Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court granting Defendant relief on a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his sentence, holding that changes to the law since the government’s appeal warranted a remand to the district court where Defendant will have the opportunity to make his case for relief under the new standard.In its original ruling, the district court concluded that, following changes in constitutional law regarding the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), Defendant no longer qualified as an armed career criminal and was not eligible for an enhanced sentence. After the government appealed, the Eleventh Circuit decided Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2017), holding that section 2255 movants were required to meet a higher burden that the one the district court applied in Defendant’s case. Applying Beeman to Defendant’s case, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Defendant did not meet the new standard. The Eleventh Circuit held that because Defendant did not and could not know that he would be required to meet the heightened Beeman standard on appeal, a remand was appropriate. View "United States v. Pickett" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction of extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a),(b)(2), holding that sufficient evidence supported Defendant’s conviction and that the district court did not violate Defendant’s right to present a complete defense when it limited his closing argument.Defendant was convicted of extortion by two alternative means - by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear; and under color of official right. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the government presented sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction for extortion; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it prevented Defendant from arguing in closing that the government should have charged him with theft instead of extortion. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for three federal child sex offenses. The court held that defendant's text messages asking a person he thought was a minor to send him sexually explicit pictures of herself can support a conviction for making a "notice" to receive child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251(d)(1)(A). The court also held that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find that defendant believed one of the victims was thirteen years old, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting a detective's challenged testimony. View "United States v. Caniff" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendants Vazquez, Valencia, and Portocarrero's convictions and sentences for trafficking cocaine in international waters, in violation of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act. The court held that defendants' challenges to the district court's exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Act was foreclosed by binding precedent. Therefore, the district court properly exercised jurisdiction in this case.The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Valencia's motion for mistrial; neither Portocarrero nor Vazquez have demonstrated that there was an actual conflict of interest under these circumstances; because Valencia and Portocarrero were not eligible for safety-valve relief in the first place, the court need not consider whether these defendants otherwise met the substantive requirements of safety-valve relief or defendants' constitutional claim based on the Fifth Amendment; the district court did not clearly err in denying Vazquez a minor role reduction under USSG 3B1.2(b); and any error in the guidelines calculation was harmless as both Valencia and Portocarrero received the statutory mandatory minimum sentence and the district court could not have sentenced them to less. View "United States v. Vazquez Valois" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a civil rights complaint and emergency motion for stay of execution, claiming that excluding his Imam from the execution chamber at the time of his execution in favor of a Christian chaplain violated his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA); requiring the presence of a Christian chaplain in the execution chamber at the time of his execution also violated his rights under RLUIPA; Alabama's practice of requiring a Christian chaplain in the execution chamber, while forbidding clerics of other faiths, violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment; and refusing to honor his late election for nitrogen hypoxia as the method of his execution, where his lateness resulted from his religious beliefs, also violated RLUIPA.The Eleventh Circuit held that Alabama's prison officials favored one religious denomination to the detriment of all others; they have made only general claims about their compelling interest; and they have offered nothing remotely establishing that their policy was narrowly tailored to further that interest. The court held that petitioner was substantially likely to succeed on the merits of his Establishment Clause claim given the little evidence in the record to support the government's interest and the fit between those interests and the state's policy. In this case, given the paucity of evidence, the court concluded that it was not altogether surprising that the state has not clearly argued that petitioner knew or should have known sooner that his religious beliefs would not be accommodated. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for an emergency stay of execution. View "Ray v. Commissioner" on Justia Law

Creditors filed suit alleging that a husband and wife worked together to commit multiple acts of mail and wire fraud over several years for the purpose of hiding the husband's assets—acts which, in the creditors' telling, violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The district court found in favor of the wife, finding that no reasonable juror could conclude that they formed an organization with some sort of framework, formal or informal, for the purpose of engaging in racketeering activity.The Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that there was a genuine factual dispute as to whether the couple formed an association-in-fact enterprise separate and apart from their marital relationship. In this case, the district court erred by applying a heightened standard for association-in-fact enterprises consisting of married couples, rather than applying the sames rules to married couples as to everyone else. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings and vacated the district court's order awarding the wife costs. View "Al-Rayes v. Willingham" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted in part a petition for panel rehearing, vacated the prior opinion in this case, and substituted the following opinion. Petitioner sought review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal.The court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA's finding that petitioner was convicted under Fla. Stat. 893.13(1)(a) (possession with intent to deliver), and not section 893.13(6)(a) (simple possession). Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction under Immigration and Nationality Act section 242 to grant petitioner relief on this claim and dismissed the petition for review in part.The court held that DHS was not required to file a cross-appeal to advance its controlled substance argument on appeal to the BIA, and the BIA did not err in considering that argument. The court also held that Flunitrazepam is a controlled substance, and the BIA did not err in denying petitioner's motion for a remand to pursue a section 212(h) waiver. Accordingly, the court denied the petition in part. View "Bula Lopez v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1), which makes it a crime for any person to use, without authority, a means of identification of another person. The court held that, considering all the evidence, the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the bank was insured by the FDIC both before and after defendant's offenses and that it did not need to renew its insurance in the interim. Therefore, coupled with the universal presumption that all banks were federally insured, and viewing the proof in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable juror could find that the bank was insured by the FDIC on the dates of defendant's offenses. Furthermore, the court held that the plain meaning, statutory context, and existing precedent all showed that defendant "used" his victim's means of identification when he employed that person's signature to obtain the loan and thereby converted the signature to his own service. View "United States v. Munksgard" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on trial counsel's ineffective assistance by failing to object, or move for a mistrial, at any point during the deadlocked jury deliberations. Petitioner claimed that the total force and effect of the two trial judges instructing the jury over and over again that it must keep deliberating after the jury declared over and over again that it was unable to reach a verdict, was coercive.Because the claim was not adjudicated on the merits in the state court proceedings, the court need not defer to the decisions of the state courts here. The court held that the failure of petitioner's counsel to object and to move for a mistrial, as the coercive circumstances piled up, was prejudicial. Furthermore, trial counsel's failure to object and move for a mistrial was deficient performance for Strickland purposes. View "Brewster v. Hetzel" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence found in the search of his vehicle. The court held that the rapidly blinking turn signal provided reasonable suspicion to stop the car where state law required turn signals to be in good working condition. However, under Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015), the patrolman did unlawfully prolong the stop. The court held that the patrolman's actions were nonetheless permitted under binding case law at the time and thus the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied in this case. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law