Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Mitchell was a Duval County Jail pretrial detainee. Detective Simpson told a jail official to “obtain,” “seize,” and “confiscate and review” all of Mitchell’s incoming and outgoing mail. A mail clerk, Perkins, delivered a letter from Mitchell’s attorney marked “Legal Mail” that had already been opened. When Perkins later asked Mitchell specific questions about his case, Mitchell concluded that she had read at least part of the letter. During the next year, Mitchell continued to experience issues with his mail. Perkins switched an outgoing letter to Mitchell’s family with another inmate’s letter. Sergeant Clark, the mailroom supervisor, tried to “intimidate” Mitchell, intercepting his grievances and warning him to stop filing complaints.Mitchell filed a pro se complaint alleging that Simpson, Perkins, and Clark, violated his constitutional rights. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, noting that: A simple rule has governed prison mail procedures in our Circuit for nearly 50 years: a prison official may not open an inmate’s properly marked legal mail outside of his presence. The defendants’ conduct violated Mitchell’s First Amendment right to free speech; it was clearly established that the officials’ conduct was unlawful. View "Mitchell v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 2002, Hayes, age 20, violently attacked his 60-year-old neighbor without provocation or apparent motive, causing her to lapse into a coma. Hayes was later seen burning items in his backyard. Clothing recovered from the burn pile contained the victim’s blood. Charged with attempted first-degree murder with a deadly weapon and armed trespassing, Hayes was found incompetent to proceed and transferred to a state mental health facility. After months of treatment, the psychology department and two court-appointed psychiatrists concluded that Hayes was competent to proceed Counsel filed a notice of intent to rely on an insanity defense and renewed his objection to the competence finding but never obtained an expert opinion regarding Hayes’ sanity at the time of the attack. On the first day of trial, defense counsel withdrew the insanity defense, allegedly at Hayes' request. Defense counsel did not call witnesses but attempted to present a misidentification defense through cross-examination. At sentencing, new defense counsel presented extensive evidence of Hayes’ mental illnesses. The court called Hayes “mentally disturbed” but sentenced him to life imprisonment.Hayes argued that trial counsel was ineffective for abandoning the insanity defense. The Eleventh Circuit reversed a grant of federal habeas relief. To establish prejudice, Hayes must show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The district court instead relied on a prejudice test that was rejected by the Supreme Court. Under the clear and convincing standard required by Florida law, Hayes cannot show a reasonable probability that his insanity defense would have been successful if presented to the jury View "Hayes v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted rehearing en banc and this is the decision of the en banc court vacating the panel opinion and remanding the case to the panel for further proceedings.The en banc court held that Supreme Court precedent requires the use of the preponderance standard of predictive proof in ultimate discovery exception cases. Even if the court were not to do so, the court held that the preponderance standard must be used because of the advantages it has over the reasonable probability standard when it comes to finding whether evidence ultimately would have been discovered through lawful means if the constitutional violation had not taken place. View "United States v. Watkins" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit joined the Fourth and Sixth Circuits in holding that a sentence imposed upon the revocation of supervised release qualifies for a reduction under section 404(b) of the First Step Act when the underlying crime is a covered offense under the Act.However, the court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a sentence reduction. In this case, the district court provided an alternative reason for the denial of a sentence reduction based on defendant's "unwillingness or inability to abide by the law" and his "continued lawless behavior"—as demonstrated by his prison disciplinary record and most recent drug and firearm offenses—and a concern about recidivism. The court concluded that the district court's reasons were clear, supported by the record, and did not constitute an abuse of discretion. View "United States v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Coats, then a convicted felon, was arrested after making several (recorded) controlled drug sales to a confidential informant (CI). Coats was housed at the Wilkinson County jail, where the CI was also in custody. Coats gained access to the CI and punched him. That incident resulted in additional state charges for battery and influencing a witness, to which he pleaded guilty.Coats then pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Coats to serve 235 months' imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which applies when a defendant who is convicted under section 922(g) has three prior convictions for a “serious drug offense” or a “violent felony.” Coats had a 2003 Georgia burglary conviction, which the court determined was a violent felony under ACCA. The court denied an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction to his sentencing range, citing his obstructive conduct preceding his guilty plea.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Any Rehaif error was nonprejudicial; Coats was not informed of section922(g)’s essential "knowledge" requirement, but he made no attempt to show that he would not have pled guilty but for that error. Of the 12 criminal convictions identified in his PSR, at least four were for felonies. Coats did not dispute the PSR’s description of his criminal history. The burglary conviction qualifies as an ACCA violent felony and the district court did not clearly err in refusing to award an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. View "United States v. Coats" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction for conspiring to distribute and distributing controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846, 841, and conspiring to commit and committing health care fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1349, 1347. Defendant's conviction stemmed from a large governmental investigation of a pill mill. The district court sentenced defendant to 120 months in prison for each count, to run concurrently.The Eleventh Circuit reversed defendant's conviction for health care fraud under Count 24 where the government concedes, and the court agrees, that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. The court explained that Indian Nat Insurance—an entity not named in the indictment—was billed for the prescriptions pertaining to this count. The court affirmed the remainder of defendant's convictions and the district court's evidentiary rulings. Finally, in regards to the contested jury instruction, the court found no plain error affected defendant's substantial rights. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Akwuba" on Justia Law

To root out police corruption in Miami, the FBI created a reverse sting operation, having agents pose as would-be drug dealers. Officer Anderson became the subject of the investigation and eventually agreed to act as a cooperating witness, wearing a recording device. Anderson identified Officer Harris as having corruptly engaged in misconduct. At the FBI’s direction, Anderson set up the “protection” operation, during which officers Harris and Archibald protected “drug couriers” as they delivered containers purportedly filled with cocaine to hotels. Both were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to support their convictions. With respect to an entrapment defense, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to take part in the charged crimes. Archibald was not entitled to a duress instruction. The court rejected claims of perjury and government misconduct with respect to grand jury proceedings. The defendants failed to establish that the prosecutor struck an African American juror because of race, in violation of “Batson.” The district court did not err by not providing the jury with a read-back of Archibald’s testimony. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to clarify, modify, and terminate early his term of supervised release. The court also affirmed a July 2017 sealed order, which required him to disclose details about work he performs as part of the security company he owns and operates and to inform prospective clients of his sex offender status. Defendant is serving his supervised release term of ten years as part of his sentence for accessing with intent to view child pornography.The court concluded that the district court did not add an occupational restriction or otherwise modify the conditions of defendant's supervised release when it entered the July 2017 sealed order, and therefore no evidentiary hearing was required and the district court was not required to address the U.S.S.G. 5F1.5 factors. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to modify the conditions of his supervised release which sought the elimination of the internet restriction. As with the motion to modify, the record establishes that the district court considered the relevant 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and did not abuse its discretion in denying summarily the motion for early termination. View "United States v. Cordero" on Justia Law

A conviction under Fla. Stat. 790.23(1)(a)—which makes it unlawful for a convicted felon to "own or to have in his or her care, custody, possession, or control any firearm, ammunition, or electric weapon or device, or to carry a concealed weapon, including a tear gas gun or chemical weapon or device"—does not constitute a "firearm offense" within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(C), and its cross-reference to 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3).The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's final order of removal and vacated the BIA's decision deeming petitioner removable under section 1227(a)(2)(C) of the INA, based on his conviction for a violation of Fla. Stat. 790.23(1)(a). Applying the categorical approach, the court explained that the prohibited items for the possession and concealed carrying offenses in section 790.23(1)(a) are means of committing those crimes, and not elements of separate crimes. View "Simpson v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court in light of the Court's holding that 18 U.S.C. 1030 applies when a person "accesses a computer with authorization but then obtains information located in particular areas of that computer—such as files, folders, or databases—that are off limits to him," Van Buren v. United States, 593 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 1648, 1652, 1662 (2021), the Eleventh Circuit vacated defendant's conviction for computer fraud under section 1030 and remanded for further proceedings. In this case, section 1030 does not cover those who, like defendant, have improper motives for obtaining information that is otherwise available to them. View "United States v. Van Buren" on Justia Law