Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Creditors filed suit alleging that a husband and wife worked together to commit multiple acts of mail and wire fraud over several years for the purpose of hiding the husband's assets—acts which, in the creditors' telling, violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The district court found in favor of the wife, finding that no reasonable juror could conclude that they formed an organization with some sort of framework, formal or informal, for the purpose of engaging in racketeering activity.The Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that there was a genuine factual dispute as to whether the couple formed an association-in-fact enterprise separate and apart from their marital relationship. In this case, the district court erred by applying a heightened standard for association-in-fact enterprises consisting of married couples, rather than applying the sames rules to married couples as to everyone else. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings and vacated the district court's order awarding the wife costs. View "Al-Rayes v. Willingham" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted in part a petition for panel rehearing, vacated the prior opinion in this case, and substituted the following opinion. Petitioner sought review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal.The court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA's finding that petitioner was convicted under Fla. Stat. 893.13(1)(a) (possession with intent to deliver), and not section 893.13(6)(a) (simple possession). Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction under Immigration and Nationality Act section 242 to grant petitioner relief on this claim and dismissed the petition for review in part.The court held that DHS was not required to file a cross-appeal to advance its controlled substance argument on appeal to the BIA, and the BIA did not err in considering that argument. The court also held that Flunitrazepam is a controlled substance, and the BIA did not err in denying petitioner's motion for a remand to pursue a section 212(h) waiver. Accordingly, the court denied the petition in part. View "Bula Lopez v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1), which makes it a crime for any person to use, without authority, a means of identification of another person. The court held that, considering all the evidence, the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the bank was insured by the FDIC both before and after defendant's offenses and that it did not need to renew its insurance in the interim. Therefore, coupled with the universal presumption that all banks were federally insured, and viewing the proof in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable juror could find that the bank was insured by the FDIC on the dates of defendant's offenses. Furthermore, the court held that the plain meaning, statutory context, and existing precedent all showed that defendant "used" his victim's means of identification when he employed that person's signature to obtain the loan and thereby converted the signature to his own service. View "United States v. Munksgard" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on trial counsel's ineffective assistance by failing to object, or move for a mistrial, at any point during the deadlocked jury deliberations. Petitioner claimed that the total force and effect of the two trial judges instructing the jury over and over again that it must keep deliberating after the jury declared over and over again that it was unable to reach a verdict, was coercive.Because the claim was not adjudicated on the merits in the state court proceedings, the court need not defer to the decisions of the state courts here. The court held that the failure of petitioner's counsel to object and to move for a mistrial, as the coercive circumstances piled up, was prejudicial. Furthermore, trial counsel's failure to object and move for a mistrial was deficient performance for Strickland purposes. View "Brewster v. Hetzel" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence found in the search of his vehicle. The court held that the rapidly blinking turn signal provided reasonable suspicion to stop the car where state law required turn signals to be in good working condition. However, under Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015), the patrolman did unlawfully prolong the stop. The court held that the patrolman's actions were nonetheless permitted under binding case law at the time and thus the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied in this case. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's authorized successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The court held that, given the holding in Ovalles v. United States, 905 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2018) (en banc), that 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(B)'s residual clause is not unconstitutionally vague, a Johnson- or Dimaya-based vagueness challenge to section 924(c)'s residual clause cannot satisfy section 2255(h)(2)'s "new rule of constitutional law" requirement. Likewise, the court held that any challenge petitioner might raise to the district court's use of the categorical approach and its application of section 924(c)(3)(B)'s residual clause in his case would not satisfy section 2255(h) either, as such a claim would be statutory in nature. View "Solomon v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted a petition requesting panel rehearing, vacated its earlier opinion, and issued this opinion in its place.The court affirmed the district court's denial of a petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The court affirmed and held that petitioner failed to show that had his trial counsel used all of the impeachment material during the guilt phase of his trial, every fairminded jurist would conclude that there was a "substantial, not just conceivable," likelihood that the result of his trial would have been different. Therefore, the state trial court's prejudice determination was not unreasonable. The court also held that, even considering any purported cumulative effect from the admission of the food stamps and cocaine citation and trial counsel's failure to present the impeachment evidence, a fairminded jurist could still conclude that it was insufficient to undermine his confidence in petitioner's trial. View "Meders v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison" on Justia Law

Fla. Stat. 893.13(6)(a), cocaine possession, is divisible by the identity of the drug possessed, permitting the use of the modified categorical approach to determine what substance was involved in a particular offense. The Eleventh Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that the record unambiguously demonstrated that petitioner's conviction involved cocaine, a federally controlled substance under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). View "Guillen v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), in admitting expert testimony concerning DNA evidence directly linking defendant to the firearm. Even if the district court had abused its discretion in allowing the expert testimony, any claimed error would have been harmless. View "United States v. Barton" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Colombia, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal. The court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA's factual finding regarding petitioner's statute of conviction and the court lacked jurisdiction under Immigration and Nationality Act section 242 to grant him relief. Therefore, the court dismissed the petition for review in part.In regard to petitioner's remaining claims, the court held that DHS was not required to file a cross-appeal to advance its controlled substance argument on appeal to the BIA, and the BIA did not err in considering that argument. Furthermore, petitioner's drug-trafficking crime was an aggravated felony, the BIA did not err in denying petitioner's motion for remand to pursue a section 212(h) waiver, and the court denied petitioner's request for a remand to seek such relief. View "Bula Lopez v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law