Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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In the early morning of August 26, 2021, an Uber driver named J.T. picked up Terius Thomas in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Upon reaching the drop-off location, Thomas threatened J.T. with a firearm and demanded his wallet. A struggle ensued, and Thomas exited the vehicle without obtaining the wallet. As J.T. drove away, he heard two gunshots, and responding officers later found shell casings and a bullet hole in J.T.'s car. Thomas was indicted on charges of attempted Hobbs Act Robbery and using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. He pled guilty to the robbery charge, and the firearm charge was dismissed.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida calculated Thomas's guidelines range based on a total offense level of 24 and a criminal history category (CHC) of III, resulting in a range of 63 to 78 months' imprisonment. The court noted Thomas's extensive criminal history, including juvenile offenses and pending burglary charges, and granted the government's motion for an upward variance, sentencing Thomas to 120 months' imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. Thomas did not object to the CHC calculation at sentencing but later appealed, arguing that the miscalculation affected his substantial rights and that his sentence was unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that although the district court erred in calculating Thomas's CHC, the error did not affect his substantial rights. The appellate court noted that the district court's extensive comments indicated that the sentence would have been the same regardless of the guidelines range. The court also found that the sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable, given Thomas's criminal history and the severity of the offense. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Elizabeth Peters Young was convicted of conspiring to pay and receive kickbacks from federal reimbursements for medical creams and lotions dispensed by pharmacies she worked with. The district court sentenced her to 57 months in prison and ordered her to pay $1.5 million in restitution and forfeiture, representing the gross proceeds she controlled during the conspiracy.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially reviewed the case. Young challenged her conviction, restitution order, and forfeiture judgment, arguing insufficient evidence for her conspiracy conviction, improper calculation of restitution, and errors in the forfeiture amount. The district court denied her motion to set aside the verdict and sentenced her, including the contested financial penalties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Young’s conspiracy conviction, finding sufficient evidence that she conspired with others, including a pharmacy, to receive kickbacks. The court also upheld the forfeiture judgment, ruling that Young was liable for the gross proceeds she controlled, even if she distributed some to co-conspirators. However, the court vacated the restitution order, agreeing with Young that the government did not prove the amount of loss it experienced due to her conduct. The court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the correct restitution amount. View "USA v. Young" on Justia Law

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Bryan Jennings was convicted of the murder and sexual battery of six-year-old Rebecca Kunash in 1979. He was found guilty of first-degree murder and other charges, and sentenced to death. Jennings's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court, and his initial state postconviction relief efforts were unsuccessful. He filed his first federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in 2002, which was denied, and the denial was affirmed on appeal.Jennings later filed additional postconviction motions in state court, including claims under Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States, alleging prosecutorial misconduct based on new evidence, such as an affidavit from a cellmate who testified against him. The state trial court held an evidentiary hearing but did not find the new evidence credible and denied relief. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed this decision.In 2018, Jennings filed a second federal habeas corpus petition, including the Brady and Giglio claims. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida dismissed the petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, ruling it was a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), and denied Jennings's motion for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Eleventh Circuit held that Jennings's second-in-time § 2254 petition was indeed a second or successive petition subject to § 2244(b)’s restrictions, as established in Tompkins v. Secretary, Department of Corrections. The court concluded that Jennings's Brady and Giglio claims were ripe at the time of his first petition and thus did not fall under the exception outlined in Panetti v. Quarterman. Consequently, the district court correctly dismissed the petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Jennings v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Police officers responded to a 911 call about a suspicious individual in a residential neighborhood. Officer Sanchez encountered Victor Grandia Gonzalez, who matched the description given by the complainant. Gonzalez was walking in the street, wearing dark clothing, and carrying a backpack. He appeared nervous and sweaty. Officer Exantus, after speaking with the complainant, learned that Gonzalez had been seen looking into mailboxes and concealing himself between cars. Upon arrival, Exantus patted down Gonzalez and found scissors. Gonzalez admitted to living out of his car and showed a photo of his ID listing a home county 30 minutes away. Based on these observations and the complainant’s report, Gonzalez was arrested for loitering and prowling. A search of his backpack revealed stolen mail.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Gonzalez’s motion to suppress the mail evidence and statements, finding that the officers had probable cause for the arrest. Gonzalez pleaded guilty to one count of possessing stolen mail but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling. He was sentenced to time served and two years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require a misdemeanor to occur in an officer’s presence for a warrantless arrest. The court found that the officers had probable cause to arrest Gonzalez for loitering and prowling under the totality of the circumstances, including the complainant’s report and the officers’ observations. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

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Charles Johnson, Jr. was arrested by Officer Garrett Rolfe for driving while intoxicated. Johnson alleged that Rolfe used excessive force during the arrest, resulting in a broken collarbone. Johnson sued Rolfe and the City of Atlanta under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia state law, claiming excessive force and battery. Johnson's complaint stated that he was respectful and did not resist arrest, but Rolfe threw him to the ground, causing his injury.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia reviewed the case. The City moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it failed to state a claim for Monell liability. Rolfe moved for judgment on the pleadings, submitting body camera and dashcam footage showing Johnson resisting arrest. The district court considered the video evidence, determining it was central to Johnson's claims and its authenticity was not disputed. The court found that Rolfe did not use excessive force and was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. Consequently, the court dismissed the Monell claim against the City, as there was no underlying constitutional violation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the video evidence was properly considered under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. The court found that Rolfe's use of force was objectively reasonable given the circumstances, including Johnson's resistance and the dangerous location of the arrest. Therefore, Rolfe was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claim against the City, as no constitutional violation occurred. View "Johnson v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

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The case involves Gretchen Buselli, who was convicted of a murder-for-hire plot targeting her estranged husband, Bradley Buselli, and for making false statements to a federal agent. The evidence presented at trial included recorded phone calls where Buselli discussed hiring someone to kill Bradley, and surveillance footage showing her leaving $5,000 in a lunch box as payment. Buselli had reported Bradley for abusing their daughter, but investigations found no evidence supporting her claims. She was arrested after an undercover FBI agent, posing as a hitman, confirmed the murder-for-hire plot.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida handled the initial trial. Buselli was indicted on two counts: use of interstate commerce with intent to commit murder-for-hire and making materially false statements. She contested the jury instructions related to the murder-for-hire charge, arguing that the jury should be instructed on Florida’s defenses to murder, such as justifiable and excusable homicide. The district court declined to include these instructions, finding no evidence to support them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the statutory language in 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) does not require incorporating state law defenses into federal murder-for-hire prosecutions. The court also found that any error in the jury instructions was harmless, as no reasonable jury would have found Buselli’s actions justified under Florida law. Additionally, the court rejected Buselli’s constitutional challenge to her false-statements conviction and found no error in the jury instructions related to this charge. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed both of Buselli’s convictions. View "United States v. Buselli" on Justia Law

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James Harding was charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin and possession with intent to distribute heroin. The charges stemmed from a conspiracy that allegedly took place in the Southern District of Alabama between early 2018 and April 2019. During the trial, the United States introduced evidence from a separate investigation that took place over two years after the alleged end of the charged conspiracy. This evidence, which was found at Harding's home in the Northern District of Alabama, included multiple firearms and almost two kilograms of heroin. The district court admitted this evidence as intrinsic to the charged conspiracy and, alternatively, as admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Harding was found guilty of both charges.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence from the separate investigation as intrinsic to the charged conspiracy. The court reasoned that the evidence did not arise from the same transactions, was not necessary to complete the story of the charged crime, and was not inextricably intertwined with the charged crime. The court also found that the district court abused its discretion by failing to provide a limiting instruction regarding the evidence from the separate investigation. The court concluded that the errors were not harmless and could have influenced the jury's verdict. As a result, the court vacated Harding's convictions and sentence and remanded the case for a new trial. View "United States v. Harding" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The case revolves around a warrantless search of a probationer's home, which was also occupied by a non-probationer. The probationer, Tremayne Linder, was on probation for burglary and attempted armed robbery. His probation conditions included a clause that allowed for warrantless searches of his residence. The non-probationer, Lakesia Harden, was Linder's girlfriend and was aware of his probation status. The police, suspecting marijuana use, conducted a warrantless search of Linder's home and found drugs in a shared closet. Harden was subsequently arrested and charged with possession of marijuana and methamphetamine with intent to distribute.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. Harden moved to suppress the drugs and her post-arrest statements as fruits of the allegedly unlawful search. However, the district court denied the suppression motions. At trial, the government admitted the drugs and Harden's statements into evidence, and the jury found her guilty as charged in the indictment. Harden appealed the denial of her suppression motions.The case was then reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The court held that a warrantless search of a probationer's home, based on reasonable suspicion and a probation condition allowing warrantless searches, is not rendered unreasonable because the home was occupied by another person who knew about the probation. The court affirmed the district court's decision, ruling that the search was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. View "USA v. Harden" on Justia Law

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The United States Coast Guard seized a vessel in the Dominican Republic's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that bore no nationality indicators. The crew claimed Colombian nationality for the vessel, but Colombia could not confirm or deny the vessel's registry, rendering it stateless under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). The vessel was found to contain drugs, leading to the arrest and prosecution of the crew members, Jhonathan Alfonso, Jose Jorge Kohen, and Jose Miguel Rosario-Rojas, under the MDLEA.The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the MDLEA was unconstitutional as applied to them because they were arrested in the EEZ, which they asserted is not part of the "high seas" as defined by customary international law. The district court denied the motion, concluding that it had subject matter jurisdiction under the MDLEA. The defendants subsequently pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that the EEZ is part of the "high seas" and thus within Congress’s authority under the Felonies Clause. The court also concluded that the defendants could not show any plain error with regard to the MDLEA’s definition of a vessel without nationality as including vessels where registry is asserted but cannot be confirmed or denied by the foreign country. View "United States v. Alfonso" on Justia Law

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The case involves Jay Diamond, who was convicted of impersonating a federal officer in an attempt to avoid a speeding ticket and to avoid being arrested for falsely impersonating a federal officer. The incidents occurred when Diamond was pulled over for speeding and he told the officer that he was an air marshal. He presented a badge that read "United States Federal Air Marshal." However, upon investigation, it was found that Diamond was never employed as a federal air marshal or through the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).In the lower courts, Diamond argued that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that he acted as a federal officer and that the district court erred in admitting evidence of his alleged prior bad acts and in instructing the jury. The district court denied Diamond's motion to exclude his ex-wife's testimony about his prior instances of impersonating a federal officer or military member. The court also denied Diamond's request for a jury instruction on the misdemeanor offense in 18 U.S.C. § 701, which Diamond argued was a lesser included offense of his alleged § 912 crime.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Diamond's convictions were affirmed. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support Diamond’s § 912 convictions. The court also ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Diamond's ex-wife's testimony. Furthermore, the court found that 18 U.S.C. § 701 is not a lesser included offense of § 912, and therefore the district court did not err in refusing to give Diamond's requested § 701 instruction. View "United States v. Diamond" on Justia Law