Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A tip came in that a Kik app user was distributing child pornography. The tip included the user's IP address and Gmail account, which was tied to Kushmaul, who had been convicted of “Promoting the Sexual Performance of a Child” in Florida in 2016. Officers went to Kushmaul’s address, which was listed in the Florida Sex Offender Registry. Kushmaul handed over his cell phone. The officers discovered a Snapchat3 account that was not listed on Kushmaul’s sex offender registry. Kushmaul went to the Bay County Sheriff’s Office, where he was advised of his Miranda rights. He subsequently admitted to viewing child pornography. Kushmaul signed a “consent to search form,” and an officer downloaded Kushmaul’s cell phone, revealing 20 images of “child sexual abuse material.” He pled guilty under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2), (b)(1) and 2252A(a)(5)(b), (b)(2), for distribution and possession of child pornography. Although the statutory minimum sentence under section 2252A(a)(2) is only five years, that minimum increases to 15 years if the offender “has a prior conviction . . . under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.”Kushmaul was sentenced to the 180-month mandatory minimum. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Kushmaul’s claims that his Florida offense does not qualify for sentencing enhancement because the Florida offense is broader than its federal counterpart. View "United States v. Kushmaul" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit dismissed a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal because petitioner had been convicted of an aggravated felony. In this case, the IJ and BIA found that petitioner's Florida convictions for money laundering and workers' compensation fraud were aggravated felonies because each conviction involved fraud or deceit in which the amount of loss to the victim exceeded $10,000 under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). The court held that substantial evidence in the record, including petitioner's admission of guilt and a concomitant plea agreement, fully supports the agency's finding of the loss amount. View "Garcia-Simisterra v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit sua sponte vacated and withdrew its previous opinion, and issued this opinion in its place.Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Eleventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability to determined whether the district court violated Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc), by failing to address petitioner's claim that he no longer qualified as an armed career criminal in light of Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), because his prior 1988 Alabama conviction for attempted first-degree robbery has no state law elements.The court affirmed the district court's judgment and held that a close review of the district court's opinion reveals that it correctly identified and sufficiently addressed petitioner's claim. In this case, the district court classified petitioner's claim as a collateral attack against his state sentence and dismissed it. The court noted that it may be best practice for a district court to follow a "show your work" approach by directly restating a movant's claim and then laying out all analytical steps in addressing that claim. However, the district court's approach here correctly identified and sufficiently analyzed petitioner's claim and did not run afoul of Clisby View "Senter v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e). The court held that defendant failed to show that his counsel's representation with respect to the state plea offer was objectively unreasonable under Strickland v. Washington, and the district court did not err in concluding that defendant failed to show prejudice. The court also held that the district court did not err in determining that defendant's three prior sale of cocaine convictions under Fla. Stat. 893.13(1)(a)(1) were serious drug offenses within the meaning of the Armed Career Criminal Act. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's determination that petitioner should be removed from the United States because he has been convicted of two or more crimes of moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).The court held that petitioner's conviction for vehicular homicide in Florida contains the necessary mens rea to constitute a crime of moral turpitude. When a person deviates from the standard of care by operating a motor vehicle so recklessly that it is likely to cause death or great bodily harm, and, in fact, results in the killing of a human being, the court has little difficulty finding that he has exhibited the baseness in the duties owed to society that constitutes moral turpitude. Therefore, petitioner's conviction in Florida of vehicular homicide is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, and he is removable under the controlling statute. View "Smith v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenges the application of an Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) enhancement to his 1994 sentence for the unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon. Petitioner claims that he was sentenced under the ACCA's residual clause, which the Supreme Court has since held to be unconstitutionally vague.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition, concluding that petitioner cannot meet his burden of proving it is more likely than not that in fashioning his sentence, the district judge relied solely on the residual clause. Furthermore, petitioner could not meet this burden on any remand. In this case, the district court already examined the record and correctly found that it does not reveal which clause the sentencing judge relied on. Nor would any other obvious source of information provide any helpful information. Therefore, remand would be futile. View "Santos v. United States" on Justia Law

Taylor pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least five kilograms of a mixture containing a detectable amount of cocaine hydrochloride (powder cocaine) and at least 50 grams of a mixture containing a detectable amount of cocaine base (crack cocaine), 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Section 841(b) then provided that an offense involving either 50 grams or more of crack or five kilograms or more of powder cocaine carried a mandatory minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment and a maximum of life in prison. The court calculated Taylor’s Guidelines range as life in prison and “reluctantly” applied the Guidelines as mandatory.The Eleventh Circuit vacated. On remand, in 2005, the district court resentenced Taylor to 360 months’ imprisonment. The 2010 Fair Sentencing Act increased the quantity of crack cocaine required to trigger a 10-year mandatory minimum from 50 grams to 280 grams. The 2018 First Step Act allows—but does not require—courts to reduce an eligible prisoner’s sentence as if the drug-quantity changes were in effect at the time the prisoner committed his offense. The district court denied Taylor’s motion for resentencing, finding that Taylor’s was not a “covered offense” because it involved five kilograms or more of powder cocaine, “a sufficient quantity to trigger the mandatory minimum sentence.” The Eleventh Circuit vacated. A federal drug crime involving both crack cocaine and another controlled substance can be a “covered offense” under the First Step Act. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for passing a fictitious financial instrument, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 514(a)(2), and of corruptly endeavoring to obstruct the administration of the Internal Revenue Code, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7212(a). Defendant's conviction stemmed from his attempt to satisfy his tax obligations with a fraudulent $3.6 million check known as an international bill of exchange.The court held that the IRS' collection activity qualifies as a "particular administrative proceeding" and thus satisfied the nexus requirement in Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1109 (2018). In this case, there was sufficient evidence of a nexus between his actions and an administrative proceeding to support defendant's conviction. The court rejected defendant's numerous objections to the district court's evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Graham" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. Law enforcement agents had placed a GPS tracking device in two packages after finding cocaine hidden in them. The agents put both packages into the mail stream and attempted to track the packages.Even assuming the warrantless monitoring of the GPS tracking device signal from the package once it entered the house was a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the court held that there is a reasonable probability that the evidence would have been discovered anyway. The court explained that the evidence incriminating defendant would have been discovered through ongoing investigation and the pursuit of leads that were already in the possession of the agents at the time the device started functioning and they monitored it. In this case, defendant was the lead suspect; the agents had already looked up information about her and had obtained her address; they were discussing doing a knock and talk at her house, which would not have required a search warrant; at the moment the tracking device reactivated, they were actively discussing doing it; and it is not as if the knock and talk is a novel or unfamiliar investigative technique: collectively the agents had done hundreds of them. View "United States v. Watkins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Georgia's lethal injection protocol, as applied to his unique medical situation, violates the Eighth Amendment and that the firing squad is a readily available alternative. At issue was whether a method-of-execution claim that would have the necessary effect of preventing the prisoner's execution should be brought as a civil rights action under section 1983, or as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order dismissing the complaint as untimely and held that a section 1983 claim for relief that would prevent a state from executing a prisoner under present law must be reconstrued as a habeas petition. Because plaintiff's requested relief would prevent the State from executing him, implying the invalidity of his death sentence, it is not cognizable under section 1983 and must be brought in a habeas petition. Furthermore, because the petition is second or successive, the court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. In this case, plaintiff did not move this court for permission to file his petition and thus the district court lacked jurisdiction. View "Nance v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections" on Justia Law