Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of producing and possessing child pornography in violation, respectively, of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2251(a) and 2252A(a)(5)(b). On appeal, Defendant claimed raised three grounds of error, 1.) the government failed to trigger federal jurisdiction; 2.) the district court erred when it discharged an impaneled-but-not-yet sworn jury in his absence, and 3.) the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that by transferring content from his phone to a hard drive that was manufactured overseas, federal jurisdiction was triggered. The court noted that Defendant's counsel consented to the jury not being sworn and that doing so outside of his presence didn't raise constitutional concerns. Finally, the court found the evidence presented by the government to be sufficient to support Defendant's convictions. View "USA v. Clark Downs" on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court. Ruan v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2370 (2022) (Ruan II), the Eleventh Circuit ordered supplemental briefing to address whether the mens rea jury instruction used in this case was error and whether any such error was harmless. Among other things, Defendants challenged the jury instructions used for their substantive drug convictions under 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a), which prohibits the “knowing or intentional” dispensing of controlled substances “except as authorized.” The relevant drugs in this case are only “authorized” to be dispensed pursuant to a prescription, and an effective prescription must be made for a “legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice.” Defendants requested that the jury be instructed that their good faith be a defense to an allegation that they acted outside the “usual course of professional practice.”   The Eleventh Circuit vacated in part and affirmed in part Defendants’ convictions. The court explained that here, the district court did not adequately instruct the jury that Defendants must have “knowingly or intentionally” prescribed outside the usual course of their professional practices. At a minimum without the limiting qualification that only subjective good faith was sufficient for conviction, the jury was authorized to convict under the sort of objective good faith or honest effort standard rejected by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the court vacated Defendants’ substantive drug convictions under Section 841(a). The court vacated Defendants’ sentence for all counts and remanded for resentencing on the surviving counts. View "USA v. Xiulu Ruan, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner is a Florida prisoner serving three death sentences. After pursuing a direct appeal and postconviction relief in the Florida state courts, Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254, alleging, in relevant part, that his counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance during the penalty phase. After the district court denied Petitioner’s Section 2254 petition on the merits, the Eleventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on one issue: “Whether the district court erred in denying Jennings’s claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the penalty phase of his capital trial by failing to conduct further investigation into Petitioner’s childhood and background.”   The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision that Petitioner failed to establish prejudice was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and the court affirmed on that ground. The court wrote that given the facts of this case, it was not unreasonable for the state court to conclude that Defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to present the mitigation evidence in question during the penalty phase. As an initial matter, there is a significant probability that much of the omitted mitigation evidence, when combined with that adduced at trial, would have undermined some of the mitigating factors that the trial court found. Furthermore, there were significant aggravating factors present in this case. View "Brandy Bain Jennings v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, Sections (1) and 924(e)(1). In support of his guilty plea, the factual proffer shows that he unlawfully possessed a loaded firearm on September 26, 2017. Although Defendant conceded that he had two prior convictions that satisfy ACCA’s definition of a “violent felony,” he objected to the probation officer’s conclusion that his two cocaine-related convictions met ACCA’s “serious drug offense” definition. But the district court overruled Defendant’s objection, finding that his cocaine-related convictions did qualify and sentenced Defendant to ACCA’s mandatory fifteen-year minimum. Defendant appealed his sentence.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that ACCA’s definition of a state “serious drug offense” incorporates the version of the federal controlled substances schedules in effect when Defendant was convicted of the prior state drug offense. The court explained that when possible, the court interprets the provisions of a text harmoniously. To read the definition in Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) harmoniously with the rest of Section 924(e)’s subparts, the court wrote it must read that definition to incorporate the version of the federal controlled-substances schedules in effect when Defendant’s prior state convictions occurred. Thus, the court concluded that ACCA’s “serious drug offense” definition encompasses a prior state offense that involved “manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute” ioflupane, “for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law. Finally, the court wrote that Defendant suggested no other reason why Section 893.13(1) might be categorically broader than ACCA’s definition of a “serious drug offense.” View "USA v. Eugene Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendant who pleaded guilty to attempting to possess 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute has a prior 3-point offense but does not have more than 4 criminal history points or a prior 2-point violent offense. The district court concluded that Defendant remained eligible for relief under the Act because he did not have all three characteristics.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that Defendant was eligible for safety-valve relief despite his prior 3-point offense. The court further rejected the government’s arguments to the contrary. The court reasoned that because the conjunctive “and” joins together the enumerated characteristics, a defendant must have all three before he is ineligible for relief. The court explained that here Defendant’s prior 3-point offense does not disqualify him from safety-valve relief. Section 3553(f)(1) begins with a negative—“the defendant does not have”—and the three requirements that follow are joined by an “and.” View "USA v. Julian Garcon" on Justia Law

On March 26, 2020, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida suspended all grand jury sessions in response to the pandemic. On August 28, 2020, while the administrative order suspending grand jury sessions was still in effect, the government filed a sealed two-count information against B.G.G. The information charged B.G.G. with conspiring to accept kickbacks for prescribing opioids from August 2012 through August 31, 2015, in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 371, and with soliciting and receiving kickbacks for prescribing opioids on August 31, 20   The question in this case is whether the district court abused its limited discretion when it granted “leave” to dismiss the information against B.G.G. with prejudice. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order. The court explained that although “a dismissal under rule 48(a) does not bar a subsequent prosecution,” it also “does not impair the protection afforded by the statute of limitations.” If the grand jury later indicts B.G.G., he can still raise a statute of limitations defense. The court explained it need not pass on the statute of limitations issue and do not determine whether the sealed information was instituted within the meaning of section 3282(a). The court only concluded that the district court erred in not applying the “leave” requirements for dismissing an information under rule 48(a). The court vacated the dismissal order and remand to the district court for further proceedings. View "USA v. B.G.G." on Justia Law

Defendant seeks vacatur of his 71- month sentence. He contended the government breached his plea agreement by arguing at sentencing against recommendations it allegedly promised to make to support a lower sentence than Defendant received. The Eleventh Circuit subjected Defendant’s claims to plain-error review on direct review because Defendant never objected at sentencing that the government failed to live up to its bargain.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different district judge. The court explained that plain error occurred when the government breached the plea agreement and the breach prejudiced Defendant and seriously affected the integrity, fairness, and public reputation of the proceedings. The court wrote that here, the government breached its promise in the plea agreement to recommend a sentence within the guidelines range by advocating for an above-guidelines sentence. Even though the government stated at sentencing that it recommended a 66-month sentence, it then said that this was not enough and that Defendant deserved a sentence two or three times higher—an argument at war with its “recommendation.” For these reasons, the error that was plain occurred here, and the error affected Defendant’s substantial rights. View "USA v. Robert Brandon Malone" on Justia Law

Over the past 25 years, Florida lawmakers have amended the state's sex-offender registration law dozens of times, making them increasingly more burdensome. Following the state's 2018 amendments to the law, Plaintiffs, a group of men who were subject to the law based on convictions occurring before the amendment, challenged the constitutionality of the law. Finding that Plaintiffs' injuries all accrued in 2018, the district court dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims as untimely under the applicable four-year statute of limitations.The Eleventh Circuit reversed in part. Reviewing each of Plaintiffs' claims individually, the court found that while Plaintiff's injuries originated in 2018; they were ongoing. Thus, applying the continuing violation doctrine, the court reversed the district court's holding on several of Plaintiffs' claims, dismissing the remaining claims as untimely. View "Jane Doe, et al. v. Richard L. Swearingen" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted by a Georgia jury of kidnapping, robbery, gang rape, and murder. The jury recommended that Petitioner be sentenced to death for his crimes. Having exhausted his state post-conviction remedies, Petitioner filed a federal habeas corpus petition, arguing, as relevant here, that his trial counsel rendered him constitutionally ineffective assistance in connection with the sentencing phase of his trial. The district court denied relief, but a panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed and vacated Petitioner’s death sentence, holding that the state court’s rejection of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts and involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.   The Eleventh Circuit granted rehearing en banc to decide whether the state court’s decision that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his ineffective assistance claim warrants deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s petition and remanded it to the panel. The court held that the state court reasonably concluded that Petitioner was not prejudiced by any of his counsel’s alleged deficiencies in connection with his sentencing proceeding.   The court explained that while Petitioner argues that the background evidence that Mostiler should have presented parallels the evidence in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), and Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005), those cases “offer no guidance with respect to whether a state court has unreasonably determined that prejudice is lacking” because the Supreme Court “did not apply AEDPA deference to the question of prejudice in those cases.” View "Willie James Pye v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison" on Justia Law

Defendant argued that the district court improperly considered as an Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) predicate offense his prior conviction for drug trafficking under Florida Statutes Section 893.135(1)(b)1. Defendant contended that the particular Florida statute did not constitute a serious drug offense under the ACCA because the elements of that statute did not satisfy the requirements of the ACCA.The Eleventh Circuit certified the question raised by Defendant’s challenge to the Florida Supreme Court. The Florida Supreme Court answered the court’s certified question, holding that, for purposes of Florida’s drug trafficking statute, “a completed purchase requires proof that the defendant both (1) gave consideration for and (2) obtained control of a trafficking quantity of illegal drugs,” and further that “the requisite control [consists] of the same range of conduct that qualifies as constructive possession under federal law.” In light of this response, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence. View "USA v. Michael Anthony Conage" on Justia Law