Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court concluded that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals' (CCA) denial of petitioner's guilt-phase ineffective assistance claim was not an unreasonable determination of the facts or contrary to clearly established law; federal law does not clearly establish that Alabama's hearsay rules create a due process violation; and the CCA's determination that the prosecution did not shift the burden of proof to petitioner was neither unreasonable nor contrary to clearly established law.In this case, the Rule 32 court's determinations that petitioner's trial counsel's performance was not deficient, and that petitioner could not show prejudice, were not unreasonable. Furthermore, Alabama's application of its hearsay rules to exclude testimony at petitioner's state habeas evidentiary hearing did not violate his due process rights under clearly established federal law. Finally, the prosecutor's comments appeared to concern the failure of the defense to counter the evidence presented by the government, not petitioner's failure to show evidence of his innocence. View "Broadnax v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The en banc court vacated defendant's convictions, concluding that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing a juror and the removal violated defendant's right under the Sixth Amendment to a unanimous jury verdict. The district court removed a juror who expressed, after the start of deliberations, that the Holy Spirit told him that defendant was not guilty on all charges, and concluded that the juror's statements about receiving divine guidance were categorically disqualifying.The en banc court concluded that the record establishes a substantial possibility that the juror was rendering proper jury service. The en banc court explained that a rigorous standard protects the rights of the accused to a unanimous jury verdict. Furthermore, there was a substantial possibility that the juror was fulfilling his duty to render a verdict based on the evidence and the law. In this case, the juror expressed a clear understanding of proper jury service; confirmed that understanding when he recounted to the judge the traditional role of a juror; and never gave any indication that he was refusing to consider the evidence or follow the law. Nor did the juror express any lack of faith in the justice system or admit he could not be fair. The record establishes that the juror repeatedly referred to the evidence in explaining his deliberative process, and his assurances were supported by other jurors. Accordingly, the en banc court remanded for a new trial. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

After a law enforcement reverse sting operation caught petitioner in the midst of an effort to commit armed robbery of a house he believed held the cocaine stash of a Colombian drug cartel, a jury convicted petitioner of both conspiring to use and using a firearm during a crime of violence or drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(o) and 924(c).The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion collaterally attacking his convictions. Petitioner claims that under United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), the only crime-of-violence offense that the jury could have relied on to predicate the challenged convictions -- conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery -- is not actually a crime of violence. However, the court concluded that, even though conspiracy commit Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence, his section 2255 motion still fails. The court explained that this is because in addition to the Hobbs Act conspiracy, the district court instructed the jury that it could predicate the challenged section 924(c) and (o) convictions on two related drug trafficking offenses, attempt and conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. Therefore, given the facts and circumstances presented at trial, the jury could not have relied on the invalid Hobbs Act conspiracy predicate without also relying on the drug trafficking offenses, each of which remain valid predicates. View "Foster v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence of firearms found in plain view during the search of a house. The court concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's car and to conduct an investigatory Terry stop under the totality of the circumstances. In this case, the officers knew that a social security number associated with a fugitive had been used recently to connect a utility service at the house; they had a specific, articulable, objective basis for believing that the fugitive could be found at that location; and when the officers observed defendant leaving the house, it was in the pre-dawn hours, which gave the officers an objective, reasonable reasonable suspicion that any man leaving the house was either the fugitive, or as a resident of the house, may have known the fugitive and his whereabouts. The court also concluded that the officers did not unlawfully extend the stop, and that defendant voluntarily consented to the officers' search of the residence. View "United States v. Gonzalez-Zea" on Justia Law

Appellants Lee, Bennett, and the law firm challenge the district court's orders requiring the firm to pay $15,000 into the court's registry and directing that $7,000 of those funds be paid to the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) fund to cover the fees and expenses of defendants' court-appointed counsel. In this case, shortly after defendants were arraigned, the district court disqualified the attorneys and the law firm from representing any of the defendants based upon an actual or potential conflict of interest. The law firm had already collected a total of $21,000 from defendants.The Eleventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction appellants' challenge to the district court's determination that funds were available to defendants. The court explained that this argument does not fit within the narrow exception that permits the court to review a district court's compliance with 18 U.S.C. 3006A's procedures. The court affirmed in all other respects. The court concluded that there was no error in the district court sua sponte raising the question of whether a portion of the fees paid to appellants were available for payment from or on behalf of defendants; the district court performed a thoroughly appropriate inquiry before entering its order directing the payment of $15,000 into the court's registry; and appellants were able to seek further review in the district court when they filed objections to the magistrate judge's order. Even if the court assumed that the district court failed to afford appellants adequate notice and opportunity to be heard before directing them to pay money into the court's registry, the error was harmless. Finally, the district court committed no procedural error based on the timing of its order directing appellants to pay funds into the court's registry. View "United States v. Pacheo-Romero" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's 70 month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court concluded that, even if it accepted defendant's contention that the district court focused almost exclusively on his criminal history when crafting his sentence, the court cannot conclude that the district court gave that history an unreasonable amount of weight. In this case, when defendant was sentenced as a felon in possession of a firearm, he had already been convicted of at least five separate violent crimes. Furthermore, defendant's current conviction for a firearm offense came coupled with an admission that he had committed another firearm offense less than a year earlier. Therefore, defendant's sentence was not unreasonable. View "United States v. Riley" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition in a case where petitioner was convicted of two murders and sentenced to death.The court concluded that petitioner's trial attorneys were not prejudicially ineffective by failing to further investigate and present to the jury evidence of his mental illness, cognitive deficits, and brain damage, and by failing to investigate and present evidence of additional mitigating family background and social history. The court concluded that the state court's rejection of these claims was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. The court was similarly unpersuaded regarding petitioner's procedural and substantive claims of incompetency to stand trial. Furthermore, petitioner's due process rights were not violated when he was required to wear a stun belt at trial. The court rejected petitioner's several claims of prosecutorial misconduct. Finally, the court concluded that it was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law for the Georgia Supreme Court to have concluded, on direct review, that the prosecutor's violation of petitioner's Fifth Amendment rights by commenting on his failure to testify was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Raheem v. GDCP Warden" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated its previous opinion and substituted it with the following opinion.The court affirmed defendant's conviction for five counts of armed robbery and carrying a firearm in furtherance of the robberies. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion to continue the trial date; the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in declining to dismiss Juror 20 for cause based on her employment with the Department of Community Supervision because she did not qualify as a member of a police department; even assuming without deciding that the Google geo-location data should have been excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree," any error in admitting that evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; the evidence sufficiently supported defendant's convictions on all five robberies; the special agent's testimony does not warrant vacatur of the convictions; and, even assuming error, cumulative error does not warrant vacatur of the convictions. View "United States v. Pendergrass" on Justia Law

The Sentencing Guidelines' enhancements under subsections 2L1.2(b)(2) and (3), for criminal convictions received before and after the defendant's previous deportation or removal, do not violate the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection. Nor do they cause unlawful double-counting in violation of due process or otherwise.Defendant was convicted of illegal reentry after the 2016 United States Sentencing Guidelines went into effect. Because he had committed other offenses both before his original deportation and after it, but before his current illegal-reentry offense, he received offense-level increases under both subsections USSG 2L1.2(b)(2) and (3).The Eleventh Circuit concluded that defendant's challenge to section 2L1.2(b)(2) is foreclosed by the court's binding precedent in United States v. Adeleke, 968 F.2d 1159, 1160–61 (11th Cir. 1992). The court explained that subsections 2L1.2(b)(2) and (3) do not apply to all noncitizens convicted of any crime in the United States; rather, they apply to only those noncitizens who both have illegally reentered the United States and have been convicted of other crimes. Furthermore, this is important because, through section 1326(b), Congress has determined that illegally reentering the United States after being deported following conviction on another crime is a more serious offense than simply illegally reentering the United States, and that conduct should be deterred. The court further explained that the challenged guidelines reflect the national interests that Congress permissibly has endorsed through its enactment and amendment of section 1326(b). The court also concluded that Congress has entrusted the Sentencing Commission with direct responsibility for fostering and protecting the interests of, among other things, sentencing policy that promotes deterrence and appropriately punishes culpability and risk of recidivism—the interests the Sentencing Commission cited in issuing the challenged guidelines. Finally, the court concluded that subsections 2L1.2(b)(2) and (3) are rationally related to the Commission's stated interests in issuing them. Therefore, the court upheld the guidelines at issue and affirmed defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Osorto" on Justia Law

A majority of the active judges of the Eleventh Circuit voted to rehear this case en banc.This petition for writ of mandamus arises under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3771. Petitioner, one of more than 30 woman who were victimized by notorious sex trafficker and child abuser Jeffrey Epstein, sought mandamus relief, alleging that when federal prosecutors secretly negotiated and entered into a non-prosecution agreement with Epstein in 2007, they violated her rights under the CVRA. Specifically, petitioner alleged that federal prosecutors violated her rights to confer with the government's lawyers and to be treated fairly by them.The en banc court held that the CVRA does not provide a private right of action authorizing crime victims to seek judicial enforcement of CVRA rights outside the confines of a preexisting proceeding. The court explained that, while the CVRA permits a crime victim like Ms. Wild to move for relief within the context of a preexisting proceeding—and, more generally, to pursue administrative remedies—it does not authorize a victim to seek judicial enforcement of her CVRA rights in a freestanding civil action. In this case, because the government never filed charges against Epstein, there was no preexisting proceeding in which Ms. Wild could have moved for relief under the CVRA, and the Act does not sanction her stand-alone suit. View "In re: Courtney Wild" on Justia Law