Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff agreed to help Defendants LLC obtain financing, and Defendants agreed to assign Plaintiff and his company their majority stake in the LLC.AN issue arose regarding what that assignment entailed. After years of litigation and a two-week trial, the jury awarded Plaintiff a four-million-dollar verdict on claims of fraud and conversion, which they reduced by a half-million dollars for his failure to mitigate damages. Defendants now seek to vacate that verdict, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded in part. The court held that the district court had subject matter over this action, and the Circuit Court has jurisdiction over the appeal. Second, none of the issues raised by Defendants on appeal warrant reversal. And three, on Plaintiff's cross-appeal, the district court erred in giving a failure-to-mitigate instruction to the jury. The court thus reinstated the $500,000 that the jury subtracted from the compensatory damages award.   The court explained that Plaintiff's federal civil RICO claim was not so obviously frivolous that it failed to invoke federal jurisdiction. And although the district court could have declined to continue exercising jurisdiction once the federal RICO claim was dismissed, the parties consented to litigate the remaining state law claims in federal court. As a result, Defendants cannot argue on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by declining to dismiss the case. View "Arturo Rubinstein, et al v. Yoram Yehuba, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action against several DeKalb County, Georgia investigators, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights during his arrest. Plaintiff claimed that S.D. used excessive force when he shot him three times, that V.J. used excessive force when he pistol-whipped him, and that all three Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on every claim.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for V.J. on the pistol-whip claim. But affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for S.D. on the shooting claim and for all Defendants on the deprivation of medical care claim.   The court held that V.J. used excessive force in pistol-whipping Plaintiff and that Plaintiff’s right to be free of V.J.’s use of force was clearly established at the time. Further, viewing the facts through the appropriate lens, V.J. could not have reasonably believed that Plaintiff was resisting when he tried to sit up after communicating that he needed to do so to breathe. And because “a handcuffed, non-resisting [suspect’s] right to be free from excessive force was clearly established” at the time, V.J is not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against him.   Finally, even though Plaintiff met his burden that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights, the court concluded that there was no established law on how long before officers must request medical care for a suspect that has been shot to constitute deliberate indifference. View "Nicholas C. Wade v. Solomon Daniels, et al." on Justia Law

In Defendant’s presentence investigation report (“PSI”), the probation officer determined that Jackson’s prior criminal history qualified him for an Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) sentencing enhancement. ACCA applies to a conviction under 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g) for firearm possession by a prohibited person if the defendant has three qualifying convictions for “a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. Section 924(e)(1). Based on that conclusion, it sentenced Defendant to ACCA’s mandated fifteen-year minimum.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence. The court held that due-process fair-notice considerations require the court to apply the Controlled Substance Act Schedules in place when Defendant committed the offense for which he is being sentenced. At the times of Defendant’s cocaine-related prior offenses for which he sustained convictions under Fla. Stat. Section 893.13, the cocaine-related activity Section 893.13 criminalized categorically included activity involving ioflupane. Further, At the times of Defendant's prior cocaine-related state convictions, Fla. Stat. Section 893.13(a)(1)’s controlled-substance element was broader for cocaine-related offenses than ACCA’s “serious drug offense” definition, so Defendant’s 1998 and 2004 cocaine-related convictions do not qualify as “serious drug offense[s].” The two Smith cases, Shular, and McNeill do not require the conclusion that Defendant’s prior cocaine-related convictions qualify as “serious drug offense[s].” Thus, because Defendant’s cocaine-related Section 893.13 offenses do not qualify as “serious drug offenses” under ACCA, the court vacated his sentence and remanded to the district court for sentencing without the ACCA enhancement. View "USA v. Eugene Jackson" on Justia Law

Following a guilty plea, Defendant objected to the presentence investigation report (“PSI”) arguing that pursuant to Section 2M5.2(a)(2), his base offense level should have been 14 rather than 26 because the weapons parts that were seized could be converted to only two functional weapons.   Interpreting U.S.S.G. Section 2M5.2(a)(2), the Eleventh Circuit explained that the subsection sets a lower base offense level for defendants convicted of illegally exporting weapons if the offense involved only non-fully automatic small arms and there were no more than two weapons. The question here is whether a defendant who exports enough weapons parts for two operable firearms, along with additional parts to service additional firearms, can take advantage of the lower base offense level.   The court affirmed Defendant’s sentence, finding that the district court applied the correct base offense level because Defendant’s offense did not fit within the narrow carveout set forth in Section 2M5.2(a)(2)(A); and the court lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s discretionary decision not to depart downward from the Guidelines. View "USA v. Christopher Daniel Stines" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 180-month sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At sentencing, the district court concluded that Defendant qualified for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. Section  924(e), because he had at least three prior “serious drug offenses.” On appeal, Defendant argued the “maximum term of imprisonment” is not the “statutory maximum” penalty but instead the high end of the particular sentencing range calculated for his prior convictions under Alabama’s presumptive sentencing standards.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant’s ACCA-enhanced sentence. The court found that the district court did not err in concluding that Defendant had at least three qualifying serious drug offenses under the ACCA and in imposing an enhanced 180-month sentence. The court explained that to count as a “serious drug offense” under the ACCA, the drug offenses must have a “maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more . . . prescribed by law.” See 18 U.S.C. Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Alabama’s statutory maximum penalties for each of Defendant’s drug offenses was ten years or more. The court applied the categorical approach and looked to the maximum statutory sentence for Defendant’s drug offenses, not to the high end of his presumptive sentencing range. View "USA v. Quinton Deairre Gardner" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and indicted under 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits an alien who "is illegally or unlawfully in the United States" from possessing a firearm. Defendant did not dispute that he possessed a firearm, but filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, claiming Section 922(g)(5)(A) violated his Second Amendment rights. The district court denied Defendant's motion, ultimately convicting him after a bench trial.Defendant appealed, arguing that because he lived in the United State prior to his arrest, he was among "the people" protected by the Second Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit rejected Defendant's argument, holding that the Second Amendment does not apply to all citizens. Under District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the Second Amendment confers the right to gun ownership to individuals, not collectively. Thus, certain groups of people are constitutionally deprived of the right to own or possess a gun. Based on the Eleventh Circuit's "'examination of a variety of legal and other sources' from the Founding era," aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States are among those who are constitutionally restricted from owning or possessing a firearm. View "USA v. Ignacio Jimenez-Shilon" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy and substantive health care fraud for fraudulently billing Medicare and Medicaid for millions of dollars for visits to nursing home patients that he never made. He challenged the convictions, sentence, restitution amount, and forfeiture amount on appeal. In an April 12, 2022 opinion, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentence.Following the court's initial opinion, Defendant filed a petition for rehearing en banc. The Eleventh Circuit considered Defendant's petition as a petition for a panel rehearing. The court granted Defendant's petition, vacated its previous opinion and issued a revised opinion that did not change the court's judgment or Defendant's sentence. Defendant was given 21 days to file a supplemental brief. View "USA v. Douglas Moss" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 habeas petition. The Eleventh Circuit issued a certificate of appealability and concluded that the district court properly denied Section 2254 habeas petition. The court reviewed Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims under the two-prong test set forth in Strickland. To prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, the petitioner must show (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.   The court held that counsel’s failure to assert the failure-to-inform theory as trial court error in briefing Petitioner’s appeal could not amount to ineffective assistance under Strickland. The fact that Petitioner was concerned about a joint trial, not joint representation, fully supports the Florida District Court of Appeal (“DCA”) rejection of this ineffective assistance claim. The court reasoned that the trial court appropriately responded to Petitioner’s concern by explaining why Petitioner would not be prejudiced by a joint trial: because the State had charged Petitioner as a principal in the armed robbery, all of the evidence that would be introduced in co-defendant’s trial would be introduced in his as well.   Further, the district court correctly concluded that Petitioner failed to establish that the DCA’s affirmance of this ineffective assistance claim constituted an adjudication that was “contrary to, or an incorrect application of,” the Supreme Court’s holdings in Strickland. View "Gregory Lamar Blackmon v. Secretary, Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence of 168 months imprisonment followed by 30 years of supervised release, imposed pursuant to his guilty plea for child sex crimes. He challenged the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his bottom-of-the-guidelines sentence, arguing that the district court did not properly consider the 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) factors. He also contested the imposition of a special condition of supervised release prohibiting him—absent probation office approval—from using or possessing a computer or a device capable of connecting to the internet and from possessing an “electronic data storage medium.”   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the relevant factors or imposing a special condition of supervised release. The court reasoned that the district court did not commit any procedural errors. Here, the district court stated that it had considered the advisory guidelines and “all of the factors” set out in Section 3553(a)(1)– (7) and reliance on some Section 3553(a) factors over others does not necessarily render a sentence unreasonable.   Next, the court reasoned that the sentence was substantively reasonable because the district court imposed the lowest possible prison sentence within the range and it was within the district court’s discretion to weigh the factors as it did and arrive at this sentence. Finally, the court held that a district court has discretion to impose any condition of supervised release it deems appropriate so long as it comports with the factors enumerated in Section 3553(a). View "USA v. Blaine Joyner Coglianese" on Justia Law

Defendant played several distinct roles in a large-scale methamphetamine drug trafficking conspiracy operating out of the Tampa Bay, Florida area. On appeal, he disputed various building blocks of his 135-month prison sentence imposed by the district court. His primary challenge involved the trial court’s determination that he was responsible for distributing 200 kilograms of methamphetamine. He also made three other arguments on appeal -- concerning his sentencing enhancement for possessing a firearm, the district court’s decision not to grant him a downward variance or downward departure, and the overall reasonableness of his sentence.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and held that the district court did not err in attributing 200 kilograms of methamphetamine to the drug trafficking organization as a whole. The court reasoned that under case law, the government meets its burden of establishing the relevant drug quantity by a preponderance of the evidence by convincing the trier of fact that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence. The court concluded that there is no basis on the record for the court to find that the total quantity determination reflected any clear error. Further, Defendant’s involvement was not limited to a single discrete act or a single discrete phase of this elaborate conspiracy. Additionally, the district court was justified in enhancing Defendant’s sentence on the grounds that his co-conspirator had stored a firearm at the stash house. View "USA v. Edwar Rodriguez" on Justia Law