Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Eleventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability and held that the district court violated Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc), by failing to address petitioner's claim that he no longer qualified as an armed career criminal in light of Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), because his prior 1988 Alabama conviction for attempted first-degree robbery has no state law elements. The court explained that Clisby requires a federal district court to resolve all claims for relief raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to section 2254, regardless of whether habeas relief is granted or denied. In this case, the district court never in the first instance resolved petitioner's claim that his attempted robbery conviction could not be a violent felony because, as an offense unrecognized by Alabama law, it has no elements at all. Accordingly, the court vacated the denial of the section 2255 petition without prejudice and remanded. View "Senter v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief to petitioner. Petitioner argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a certain juror's presence on the trial jury. Because the Warden concedes that counsel performed deficiently, the only issue is prejudice.The court held that the state habeas court's ruling that petitioner did not prove that the juror was actually biased against him was not based on an unreasonable determination of fact under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). In this case, the court cannot say for certain what the juror meant when he raised his hand in response to a question during voir dire regarding a murder prosecution involving a shooting, and, for that reason, the court cannot say the state court's finding was unreasonable. The court also held that the state court did not unreasonably apply Strickland v. Washington when it held that petitioner failed to establish a reasonable probability that his appeal would have been decided differently had appellate counsel raised the presence of the juror. Finally, the court held that Georgia's juror non-impeachment statute is not an alternative basis for relief. View "Teasley v. Warden, Macon State Prison" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's four drug convictions and sentences for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute heroin and possessing with intent to distribute heroin and fentanyl. The court held that the district court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress where defendant has shown no clear error in the district court's finding that the detective did not make any false statements and was able to see what he reasonably believed was contraband or evidence of a crime.The court also held that the district court did not err by denying defendant's motions for a mistrial where there was no error in the prosecutor's opening remarks and the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the fentanyl evidence. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for mistrial based on defendant's brother's outburst. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting DNA testimony, as well as defendant's rental application and lease. The court denied defendant's claims of cumulative error. Finally, the court held that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Joseph" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and 63 month sentence for possession of an unregistered, sawed-off shotgun. The court rejected defendant's contention that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; there was more than sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that defendant knew his shotgun was a weapon, not a collector's item, and that he further knew the shotgun, as modified, was less than 26 inches in overall length, or at least that its barrel was less than 18 inches in length; the district court's instruction to the jury regarding the knowledge element was consistent with court precedent; the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress where defendant's traffic stop and arrest were both lawful, and the vehicle was properly searched under the inventory search exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement; the court rejected defendant's assertions that the district court reversibly erred in failing either to appoint him competent substitute counsel or to sua sponte continue his trial until standby counsel could be present; and, even assuming arguendo that the district court erred in proceeding with the trial without standby counsel present, any error was harmless. Finally, the court held that the district court did not clearly err by calculating defendant's base offense level under USSG 2K2.1(a)(4)(B). View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions for conspiring to violate, and of knowingly and willfully violating, the False Statements Act. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their ownership and operation of a second-tier subcontractor on a project to construct a building for a federal agency where they submitted to the agency certified payroll forms containing false, fictitious, and fraudulent statements and entries within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(3).The court held that the payroll forms containing the false statements were made or used in a matter within the jurisdiction of the federal agency. The court also held that the false statements were material. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying the renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal on materiality grounds. However, the court held that the district court, in determining defendants' guidelines ranges, failed to properly calculate the loss caused by their crimes. In this case, the district court erroneously applied the USSG 2B1.1(b)(1)(J) enhancement based on gain even though there was no loss. Accordingly, the court vacated defendants' sentences and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Bazantes" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for bank fraud, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and money laundering. The court held that the district court did not err by allowing defendant to proceed pro se after he invoked his right to self-representation. In this case, the waiver of defendant's right to counsel was clear, uncontested on appeal, and repeatedly reaffirmed after signs of uncertainty. The court also held that the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(b) and, in any event, any error was harmless.The court further held that, to trigger the USSG 2B1.1(b)(16)(A) enhancement, at least in a case involving property held by a financial institution for a depositor, the financial institution (1) must be the source of the property, which the court interprets as having property rights in the property, and (2) must have been victimized by the offense conduct. The court held that the two-level enhancement was not erroneously applied to defendant's sentence where HSBC-Monaco, not defendant, was a source of the derived property; control over the property transferred directly from HSBC-Monaco to defendant; and the bank was not just a conduit for a transfer of property that resulted from criminal conduct directed elsewhere. The court explained that the bank was a victim of defendant's fraud. Finally, the court held that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Muho" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for conspiring to commit healthcare and wire fraud, committing healthcare fraud, conspiring to receive and pay kickbacks, receiving kickbacks, and money laundering. The court held that there was sufficient evidence of fraud where recruits were prescribed, and Tricare was billed for, pain creams, scar creams, and vitamins that were not medically necessary; there was sufficient evidence of defendant's knowledge of the fraud and his intent to defraud; there was sufficient evidence that a witness's prescription was fraudulent; there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that defendant intended to aid in the commission of the healthcare fraud; and the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that defendant knew it was illegal to pay and receive illegal kickbacks and for laundering the proceeds of the kickback scheme. The court also held that the district court's scheduling instruction was not coercive. The court did not reach the merits of defendant's argument regarding jury instruction error on the elements of wire fraud because defendant invited the error.However, the court vacated defendant's sentence for conspiring to commit healthcare fraud because it exceeded the statutory maximum allowed by the jury's general verdict. On remand, the district court must permit the government to either consent to resentencing based on a maximum sentence of ten years on count one or elect to retry defendant on count one with a special verdict. View "United States v. Grow" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for conspiring with a pill mill's owners and doctors to illegally dispense controlled substances, of aiding and abetting the illegal dispensing of controlled substances, and of laundering and conspiring to launder the proceeds of those illicit sales.The court held that the district court did not err by allowing the agent who had become familiar with defendant's handwriting during his investigation to offer his opinion that the handwriting in the ledger was defendant's; the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's drug offense convictions and his money laundering convictions; and there were no preserved errors in the jury instructions and no unpreserved ones that meet the strictures of the plain error rule. View "United States v. Iriele" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for seven counts of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance related to his prior medical practice. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment for pre-indictment delay; the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of the Prescription Drug Monitoring Program because defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the prescriptions he wrote for his patients, and evidence of patient files stored at defendant's mother's home because the warrant was amply supported by facts establishing probable cause; the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion to exclude the government's expert witness under the Daubert standard; and there was no cumulative error.The court also held that defendant's sentence was procedurally reasonable where the district court properly calculated his Guidelines sentence and applied a two-level offense for obstruction of justice under USSG 3C1.1. Finally, defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court considered mitigation evidence, sentenced defendant at the low end of his Guidelines range, and did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him to 235 months. View "United States v. Gayden" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to declare a mistrial based on an agent's rebuttal testimony; the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a new trial where the weight of the evidence sufficiently supported the jury's verdict that the object of the conspiracy was to sell the confidential source five or more kilograms of cocaine; there was no Brady or Giglio error, plain or otherwise, let alone one that affected defendant's substantial rights; the district court did not err, plainly or otherwise, by failing to sua sponte grant defendant a new trial based on the government's alleged sentencing entrapment or sentencing factor manipulation; the district court did not err in calculating defendant's base offense level to be 30 under the sentencing guidelines; and defendant's resulting sentence of 120 months' imprisonment is procedurally reasonable. View "United States v. Gallardo" on Justia Law