disease or defect capable of causing him to possess the firearms even though he knew that he could not do so. His right to present the defense constituted his “substantial rights” under Rule 52(a). He introduced nothing to prove his defense other than his girlfriend’s testimony and his behavior. And the treating psychologist did not diagnose him with a qualifying “severe mental disease or defect” under Section 17(a). So, the erroneous admission of the psychologist’s opinions about his mental state did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights. View "USA v. Jessie James Turner, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for 27 counts of aiding and abetting the acquisition of controlled substances by deception and 102 counts of unlawfully dispensing controlled substances. On appeal, Defendant argued that the jury instructions were improper and his statute of conviction, 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a), was unconstitutionally vague. Defendant argued that the district court erred because its jury instruction used “or,” instead of “and,” in setting forth the elements of Section 841(a) offense.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed and found that Section 841(a) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to physicians. The court reasoned that in Ruan, the defendant physicians were convicted of violating Section 841(a)(1) by “dispensing controlled substances not ‘as authorized.’” Here similarly, the jury was instructed that “whether Defendant dispensed the controlled substances ‘outside the usual course of professional practice’ is to be judged objectively.” Because this instruction allowed the jury to convict Defendant without considering whether he knowingly or intentionally issued prescriptions outside the usual course of professional practice, it was erroneous under Ruan. However, the court concluded that it is satisfied that (1) this evidence extensively proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant subjectively knew his prescriptions were issued outside the usual course of professional practice, and (2) a jury would have found Defendant guilty absent the error. Further, the court rejected Defendant’s argument that Section 841 is unconstitutionally vague because the CSA does not define the phrases “legitimate medical purpose” and “usual course of professional practice.” These phrases do not require statutory or regulatory definitions. View "USA v. Dr. James Heaton" on Justia Law

Petitioner pled guilty to a charge of lewd or lascivious conduct and was sentenced to five years of sexual offender probation. The terms of that probation provided that he “qualified and shall register with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement as a sexual offender pursuant to Section 943.0435.” Petitioner—proceeding pro se—sought federal habeas corpus relief from his conviction pursuant to Section 2254. The state moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction because he was not “in custody” under Section 2254(a). The state argued that Petitioner was not in its physical custody at the time he filed his petition. Petitioner responded that his lifetime sex offender registration, “along with all the other restrictions that come with being a registered sex offender,” significantly restrained his individual liberty such that he was “in custody” for purposes of Section 2254(a). The district court dismissed Petitioner’s Section  2254 petition for lack of jurisdiction.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court found that Florida’s registration and reporting requirements for sex offenders do not render those offenders “in custody” within the meaning of Section 2254(a). The court reasoned that the proper inquiry here is under Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) and its progeny. First, he is not at the beck and call of state officials. Second, Petitioner is not required to live in a certain community or home and does not need permission to hold a job or drive a car. Third, Petitioner has to provide in-person advance notice of trips outside the state and outside the country, but the trips themselves do not require permission or approval by state officials. View "Louis Matthew Clements v. State of Florida, et al." on Justia Law

A grand jury charged Defendant with one count of possessing with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine. The district court found that the offense involved 287 grams of crack cocaine. Based on this drug-quantity finding and after applying a sentencing enhancement for three prior felony drug convictions, the district court imposed a statutorily mandated sentence of life imprisonment. In 2019, Defendant moved to reduce his sentence under the First Step Act. Defendant argued he was eligible for a sentence reduction because a judge, not a jury, made the drug-quantity finding that increased his statutory range. In October 2022, the Supreme Court granted Defendant’s petition. This appeal on remand from the Supreme Court required the Eleventh Circuit to reconsider, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022), whether the district court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for a reduced sentence under the First Step Act of 2018.   The Eleventh Circuit reinstated its prior decision and affirmed the denial of relief. The court concluded that Concepcion did not abrogate the reasoning of the court’s decision in United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2020), which forecloses Defendant’s claim for relief. The court also disagreed with the parties that Defendant is entitled to relief because his original sentence was pending on direct appeal when the Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). View "USA v. Warren Lavell Jackson" on Justia Law