Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by disregarding the Federal Rules of Evidence during a 21 U.S.C. 851 hearing. Under 21 U.S.C. 841(b), defendants convicted of certain drug-related felonies are subjected to a 240-month mandatory minimum if they have previously been convicted of a drug-related felony. A section 851 hearing is required if the existence of the prior conviction is in dispute and the decision to apply the Federal Rules of Evidence during the hearing is left to the discretion of the district court. In this case, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that there was sufficient evidence for the district court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was previously convicted of possession of cocaine. Furthermore, it was not reasonably probable that the outcome of the proceedings would have changed even if the district court had applied the correct standard. View "United States v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Second-degree murder in Florida is a "violent felony" within the meaning of the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction under the ACCA and held that defendant's contention -- that physical force is not categorically an element of Florida second-degree murder chiefly because poisoning someone does not involve physical force -- was foreclosed by recent precedent in Hylor v. United States, 896 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2018). View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendants Carthen and Groce's conviction and sentence for multiple counts of federal robbery and firearm offenses. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict; the district court did not plainly err in finding enough evidence of a conspiracy to admit the coconspirator's testimony; the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Groce's proposed impeachment evidence relating to the testimony of the alleged coconspirator; the district court did not miscalculate the mandatory minimum sentence; and Groce failed to make a threshold showing of gross disproportionality. View "United States v. Carthen" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit held that, although the decision to allow the government to introduce inculpatory evidence while both defendant and her lawyer were absent for three to ten minutes in a trial that lasted more than 49 hours violated defendant's right to counsel, her right to confront the witnesses arrayed against her, and her right to be present at trial under both the Due Process Clause and Fed. R. Crim. P. 43, the errors did not affect defendant's substantial rights. The court also rejected defendant's other challenges to her convictions based on the sufficiency of the indictment and claimed errors in the jury instructions. In this case, the indictment was plainly adequate, and, to the extent that the district court may have erred in how it charged the jury, these errors did not prejudice defendant. Finally, defendant failed to establish prejudice under the doctrine of cumulative error. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's convictions. View "United States v. Margarita Garcia" on Justia Law

The en banc court remanded this appeal to the panel for further proceedings in light of Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), after the initial panel opinion affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate her 18 U.S.C. 924(c) conviction and sentence for using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, namely, attempted carjacking.The panel reinstated its prior ruling in Ovalles I insofar as it held that defendant's attempted carjacking conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A)'s elements clause. In this case, defendant had by definition attempted to use or threaten force because she attempted to commit a crime that would be violent if completed. Therefore, given that section 924(c)'s elements clause equates an attempted force with actual or threatened force, and that an attempt conviction requires an intent to commit all elements of the completed crime, attempted carjacking qualifies as a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A) as well. View "Orvalles v. United States" on Justia Law

The question whether a predicate offense constitutes a "crime of violence" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(B) should be determined using a conduct-based approach that accounts for the actual, real-world facts of the crime's commission, rather than a categorical approach. The Eleventh Circuit held that, to the extent that its decision in United States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2013), required use of the categorical approach in making the crime-of-violence determination under section 924(c)(3)(B), it is overruled; as interpreted to embody a conduct-based approach, section 924(c)(3)(B) is not unconstitutionally vague; and, in light of the particular circumstances of its commission, defendant's attempted-carjacking offense was a crime of violence within the meaning of section 924(c)(3)(B). Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Ovalles v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the partial denial of defendant's motion to dismiss the amended complaint by the estate of Marquette F. Cummings Jr. After Cummings was stabbed by a fellow inmate and subsequently died at the hospital the next day, his estate filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendant, a prison warden, violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution by illegally interfering with Cummings's end-of-life medical care with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court held that defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity.The court held that defendant's alleged actions, including the entry of a do not resuscitate order and the decision to remove plaintiff from artificial life support, did not fall within the scope of his discretionary authority. The court held that Alabama law established that defendant's discretionary authority did not extend to such actions and thus he was not entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider whether the amended complaint stated a claim and the court's jurisdiction was exhausted under the collateral order doctrine. View "The Estate of Marquette F. Cummings Jr. v. Davenport" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus as untimely. The court held that, for purposes of AEDPA and federal habeas review, the relevant judgment in this case was the 2010 criminal judgment authorizing petitioner's confinement for a period of 25 years in the Florida Department of Corrections. In this case, petitioner's judgment was final under Florida law and the entirety of the state appellate review process was complete when the First District Court of Appeal issued its decision. Therefore, petitioner's judgment was final for purposes of triggering AEDPA’s limitations period on November 6, 2012 and the section 2254 petitioner was untimely because it was filed almost two years later in October 2015. View "Chamblee v. Florida" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion for want of jurisdiction. The court held that petitioner's second section 2255 motion was an improper vehicle to contest the denial of his first one because a Johnson v. United States claim was available to petitioner during the time that his first section 2255 motion was pending. View "Randolph v. United States" on Justia Law

A lawful permanent resident alien who has already been admitted to the United States -- who is not currently seeking admission or readmission -- can, for stop-time purposes, be rendered inadmissible by virtue of a qualifying criminal conviction. The Eleventh Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision that petitioner was barred from seeking cancellation of removal. The court held that the BIA correctly concluded that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal because the stop-time rule -- triggered when he committed a crime involving moral turpitude in January 1996 -- ended his continuous residence a few months shy of the required seven-year period. View "Barton v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law