Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
by
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the conditions of petitioner's supervision program render her "in custody" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2241, such that the district court had jurisdiction to consider her habeas petition. The court also concluded that petitioner did not validly self-execute the 1995 deportation order when, shortly before it was entered, she voluntarily left the United States. Whether the court resolved 8 U.S.C. 1101(g)'s ambiguity through the principle of lenity or through Chevron deference, the court reached the same conclusion: Section 1101(g)'s two conditions operate successively. In this case, petitioner left the Untied States before she was ordered removed and thus she was not "deported or removed" within the meaning of Section 1101(g). Accordingly, the government may lawfully deport her under the still-operative 1995 order. View "Argueta Romero v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

by
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of one count of transmitting interstate threats, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 875(c) (Count 1), and three counts of cyberstalking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2261A(2)(B) (Counts 2–4). Defendant's convictions stem from posts he made and messages he sent on Instagram, posing as various mass murderers including notorious serial killer Ted Bundy and Nikolas Cruz, the perpetrator of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School shooting.The court held that 18 U.S.C. 2261A(2)(B) is both facially constitutional and constitutional as applied to defendant's conduct. Finding the First Circuit persuasive, the court declined to employ the "strong medicine" of overbreadth in defendant's constitutional challenge to strike down section 2261A(2)(B). In regard to defendant's as-applied challenge, the court found meritless defendant's contention that his speech was regarding a matter of public concern and that the statute impermissibly restricts the content of his speech. In this case, the messages defendant sent amount to true threats and are therefore not afforded First Amendment protection. The court also concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction; the district court did not plainly err in admitting the government's expert testimony; and the court rejected defendant's challenges to the jury instructions. View "United States v. Fleury" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
Telcy, convicted of drug and firearms offenses, was sentenced to life imprisonment due to his armed career criminal enhancement. His 2010 section 2255 habeas petition, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, was rejected. In 2013 and 2016, Telcy unsuccessfully sought permission to file second or successive section 2255 habeas petitions. In 2019, under the First Step Act, the district court. reduced Telcy’s sentence to a term of 235 months without holding a hearing or revisiting its previous factual findings.Telcy again sought permission to file a second or successive 2255 habeas petition, arguing that, because his guideline range was based on the ACCA enhancement and the district court considered this guideline range when it imposed a reduced sentence, he would suffer adverse collateral consequences if he were not allowed to challenge the enhancement in light of the Supreme Court’s Johnson decision. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his petition. For purposes of the bar on second or successive 2255 motions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a First Step Act sentence reduction is not a “new judgment” that resets the clock, allowing a defendant to file a new, “first” habeas petition. When a district judge reduces a sentence under the First Step Act, the court is not authorized to conduct a plenary, de novo resentencing; the sentence reduction does not affect the validity or lawfulness of the underlying sentence. View "Telcy v. United States" on Justia Law

by
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for child pornography charges related to her two daughters. The court concluded that the district court did not violate defendant's constitutional right to present a defense by excluding expert testimony related to her intellectual disability where the proffered testimony was not key to any legally acceptable defense theory. The court also concluded that defendant's below-Guidelines sentence of 30 years in prison was substantively reasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, including the fact that defendant took about 500 images and videos of her two young children for her husband's sexual gratification. View "United States v. Litzky" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
Defendants, members of the Plowshares Movement, appealed their convictions and sentences for conspiracy, destruction of property on a naval installation, depredation of government property, and trespass. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their actions illegally entering the Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay in St. Marys, Georgia to engage in religious protest of nuclear weapons.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions and sentences, concluding that the district court did not err in denying defendants' motions to dismiss the indictment under the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA); the district court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err in holding defendants jointly and severally liable for the full amount of restitution; any alleged error in failing to award Defendants Hennessy and Trotta reductions for acceptance of responsibility was harmless; the district court did not err in holding Hennessy accountable for the entire loss amount when imposing the USSG 2B1.1 enhancement; the district court did not err in failing to address Defendant Grady's RFRA-related sentencing argument; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to give Grady's requested mistake-of-fact jury instruction. View "United States v. Grady" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
A confidential source (CI) met Ramirez, a Colombian national who was a legal resident of the U.S., and discussed the demand for AK-47 style weapons in Colombia. In 2017-2018, Ramirez obtained 45 firearms using straw purchasers in Florida and sold them throughout Colombia; he knowingly sold six firearms to the National Liberation Army (ELN), an insurgent group that the U.S. State Department has designated a foreign terrorist organization. Ramirez flew to Colombia to broker the weapons shipment with the CI and a known weapons broker for the ELN. Unbeknownst to Ramirez, two of the AK-style pistols contained hidden GPS trackers; those pistols were driven to an area controlled by the ELN and ultimately delivered to the ELN. Ramirez returned to Miami with $26,567.After additional transactions, Ramirez was arrested in the U.S., waived his Miranda rights, and admitted to using straw purchasers to buy firearms and smuggling them into Colombia. After pleading guilty, Ramirez received a 240-month sentence for providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1). Ramirez challenged the imposition of the terrorism enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3A1.4. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the sentence. The district court failed to make the required fact findings for the terrorism enhancement. The government must show that the defendant’s offense was planned to influence, affect, or retaliate against government conduct, even if that was not the defendant’s personal motive. View "United States v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
Five co-defendants were charged with wire fraud, mail fraud, and conspiracy for their involvement in a telemarketing scheme to defraud stock investors. After an eight-week trial, during which the defendants made several motions for mistrial, the jury found each defendant guilty on all counts. At a post-trial hearing, the district court found that the prosecution had acted improperly in closing arguments but denied the defendants’ motions for mistrial. The court then granted judgments of acquittal based on insufficient evidence as to two defendants.The Eleventh Circuit reversed the judgments of acquittal granted to Wheeler and Long because there is a reasonable construction of the evidence that supports the jury’s verdicts. Sufficient evidence also supported the convictions of Sgarro, Smigrod, and Topping. The prosecution’s behavior did not rise to the level of misconduct. The theory-of-defense instruction explained that there is a “difference between deceiving and defrauding.” It is "cause for concern: that the prosecutor told the jury that this instruction was “not the law.” When considered in context, however, the prosecutor’s remarks were not -improper. The district judge repeatedly emphasized to the lawyers that the theory-of-defense instruction was not an instruction about the law and did not affect the legal elements for mail and wire fraud. Nor did any of the evidentiary rulings or the jury instructions warrant reversal. View "United States v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

by
Cox, a transgender woman, was assaulted at three different Georgia prisons for male inmates: At each of these institutions, Cox received estrogen injections, causing her to present with female features. Cox’s identity as a transgender woman within these male prisons made her a target for sexual and other physical abuse she was forced to endure at the hands of other inmates. Cox sued six Georgia Department of Corrections (GDC) officials, invoking 42 U.S.C. 1983, and alleging that the GDC officials, in failing to protect her, violated the Eighth Amendment. She further alleged that three GDC officials exhibited deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of serious harm she faced as a transgender inmate by failing to comply with the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), 34 U.S.C. 30301.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Cox’s suit. Cox failed to state a failure-to-protect Eighth Amendment claim; with respect to each defendant, she either failed to establish the subjective component of deliberate indifference or failed to allege facts suggesting that the defendant acted in an objectively unreasonable manner. The court rejected the PREA claims for the same reasons. View "Cox v. Deputy Warden" on Justia Law

by
Giron, a Colombian national federal prisoner acting pro se, sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion. The application notes for U.S.S.G. 1B1.13 identify four general categories of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justifying a sentence reduction: medical, age, family, and a “catch-all ‘other reasons’ category.” Section 1B1.13 constrains district courts’ authority to identify when extraordinary and compelling reasons exist and any sentence reduction must be “consistent with applicable policy statements.” Under the governing policy statement, medical conditions rise to the level of extraordinary and compelling only if the medical condition is a terminal illness or “substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within” prison. The court found that Giron’s high cholesterol, high blood pressure, and coronary artery disease were manageable in prison, despite the existence of the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court was not required to analyze 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors; the finding of no “extraordinary and compelling reasons” was sufficiently supported. View "United States v. Giron" on Justia Law

by
Americans and co-conspirators based in China schemed to obtain EB-1C work visas fraudulently for Chinese nationals. Their clients each deposited about $300,000 into a client-owned American bank account. The government did not prosecute the Chinese clients but sought forfeiture of the funds. The Chinese nationals filed claims for the funds.The State Department denied visa requests to allow certain Chinese nationals to attend the forfeiture trial. The U.S. Attorney unsuccessfully worked with their attorney and DHS to obtain parole letters granting them entry without a visa. The Chinese argued that their inability to attend violated the Due Process Clause by preventing them from presenting an “innocent owner” defense, 18 U.S.C. 983(d)(1). The district court denied the motion, noting other means to present their testimony, such as by video conference, and that counsel could present their defenses. All the Chinese were represented by counsel at trial; four attended and testified. The court instructed the jury that the government bore the burden of proving that the “funds made the . . . visa fraud scheme easy or less difficult or ensured that the scheme would be more or less free from obstruction or hindrance.”The jury found that the government had satisfied its burden of proof as to all the funds, that five Chinese nationals—four of whom had testified—had proved that they were innocent owners, and rejected the remaining innocent-owner defenses. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding no due process violation. View "United States v. Approximately $281,110.00 Seized from an East-West Bank Account, ending in the number 2471" on Justia Law