Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for child pornography charges related to her two daughters. The court concluded that the district court did not violate defendant's constitutional right to present a defense by excluding expert testimony related to her intellectual disability where the proffered testimony was not key to any legally acceptable defense theory. The court also concluded that defendant's below-Guidelines sentence of 30 years in prison was substantively reasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, including the fact that defendant took about 500 images and videos of her two young children for her husband's sexual gratification. View "United States v. Litzky" on Justia Law

Defendants, members of the Plowshares Movement, appealed their convictions and sentences for conspiracy, destruction of property on a naval installation, depredation of government property, and trespass. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their actions illegally entering the Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay in St. Marys, Georgia to engage in religious protest of nuclear weapons.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions and sentences, concluding that the district court did not err in denying defendants' motions to dismiss the indictment under the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA); the district court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err in holding defendants jointly and severally liable for the full amount of restitution; any alleged error in failing to award Defendants Hennessy and Trotta reductions for acceptance of responsibility was harmless; the district court did not err in holding Hennessy accountable for the entire loss amount when imposing the USSG 2B1.1 enhancement; the district court did not err in failing to address Defendant Grady's RFRA-related sentencing argument; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to give Grady's requested mistake-of-fact jury instruction. View "United States v. Grady" on Justia Law

A confidential source (CI) met Ramirez, a Colombian national who was a legal resident of the U.S., and discussed the demand for AK-47 style weapons in Colombia. In 2017-2018, Ramirez obtained 45 firearms using straw purchasers in Florida and sold them throughout Colombia; he knowingly sold six firearms to the National Liberation Army (ELN), an insurgent group that the U.S. State Department has designated a foreign terrorist organization. Ramirez flew to Colombia to broker the weapons shipment with the CI and a known weapons broker for the ELN. Unbeknownst to Ramirez, two of the AK-style pistols contained hidden GPS trackers; those pistols were driven to an area controlled by the ELN and ultimately delivered to the ELN. Ramirez returned to Miami with $26,567.After additional transactions, Ramirez was arrested in the U.S., waived his Miranda rights, and admitted to using straw purchasers to buy firearms and smuggling them into Colombia. After pleading guilty, Ramirez received a 240-month sentence for providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1). Ramirez challenged the imposition of the terrorism enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3A1.4. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the sentence. The district court failed to make the required fact findings for the terrorism enhancement. The government must show that the defendant’s offense was planned to influence, affect, or retaliate against government conduct, even if that was not the defendant’s personal motive. View "United States v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Five co-defendants were charged with wire fraud, mail fraud, and conspiracy for their involvement in a telemarketing scheme to defraud stock investors. After an eight-week trial, during which the defendants made several motions for mistrial, the jury found each defendant guilty on all counts. At a post-trial hearing, the district court found that the prosecution had acted improperly in closing arguments but denied the defendants’ motions for mistrial. The court then granted judgments of acquittal based on insufficient evidence as to two defendants.The Eleventh Circuit reversed the judgments of acquittal granted to Wheeler and Long because there is a reasonable construction of the evidence that supports the jury’s verdicts. Sufficient evidence also supported the convictions of Sgarro, Smigrod, and Topping. The prosecution’s behavior did not rise to the level of misconduct. The theory-of-defense instruction explained that there is a “difference between deceiving and defrauding.” It is "cause for concern: that the prosecutor told the jury that this instruction was “not the law.” When considered in context, however, the prosecutor’s remarks were not -improper. The district judge repeatedly emphasized to the lawyers that the theory-of-defense instruction was not an instruction about the law and did not affect the legal elements for mail and wire fraud. Nor did any of the evidentiary rulings or the jury instructions warrant reversal. View "United States v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

Cox, a transgender woman, was assaulted at three different Georgia prisons for male inmates: At each of these institutions, Cox received estrogen injections, causing her to present with female features. Cox’s identity as a transgender woman within these male prisons made her a target for sexual and other physical abuse she was forced to endure at the hands of other inmates. Cox sued six Georgia Department of Corrections (GDC) officials, invoking 42 U.S.C. 1983, and alleging that the GDC officials, in failing to protect her, violated the Eighth Amendment. She further alleged that three GDC officials exhibited deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of serious harm she faced as a transgender inmate by failing to comply with the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), 34 U.S.C. 30301.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Cox’s suit. Cox failed to state a failure-to-protect Eighth Amendment claim; with respect to each defendant, she either failed to establish the subjective component of deliberate indifference or failed to allege facts suggesting that the defendant acted in an objectively unreasonable manner. The court rejected the PREA claims for the same reasons. View "Cox v. Deputy Warden" on Justia Law

Giron, a Colombian national federal prisoner acting pro se, sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion. The application notes for U.S.S.G. 1B1.13 identify four general categories of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justifying a sentence reduction: medical, age, family, and a “catch-all ‘other reasons’ category.” Section 1B1.13 constrains district courts’ authority to identify when extraordinary and compelling reasons exist and any sentence reduction must be “consistent with applicable policy statements.” Under the governing policy statement, medical conditions rise to the level of extraordinary and compelling only if the medical condition is a terminal illness or “substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within” prison. The court found that Giron’s high cholesterol, high blood pressure, and coronary artery disease were manageable in prison, despite the existence of the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court was not required to analyze 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors; the finding of no “extraordinary and compelling reasons” was sufficiently supported. View "United States v. Giron" on Justia Law

Americans and co-conspirators based in China schemed to obtain EB-1C work visas fraudulently for Chinese nationals. Their clients each deposited about $300,000 into a client-owned American bank account. The government did not prosecute the Chinese clients but sought forfeiture of the funds. The Chinese nationals filed claims for the funds.The State Department denied visa requests to allow certain Chinese nationals to attend the forfeiture trial. The U.S. Attorney unsuccessfully worked with their attorney and DHS to obtain parole letters granting them entry without a visa. The Chinese argued that their inability to attend violated the Due Process Clause by preventing them from presenting an “innocent owner” defense, 18 U.S.C. 983(d)(1). The district court denied the motion, noting other means to present their testimony, such as by video conference, and that counsel could present their defenses. All the Chinese were represented by counsel at trial; four attended and testified. The court instructed the jury that the government bore the burden of proving that the “funds made the . . . visa fraud scheme easy or less difficult or ensured that the scheme would be more or less free from obstruction or hindrance.”The jury found that the government had satisfied its burden of proof as to all the funds, that five Chinese nationals—four of whom had testified—had proved that they were innocent owners, and rejected the remaining innocent-owner defenses. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding no due process violation. View "United States v. Approximately $281,110.00 Seized from an East-West Bank Account, ending in the number 2471" on Justia Law

Defendants Perry and Ragin were indicted with seven other co-defendants on numerous charges related to their involvement in a substantial multi-year, multi-state drug distribution organization operating primarily in southern Georgia. In consolidated appeals, Perry challenges his convictions and Ragin challenges his sentence.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the DEA task force officer was properly qualified as an expert in interpreting code words for drugs, and that Perry failed to establish that he was substantially prejudiced by any offending comments the task force officer offered. Furthermore, Perry's other arguments similarly do not warrant reversing his convictions. The court also concluded that Ragin's challenges to his sentence are without merit. In this case, because the district court found that the drugs and firearms were part of a single course of conduct and were not an isolated, unrelated event, it did not err when it concluded that they were relevant for the purposes of determining Ragin's proper Guidelines range. Furthermore, the district court did not plainly err in sua sponte granting a two-level minor role reduction. View "United States v. Perry" on Justia Law

Tinker, a federal prisoner serving a 180-month sentence for possessing a firearm while a convicted felon, argued that his medical conditions—obesity, hypertension, a congenitally narrowed spinal canal, and mental illness—increased his risk of developing a severe illness should he contract Covid-19 and that such increased risk qualified him for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Assuming that Tinker could present “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for early release, as required by section 3582, the district court, after considering the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), and the requirements of U.S.S.G. 1B1.13, denied Tinker’s motion.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not procedurally err when it assumed, without explicitly finding, that Tinker could present “extraordinary and compelling reasons” before denying his motion based on section 3553(a)'s sentencing factors and section 1B1.13’s policy statement. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it weighed the section 3553(a) factors; the court emphasized Tinker’s extensive criminal history and the need to protect the public, which was within its discretion to do. The court acknowledged the parties’ filings, which discussed at length the factors that Tinker contends were ignored. View "United States v. Tinker" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition for rehearing, vacated its previous opinion and judgment, substituted this opinion in its place, and certified to the Florida Supreme Court two related questions about the nature of the Florida assault statutes: 1. Does the first element of assault as defined in Fla. Stat. 784.011(1) -- "an intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another" -- require specific intent? 2. If not, what is the mens rea required to prove that element of the statute? View "Somers v. United States" on Justia Law