Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Joseph Lusk was convicted in Florida state court in 2018 for traveling to meet a minor after soliciting a guardian. Less than a month after his release from prison in 2021, Lusk engaged in sexually explicit conversations with an undercover investigator posing as a 15-year-old girl. He was subsequently arrested and charged with attempted enticement of a minor and committing a felony involving a minor while required to register as a sex offender.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Lusk's motion to dismiss Count 2, which argued that his conduct did not involve an actual minor. Lusk pled guilty to both charges but contested the application of a sentencing enhancement for being a "repeat and dangerous sex offender against minors" based on his prior Florida conviction. The district court applied the enhancement and sentenced Lusk to 355 months' imprisonment followed by a lifetime of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred in applying the "repeat and dangerous sex offender against minors" enhancement because the Florida statute under which Lusk was previously convicted is broader than the federal statute, thus not qualifying as a predicate offense. The court vacated Lusk's sentence and remanded for resentencing without the enhancement. However, the court affirmed Lusk's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2260A, citing binding precedent that a conviction under this statute does not require the involvement of an actual minor. View "USA v. Lusk" on Justia Law

Loren Read was indicted for attempting to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity after he exchanged online messages with an undercover federal agent posing as the father of young girls. Read expressed his desire to perform sexual acts on the girls and agreed to meet the undercover agent. Upon arrival, he was arrested with three condoms in his pocket. Read pled guilty in exchange for the government not charging him with other offenses and recommending a downward adjustment to his offense level. As part of his plea agreement, Read waived his right to appeal his sentence with three exceptions, including if the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida sentenced Read to 180 months of imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. The court imposed seven special conditions of supervised release and referenced the standard conditions adopted by the Middle District of Florida without detailing them. Read did not object at the time. The written judgment included 13 standard conditions that matched the district's standard conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. Read argued that the district court violated his due process rights by not detailing the standard conditions during the oral pronouncement of his sentence. The government moved to dismiss the appeal based on Read's appeal waiver. The Eleventh Circuit granted the government's motion, holding that Read's appeal was barred by his waiver. The court determined that Read's challenge to the oral pronouncement of his sentence constituted an appeal of his sentence, which he had waived. The court also found that the exception for sentences exceeding the statutory maximum did not apply, as Read did not argue that the conditions violated statutory requirements. View "U.S. v. Read" on Justia Law

The case involves John Holland, William Moore, and Ed Cota, who were accused of participating in an illegal healthcare kickback scheme. The government alleged that Holland and Moore, hospital executives for Tenet Healthcare, paid the Cotas to refer Medicaid or Medicare-covered pregnant women to Tenet hospitals. The payments were purportedly disguised as contracts for translation services. Tracey Cota, Ed Cota's wife, pleaded guilty to violating the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) by participating in this scheme. However, the other defendants argued that their business relationship did not violate the AKS because they lacked the requisite mental state or mens rea.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held a pretrial "paper" hearing to determine the admissibility of out-of-court statements made by the defendants' alleged coconspirators. The district court concluded that the government needed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants' conduct was illegal to admit the statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). The court found that the government failed to prove the defendants' knowledge of illegality and thus excluded the coconspirator statements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court erred in requiring proof of an illegal conspiracy to admit coconspirator statements. The court clarified that under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), it is sufficient to show that the statements were made during and in furtherance of a joint venture, regardless of the venture's legality. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "United States v. Holland" on Justia Law

John Moore, Jr., and Tanner Mansell, who worked as boat crew for a shark encounter company in Jupiter, Florida, were involved in an incident on August 10, 2020. During a trip with the Kuehl family, they found a long fishing line attached to a buoy, which they believed was illegal. They hauled the line into the boat, cut sharks free from the hooks, and reported the incident to a Florida Fish and Wildlife Officer. However, the line was legally placed by Scott Taylor, who had the proper permits for shark research. Moore and Mansell were later indicted for theft of property within special maritime jurisdiction, as the line and gear belonged to Taylor.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida handled the initial trial. Moore and Mansell requested a jury instruction that required the jury to find they stole the property for their own use or benefit to convict them under 18 U.S.C. § 661. The district court rejected this request, instead instructing the jury that to steal means to wrongfully take property with the intent to deprive the owner of its use. The jury found both defendants guilty, and they were sentenced to one year of probation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the proposed jury instruction. The appellate court found that the term "steal" in 18 U.S.C. § 661 does not require the intent to convert the property for personal use, aligning with the broader interpretation of theft under federal law. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

Andrew Butler III was convicted by a jury of knowingly and intentionally possessing five grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute. The district court sentenced him to 84 months of imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. Butler appealed, arguing that the district court wrongly revoked his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation and that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict.Initially, the district court appointed Assistant Federal Public Defender Elizabeth Vallejo to represent Butler, but he expressed dissatisfaction, leading to her replacement by Robert A. Morris. Butler continued to file pro se motions disparaging Morris, resulting in Morris’s replacement by Richard A. Greenberg. Butler then requested to represent himself, and after a Faretta hearing, the court allowed it, appointing Greenberg as standby counsel. However, Butler’s disruptive behavior, including refusing to attend hearings and threatening not to attend the trial, led the court to revoke his self-representation right and appoint Mutaqee Akbar as his counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in revoking Butler’s right to self-representation due to his repeated and serious obstructionist misconduct, which spanned months and disrupted the trial schedule. The court emphasized that the right to self-representation is not a license to disrupt court proceedings and that the district court had given Butler multiple warnings and opportunities to comply.Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the Eleventh Circuit found that the evidence presented at trial, including the methamphetamine found in the safe in Butler’s hotel room and his incriminating post-arrest recorded call, was sufficient to support the conviction. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding Butler’s conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Butler" on Justia Law

Amir Meshal, a professional truck driver, was stopped by Georgia State Police officers for a minor traffic infraction. During the stop, the officers discovered Meshal was on the FBI’s No Fly List. Despite instructions not to detain him based solely on this status, the officers handcuffed Meshal, placed him in a patrol car, and searched his truck. They questioned him about his religion and international travel while waiting for guidance from the FBI. After 91 minutes, the FBI cleared Meshal, and he was released with a warning citation for the traffic infraction.Meshal sued the officers in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, alleging violations of his Fourth Amendment rights due to the extended detention and the search of his truck. The officers moved to dismiss the complaint on qualified immunity grounds, arguing that Meshal failed to allege a violation of clearly established law. The district court denied the motion, finding that the complaint sufficiently alleged that the officers detained Meshal without arguable reasonable suspicion and searched his truck without arguable probable cause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court, holding that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage. The court found that the officers lacked even arguable reasonable suspicion to justify prolonging the traffic stop beyond the time necessary to complete tasks related to the traffic infraction. Additionally, the court held that the search of Meshal’s truck was not supported by arguable probable cause. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. View "Meshal v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Three members of the Gangster Disciples, Vertuies Wall, Lawrence Grice, and Lewis Mobley, were indicted on charges including conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and drug trafficking. The indictment included notice of enhanced sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a). Mobley was found competent to stand trial despite a defense expert's testimony about his mental illness. The trial lasted five weeks, with over sixty witnesses testifying about the gang's criminal activities, including murder and drug trafficking. The jury found all three defendants guilty of RICO conspiracy, with Grice also convicted of drug trafficking conspiracy.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, the jury found Mobley and Wall guilty of RICO conspiracy involving murder, which subjected them to enhanced sentencing. Mobley was also convicted of attempted murder and related firearms offenses. Grice was convicted of RICO conspiracy and drug trafficking conspiracy. The district court sentenced Mobley to 480 months and Wall to 360 months, both under the enhanced sentencing provision. Grice received a sentence based on his convictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's findings, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and the enhanced sentences. The court found no error in the jury instructions or the special verdict form regarding the enhanced sentencing provision. The court also held that any potential error in the jury instructions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, the court rejected challenges to the admission of testimony about non-testifying coconspirators' convictions and found no cumulative error affecting the defendants' substantial rights. The court affirmed the defendants' convictions and sentences. View "United States v. Wall" on Justia Law

In August of 2020, Matthew Ostrander, a homeless fugitive, was arrested in Gainesville, Florida, for failing to register as a sex offender following a 2007 child pornography conviction. At the time of his arrest, Ostrander possessed four electronic devices, three of which contained 480 computer-generated images (CGI) of children involved in sexual activity. These images did not depict real children. Ostrander was charged with knowing possession of an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(b)(1), (d)(4).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida denied Ostrander's motion to dismiss the possession charge, ruling it was untimely and without merit. After a two-day trial, a jury found Ostrander guilty. Ostrander appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the statute and the sufficiency of the evidence and alleging prosecutorial misconduct.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the statute was not facially unconstitutional, as it was neither overbroad nor vague. The court found that the statute's legitimate sweep outweighed any potential unconstitutional applications. The court also determined that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Ostrander's conviction, as a reasonable jury could find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented. Finally, the court found no prosecutorial misconduct that would have affected the jury's verdict. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Ostrander's conviction. View "U.S. v. Ostrander" on Justia Law

Lucious Boyd, a Florida prisoner sentenced to death for first-degree murder, sexual battery, and armed kidnapping, filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after a series of unsuccessful state collateral attacks. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Boyd's claim that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated due to a juror's undisclosed criminal history. The juror, Tonja Striggles, admitted her criminal history and disclosed additional information, but Boyd did not amend his petition to include these new disclosures. The district court denied Boyd's habeas petition on the merits and granted a certificate of appealability, leading Boyd to appeal.While his appeal was pending, Boyd moved in the district court to amend his habeas petition under Rule 15(a)(2) or, alternatively, to reopen his habeas proceedings under Rule 60(b)(6), citing new evidence from Striggles's testimony. The district court characterized Boyd's motion as a second or successive habeas petition, requiring preauthorization from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which Boyd had not obtained. Consequently, the district court dismissed his motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that once a district court has entered a final judgment on a habeas petition, any new filing seeking to relitigate the same claims is considered a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). The court also noted that an appeal transfers jurisdiction to the appellate court, preventing the district court from amending the petition or reopening the case. Boyd's failure to obtain the necessary preauthorization from the appellate court meant that the district court correctly dismissed his motion. View "Boyd v. Secretary, Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Sarah Ritchie, a federal prisoner, appealed the district court's denial of her motion to vacate, set aside, or correct her sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Ritchie had pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the production of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e). She argued that her trial lawyer provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise her that the facts of her case might not support a conviction if the law developed in a particular way.The district court, after reviewing Ritchie's motion, concluded that her lawyer's failure to advise her on a "novel and unsettled point of law" did not amount to deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington. The court found that the existing legal precedent did not suggest that the facts of Ritchie's case were legally insufficient to support a conviction under § 2251(a). Consequently, the district court denied her motion and her request for an evidentiary hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Ritchie's lawyer was not constitutionally ineffective. The court noted that at the time of Ritchie's plea, there was no on-point decision suggesting that her conduct fell outside the scope of § 2251(a). The court emphasized that an attorney's failure to predict future legal developments does not constitute ineffective assistance. Given the state of the law at the time, the court found that it was not unreasonable for Ritchie's lawyer to advise her to accept the plea deal, which resulted in a significantly reduced sentence compared to the potential maximum.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Ritchie's lawyer's performance was not deficient and affirmed the district court's denial of her § 2255 motion. View "Ritchie v. United States" on Justia Law