Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions and sentences for conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1349; and wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343. Defendants' convictions stemmed from three public housing repair contracts that their construction company procured following successful bids to the county. The court held that the government presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that defendants intentionally participated in a scheme to defraud to constitute wire fraud, and knowingly and voluntarily engaged in a conspiracy to commit wire fraud. View "United States v. Estepa" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's imposition of an electronic search condition on defendant's conditions of supervised release and affirmed his above-guideline 30-month sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the special condition where, although the electronic search condition did not relate directly to defendant's firearm offense, it was reasonably related to his history as a recidivist and the statutory goals of deterring him from future potentially dangerous offenses. Furthermore, defendant was a chronic lawbreaker and the condition was neither vague nor overbroad.The court also concluded that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court weighed the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors and placed heavy emphasis on the nature and circumstances of the offense in light of defendant's prior criminal history, promoting respect for the law, and deterring defendant from continued violations of the prohibition against him possessing a gun. In this case, it was defendant's seventh conviction for illegally possessing a gun and defendant received little to no jail time for his previous offenses. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

In 2006, Potts pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii) and 846. In a consolidated case, Potts pled guilty to conspiracy to manufacture, possess with intent to distribute, and distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine and at least 5 kilograms of powder cocaine, sections 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii) and 846; and being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and 924(e). The court imposed three concurrent 240-month sentences. In 2019, Potts sought a sentence reduction under the First Step Act, 132 Stat. 5194. The district court found Potts was ineligible because he was not sentenced for a “covered offense” and that section 3553(a)'s factors indicate that a sentence reduction is unwarranted. In 2020, while Potts’ appeal was pending, the court granted Potts compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), after analyzing the 3553(a) factors and finding compelling reasons: Potts’ serious medical conditions rendered him uniquely vulnerable to COVID-19. The court imposed an additional 37-month supervised release term—the unserved portion of his original prison sentence—to be served on “home confinement” before serving his original, concurrent supervised release terms.The Eleventh Circuit then affirmed the denial of his 2019 motion. The 2020 motion rendered the issue moot with respect to his incarceration but not with respect to supervised release. The court’s refusal to reduce Potts’ supervised release terms was not an abuse of its discretion. View "United States v. Potts" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for attempted enticement of a minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity and traveling across a state line with the intent to engage in sexual activity with a person under the age of 12 years.The court concluded that there was no error in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on outrageous conduct grounds; the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress the child pornography on his computers; the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence that defendant possessed child pornography, in overruling his objection on Fifth Amendment grounds, or in instructing the jury that it could consider his refusal to answer questions about his possession of child pornography in assessing his credibility; the district court did not abuse its discretion by not permitting one of defendant's expert witnesses to testify before the jury as irrelevant; and defendant's 35 year term of imprisonment was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Castaneda" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order denying defendant's motion for a sentence reduction under section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. The court agreed with the government that defendant was eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act and that the district court erred in finding otherwise. However, notwithstanding the government's concession, the court must still decide whether the district court, in its alternative holding, abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a sentence reduction.The court held that the First Step Act does not require that the district court consider the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors when exercising its discretion to reduce a sentence under section 404(b) of the First Step Act. The court explained that the district court's alternative ruling denying defendant's request to reduce or terminate his term of supervised release failed to provide a sufficient explanation to allow for meaningful appellate review. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Stevens" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he was convicted of selling heroin and possessing a firearm as a felon. In this case, after agreeing to sell heroin and a firearm to a confidential informant, defendant sold the heroin as promised but failed to deliver the firearm on that date. Afterwards, he provided the firearm at the same time his associate provided more heroin for sale to the informant.The court upheld the district court's application of USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), which increases the offense level by four if the defendant "used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense." The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that a sufficient connection existed between the first heroin sale and the later firearm sale. Therefore, the guidelines calculation was correct and defendant's sentence was not procedurally unreasonable. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Garcon pleaded guilty to attempted possession of 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute. Garcon faced a five-year statutory minimum sentence. His PSR recommended a three-point reduction for timely acceptance of responsibility and noted a previous three-point offense for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. Garcon's Guidelines sentence range was 41–51 months but because of the five-year statutory minimum, the term was 60 months. The district court found Garcon eligible for the safety valve provision, 18 U.S.C. 3553(f) because he had less than four criminal history points and did not have a prior two-point violent offense.The Eleventh Circuit vacated. Under the First Step Act's "safety valve," district courts “shall” sentence certain convicted drug offenders with little or no criminal history according to the Sentencing Guidelines “without regard to any statutory mandatory minimum sentence.” A defendant convicted of a specified drug offense is eligible for safety valve relief only if: (1) the defendant does not have— (A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the guidelines. Section 3553(f)(1) is written in the disjunctive. Garcon is ineligible because he met one of the three disqualifying criteria with his prior three-point conviction. View "United States v. Garcon" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit held that the term "sexual activity" in USSG 2422(b) does not require interpersonal physical contact. In this case, defendant's conduct with respect to the nine-year old victim—including sending her a photo of his penis and asking her for naked pictures—constituted "sexual activity" because it was done for the purpose of sexual gratification. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's ruling in this respect.However, the court vacated the application of the five-level enhancement under USSG 2G2.2(b)(5) and set aside defendant's sentence because the district court did not determine, as required by section 2422(b), whether the "sexual activity" was conduct "for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense." On remand, the court instructed the district court to rule on that issue after hearing from the parties, and after doing so shall resentence defendant. View "United States v. Dominguez" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was initially sentenced for crack-related crimes to a term of "life imprisonment without release," moved to modify his sentence under the First Step Act and 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(B). The district court granted the motion to reduce his prison term, but also concluded that the First Step Act required it to impose an eight-year term of supervised release.The Eleventh Circuit held that the First Step Act is self-contained and self-executing, and that a motion brought under that Act need not be paired with a request for relief under section 3582(c)(1)(B). The court also concluded that a district court has the authority under the First Step Act to impose a new term of supervised release on a First Step Act movant, provided that it reduces the movant's overall sentence. In this case, the court rejected defendant's contention that the district court exceeded its statutory authority under the First Step Act when it included the release term in his modified sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

Defendant, a corrupt former police officer who was sentenced to prison for running drugs and guns, filed a motion seeking a reduction in his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). The district court denied the motion based on the Sentencing Commission's policy statement found at USSG 1B1.13.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed and concluded that section 1B1.13 is an applicable policy statement for all section 3582(c)(1)(A) motions, and Application Note 1(D) does not grant discretion to courts to develop "other reasons" that might justify a reduction in a defendant's sentence. In this case, because defendant's motion does not fall within any of the reasons that section 1B1.13 identifies as "extraordinary and compelling," the district court correctly denied his motion for a reduction of his sentence. View "United States v. Bryant" on Justia Law