Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner pled guilty to a charge of lewd or lascivious conduct and was sentenced to five years of sexual offender probation. The terms of that probation provided that he “qualified and shall register with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement as a sexual offender pursuant to Section 943.0435.” Petitioner—proceeding pro se—sought federal habeas corpus relief from his conviction pursuant to Section 2254. The state moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction because he was not “in custody” under Section 2254(a). The state argued that Petitioner was not in its physical custody at the time he filed his petition. Petitioner responded that his lifetime sex offender registration, “along with all the other restrictions that come with being a registered sex offender,” significantly restrained his individual liberty such that he was “in custody” for purposes of Section 2254(a). The district court dismissed Petitioner’s Section  2254 petition for lack of jurisdiction.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court found that Florida’s registration and reporting requirements for sex offenders do not render those offenders “in custody” within the meaning of Section 2254(a). The court reasoned that the proper inquiry here is under Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) and its progeny. First, he is not at the beck and call of state officials. Second, Petitioner is not required to live in a certain community or home and does not need permission to hold a job or drive a car. Third, Petitioner has to provide in-person advance notice of trips outside the state and outside the country, but the trips themselves do not require permission or approval by state officials. View "Louis Matthew Clements v. State of Florida, et al." on Justia Law

A grand jury charged Defendant with one count of possessing with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine. The district court found that the offense involved 287 grams of crack cocaine. Based on this drug-quantity finding and after applying a sentencing enhancement for three prior felony drug convictions, the district court imposed a statutorily mandated sentence of life imprisonment. In 2019, Defendant moved to reduce his sentence under the First Step Act. Defendant argued he was eligible for a sentence reduction because a judge, not a jury, made the drug-quantity finding that increased his statutory range. In October 2022, the Supreme Court granted Defendant’s petition. This appeal on remand from the Supreme Court required the Eleventh Circuit to reconsider, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022), whether the district court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for a reduced sentence under the First Step Act of 2018.   The Eleventh Circuit reinstated its prior decision and affirmed the denial of relief. The court concluded that Concepcion did not abrogate the reasoning of the court’s decision in United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2020), which forecloses Defendant’s claim for relief. The court also disagreed with the parties that Defendant is entitled to relief because his original sentence was pending on direct appeal when the Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). View "USA v. Warren Lavell Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 36-month prison sentence imposed upon revocation of his supervised release. He argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because (1) his conduct did not constitute a new criminal offense; (2) he accepted responsibility for his actions; and (3) he was less than a year away from completing his supervised release.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, Defendant’s above-the-guideline range sentence of 36 months was substantively reasonable. The district court acted within its discretion in giving greater weight to the nature and frequency of Defendant’s violations of the conditions of his supervisory release—including his continual methamphetamine use, failure to attend substance abuse treatment programs, and failure to report to his probation officer—than to his admission of the violations, lack of new criminal charges, and near completion of the term of the release. View "USA v. Eric King" on Justia Law

After a five-day trial, a jury convicted Defendant of healthcare fraud, conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, paying kickbacks in connection with a federal healthcare program, and conspiracy to pay and receive healthcare kickbacks. The district court sentenced him to 120 months in prison. On appeal, Defendant challenged his healthcare fraud convictions—but not his kickback convictions—on a number of grounds. The charges arose out of Defendant’s involvement in the submission of claims to Medicare for genetic cancer-screening (CGx) tests for beneficiaries who did not have cancer or familial history of cancer and that were not ordered by the beneficiaries’ primary care physicians.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that given the statutory and regulatory landscape, it agreed with the district court that the indictment was sufficient to charge Defendant with healthcare fraud. The indictment charged that CGx tests in question were not for beneficiaries who were being treated for cancer or who had a familial history of cancer and were not ordered by the beneficiaries’ treating physicians. Moreover, the government did not need to present evidence excluding every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or that was wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, provided that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. View "USA v. Ivan Andre Scott" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine, and one count of carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. Before his sentencing, a probation officer prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”). The PSR reported that Defendant had two previous convictions for controlled substance offenses. The PSR considered Defendant’s Section 846 conspiracy conviction to be his third controlled substance offense. Together, these three offenses qualified Defendant for the career offender enhancement under Section 4B1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines. On appeal, Defendant renewed his argument that his Section 846 conspiracy conviction did not count as a controlled substance offense. Defendant petitioned for, and the Eleventh Circuit granted, rehearing en banc to revisit its precedent.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded to the district court for resentencing. The court concluded that the text of Section 4B1.2(b) unambiguously excludes inchoate crimes. Under Kisor, that concluded the court’s analysis. Accordingly, the court wrote that it has no need to consider, much less defer to, the commentary in Application Note 1. Thus, the court held that Defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine in violation of Section 846 is not a controlled substance offense because the plain text of Section 4B1.2(b) unambiguously excludes inchoate crimes. Accordingly, Defendant must be resentenced without application of the career offender enhancement. View "USA v. Brandon Romel Dupree" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence of 36 months imprisonment for wire fraud, which is an upward variance from the guidelines range of 8 to 14 months. The district court imposed that sentence after Defendant pleaded guilty to providing false information to obtain an $85,000 Economic Injury Disaster Loan under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act. He challenged the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court appropriately considered the relevant Sections 3553(a) factors, provided a sufficiently compelling justification for varying from the guidelines range, and imposed a sentence that is both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The court explained that the district court was not required to state on the record that it explicitly considered each Section 3553(a) factor or to discuss each factor. It is enough that the record reflects the court’s consideration of the sentencing factors and the parties’ arguments. Further, the court held that the district court did not rely on any clearly erroneous facts in making its decision and adequately explained why it didn’t consider this to be a mine-run case, particularly because Defendant used his education and ability to exploit a government relief program. Moreover, the court wrote that the record shows that the district court considered the importance of deterrence along with other Section 3553(a) factors in varying upward. Those factors included the applicable guidelines range, Defendant’s history and characteristics, the seriousness of his crime, the nature and circumstances of it, and the need to promote respect for the law and to provide just punishment. View "USA v. Vinath Oudomsine" on Justia Law

The jury convicted Petitioner of second-degree murder and robbery. The verdict form included interrogatories about the firearm enhancement. After he was resentenced, Petitioner filed a third motion that asserted two grounds for relief. Petitioner filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus that asserted the same two claims for relief that he alleged in his third Florida Rule 3.850 motion. The district court denied the petition and denied Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. It determined that both of Petitioner’s claims were procedurally barred.   On appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus the Eleventh Circuit was required to decide whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by requesting that the jury be instructed on lesser included offenses. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition finding that Petitioner’s trial counsel did not render ineffective counsel. Further, the court wrote that because Petitioner’s claim that insufficient evidence supported his conviction was denied by the state courts based on an adequate and independent state procedural ground, he is also not entitled to relief on that claim. View "Demetrius Carey v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Defendant, a collector of child pornography, commented on several “mom blog” posts asking mothers to display sexually explicit images of their young daughters. At issue is whether requests constitute criminal attempts to produce child pornography under 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a) and (e). Defendant contends that his requests were so unlikely to succeed that they can’t support attempt liability. Second, he says that because he couldn’t have known—or even thought—that his plot would succeed, it can’t be shown that he knew or had reason to know that such visual depiction would be transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce,” as the production statute requires. Finally, he argued that his verbal requests were too insignificant to constitute the “substantial step” necessary to prove attempt.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. First, the sheer unlikelihood that Defendant’s requests to the mom-bloggers would result in the production of child pornography does not negate his desire—and thus his intent—to produce child pornography, and there is, in any event, plenty of evidence, even beyond the messages themselves, that he intended to do so. Second, contrary to Defendant’s suggestion, Section 2251(a)’s interstate-nexus element does not require that a defendant know ex-ante that his plot will succeed—only (as relevant here) that if it succeeds, the forbidden images will travel in interstate commerce. Finally, Defendant’s substantial-step argument, which he failed to clearly present to the district court, fails under plain-error review. View "USA v. Colum Patrick Moran, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with armed robbery under Georgia law. A grand jury later indicted Defendant for one count of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1), to which Defendant pled guilty. He ultimately pled guilty to the lesser included offense of robbery by intimidation. Defendant objected to the PSR’s classification of his prior conviction. He argued that robbery by sudden snatching, found within Georgia’s robbery statute, is not a crime of violence and Georgia’s robbery statute is indivisible under Mathis.Consequently, this would preclude robbery by intimidation from qualifying as a crime of violence. At the sentencing hearing, the district court held the statute is indivisible. At issue is whether Georgia’s robbery statute, O.C.G.A. Section 16-8-40, is divisible under Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016), and if so, whether robbery by intimidation under Georgia law is a crime of violence within the meaning of Section 4B1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court held that Georgia’s robbery statute is divisible and robbery by intimidation under Georgia law is a crime of violence under the Guidelines. Robbery by intimidation under Georgia law falls squarely within the generic definition of robbery. The offense requires the property be taken “from the person or the immediate presence of another.” O.C.G.A. Section 16-8-40(a) It thus qualifies as a crime of violence under the enumerated clause of the Guidelines. View "USA v. Chavar Alec Harrison" on Justia Law

Defendant challenges his convictions of healthcare fraud, illegal kickbacks, and money laundering and the related restitution award and forfeiture judgment. After Defendant filed this appeal, President Trump commuted his sentence of imprisonment and rendered any challenge to it moot. In his remaining challenges, Defendant argued that his indictment should have been dismissed because of prosecutorial misconduct, that the district court erroneously admitted expert opinion testimony against him, that the admissible evidence against him was insufficient to sustain his convictions, and that the restitution award and forfeiture judgment should be vacated.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that that the presidential commutation renders Defendant’s appeal of his prison sentence moot but does not otherwise affect his appeal. Second, the court explained that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to dismiss the indictment or to disqualify the prosecutors due to misconduct. Third, the court affirmed the admission of the expert-opinion testimony. Fourth, the court affirmed the restitution amount as not clearly erroneous. And fifth, the court held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Defendant of money laundering and that the forfeiture judgment based on money laundering was lawfully calculated. View "USA v. Philip Esformes" on Justia Law