Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants Perry and Ragin were indicted with seven other co-defendants on numerous charges related to their involvement in a substantial multi-year, multi-state drug distribution organization operating primarily in southern Georgia. In consolidated appeals, Perry challenges his convictions and Ragin challenges his sentence.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the DEA task force officer was properly qualified as an expert in interpreting code words for drugs, and that Perry failed to establish that he was substantially prejudiced by any offending comments the task force officer offered. Furthermore, Perry's other arguments similarly do not warrant reversing his convictions. The court also concluded that Ragin's challenges to his sentence are without merit. In this case, because the district court found that the drugs and firearms were part of a single course of conduct and were not an isolated, unrelated event, it did not err when it concluded that they were relevant for the purposes of determining Ragin's proper Guidelines range. Furthermore, the district court did not plainly err in sua sponte granting a two-level minor role reduction. View "United States v. Perry" on Justia Law

Tinker, a federal prisoner serving a 180-month sentence for possessing a firearm while a convicted felon, argued that his medical conditions—obesity, hypertension, a congenitally narrowed spinal canal, and mental illness—increased his risk of developing a severe illness should he contract Covid-19 and that such increased risk qualified him for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Assuming that Tinker could present “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for early release, as required by section 3582, the district court, after considering the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), and the requirements of U.S.S.G. 1B1.13, denied Tinker’s motion.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not procedurally err when it assumed, without explicitly finding, that Tinker could present “extraordinary and compelling reasons” before denying his motion based on section 3553(a)'s sentencing factors and section 1B1.13’s policy statement. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it weighed the section 3553(a) factors; the court emphasized Tinker’s extensive criminal history and the need to protect the public, which was within its discretion to do. The court acknowledged the parties’ filings, which discussed at length the factors that Tinker contends were ignored. View "United States v. Tinker" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition for rehearing, vacated its previous opinion and judgment, substituted this opinion in its place, and certified to the Florida Supreme Court two related questions about the nature of the Florida assault statutes: 1. Does the first element of assault as defined in Fla. Stat. 784.011(1) -- "an intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another" -- require specific intent? 2. If not, what is the mens rea required to prove that element of the statute? View "Somers v. United States" on Justia Law

Smith, a Muslim serving a life sentence, sued the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDOC) under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, claiming that GDOC’s grooming policy, which prohibits inmates from growing facial hair over a half-inch in length, placed a substantial burden on his religious exercise. The district court rejected Smith’s RLUIPA claim, finding that “GDOC ha[d] offered logical and persuasive reasons to show that allowing untrimmed beards would be unmanageable for GDOC” and that “it is plausible that allowing a close security inmate like Smith an untrimmed beard could be dangerous for prison security.” Rather than rule in favor of GDOC, the district court fashioned a remedy that neither party had requested: it held that RLUIPA entitled Smith to grow a three-inch beard.The Eleventh Circuit vacated. The district court’s determination that it was reasonable for GDOC to conclude that allowing Smith to grow an untrimmed beard would be both unmanageable and dangerous was not clearly erroneous but its ruling requiring GDOC to allow Smith to grow a three-inch beard was improper and contrary to the Supreme Court’s 2015 holding, Holt v. Hobbs, that courts should consider only the plaintiff’s proposed alternatives in deciding whether there is an available less restrictive means for the government to further its compelling interests under RLUIPA. View "Smith v. Dozier" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit issued this decision on remand from the en banc court.In this case, law enforcement agents had placed a GPS tracking device in two packages after finding cocaine hidden in them. The agents put both packages into the mail stream and attempted to track the packages. The court concluded that, at the time the district court entered the suppression order, the law of this circuit was that the prospects of ultimate discovery were to be gauged under the reasonable probability standard. The controlling standard has changed, and is now the preponderance of the evidence, more likely than not, standard. The court reversed and remanded for the district court to give it an opportunity to decide in its discretion whether to conduct a do-over evidentiary hearing or to accept the fact findings the magistrate judge made after conducting the hearing that he did. If the district court decides not to hold another evidentiary hearing, it should enter an order denying the motion to suppress. If the court does decide to conduct another evidentiary hearing, it should make credibility decisions, enter fact findings of its own, and rule on the motion to suppress based on those findings. View "United States v. Watkins" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit denied a petition for review challenging the BIA's dismissal of petitioner's appeal from the IJ's removal order. The court concluded that each of petitioner's two Georgia convictions for simple battery was a crime of violence for which the term of imprisonment was at least one year, within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F). Therefore, petitioner was convicted of two "aggravated felonies," as that term is defined in the Immigration and Naturalization Act, and is ineligible for cancellation of removal. View "Talamantes-Enriquez v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a criminal alien facing deportation to Somalia, petitions for review of the order of the BIA confirming his removability and denying his applications for withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and a refugee inadmissibility waiver. Petitioner also challenges the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that petitioner failed to preserve whether his defective notice to appear violated the agency's claim-processing rules; petitioner is removable for his controlled substance conviction; and, in the alternative, petitioner is removable for his second-degree assault conviction. The court also concluded that the Board denied the refugee inadmissibility waiver under the correct legal standard; the Board did not err in denying petitioner's applications for withholding of removal and for protection under the CAT; and petitioner's habeas petition is moot as to detention under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), and is not ripe as to detention under section 1231(a). Accordingly, the court dismissed in part, denied in part, dissolving the stay of removal and remanded with instructions to dismiss the habeas petition. The court denied the government's motion to dismiss the appeal. View "Farah v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Officer Sullivan pulled over Braddy on I-65 in Saraland, Alabama, after seeing Braddy react to the presence of his marked patrol vehicle and observing that Braddy’s vehicle’s license tag was obscured by bicycles. During the traffic stop, officers discovered cocaine in Braddy’s vehicle following two canine sniffs. Braddy was charged with possession with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846.The trial court denied his motion to suppress, rejecting an argument that the reason for pulling Braddy over, a violation of an Alabama law requiring motor vehicle operators to keep their license plates plainly visible, did not provide probable cause because the statute did not apply to Braddy as a nonresident of Alabama. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Any mistake of law by Sullivan was objectively reasonable and the traffic stop of Braddy’s vehicle was based on probable cause. Sullivan did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop. There was probable cause to search Braddy’s vehicle based on the reliability of the drug detection dogs’ alerts. View "United States v. Braddy" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the GDC and ASMP officials. The district court found that plaintiff did not properly exhaust the available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).The court rejected plaintiff's contention that there were no available administrative remedies under the GDC policy. Rather, the court concluded that the GDC's grievance policy is distinct from the policy at issue in Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856–57 (2016), and is not a "dead end." Furthermore, inmates need not wait for the Internal Investigations Unit investigation to conclude before filing a civil suit. The court explained that, under the GDC procedure, an inmate exhausts his administrative remedies once he properly submits a grievance alleging excessive force because that act automatically ends the grievance process. Finally, regardless of whether an inmate's mental illness may render an administrative remedy unavailable in some other case, it did not do so here. Because plaintiff did not file a timely grievance and because GDC did not waive the procedural defects in the untimely grievances that he did file, the court concluded that he failed to satisfy the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. View "Varner v. Shepard" on Justia Law

During a criminal investigation into money laundering and wire fraud, the FBI obtained a search warrant to be executed at the Miami offices of entities that comprise the Optima Companies, which were located in a business suite. The warrant identified the items to be seized, including records of and concerning two Ukrainian nationals and several American citizens who allegedly own, control, or manage more than 30 entities that fall under the name “Optima” and have offices in the Miami offices. Among the materials seized were items from the office of an in-house attorney. Optima and affiliated individuals asserting attorney-client and work-product privilege, moved under Rule 41(g), Fed. R. Crim. P., to prohibit the government’s filter team (attorneys and staff who were not involved in the criminal investigation) from reviewing any potentially privileged documents unless either they agreed or the court, after conducting its own privilege review, ordered disclosure.The district court imposed a modified filter protocol but denied the request to prohibit anyone from the government from reviewing potentially privileged documents without consent or court order. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that government filter teams per se violate privilege holders’ rights. The modified filter-team protocol allows the Optima parties to conduct the initial privilege review and requires their permission or court order for any purportedly privileged documents to be released. The filter team cannot inadvertently provide the investigation team with any privileged materials. View "United States v. Korf" on Justia Law