Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit vacated its previous order and replaced it with the following:The court held that petitioner's application seeking an order authorizing the district court to consider a successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A), failed for two reasons: petitioner raised an ineffective assistance of counsel - biased judge claim in his original section 2254 petition and, thus to the extent that the gravamen of the claims was the same, his current claim was precluded by section 2244(b)(1); and even if petitioner's current claim was not precluded by section 2244(b)(1), he failed to make a prima facie showing that he would be entitled to relief. Therefore, the court dismissed the application to the extent that it was barred by In re Mills and 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1), and denied the application to the extent that it was not. View "In re: Octavious Williams" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions and sentences for armed bank robbery and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions and thus the district court did not err by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; the district court did not deny defendant his constitutional right to testify where the district court specifically found that he made his decision not to testify knowingly and voluntarily; and the district court properly applied the sentencing guideline enhancement for obstruction of justice, U.S.S.G. 3C1.1,1 based on defendant's attempt to avoid identification by covering up his distinctive tattoos. View "United States v. Watts" on Justia Law

Florida attempted first-degree murder is a "violent felony" within the meaning of the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to vacate his sentence. The court held that Florida attempted first-degree murder was a violent felony because it required the attempted use of physical force that was capable of causing pain or injury. In this case, defendant received an enhanced sentence under the Act because he was previously convicted of three violent felonies, including Florida attempted first-degree murder. Furthermore, defendant's prior convictions for Florida aggravated assault and Florida strong-arm robbery were also violent felonies. View "Hylor v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of violating 31 U.S.C. 5324(b)(2) and 18 U.S.C. 2 by causing or attempting to cause a car dealership to file certain Form 8300s with the Treasury Department that contained material omissions and misstatements of facts concerning defendant's identity as the individual who provided cash payments of over $10,000 for the purchases of each of three sports cars. The court held that, although the evidence was circumstantial only, it was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The court remanded with instructions to resentence defendant because the district court failed to make and explain factual findings that adequately support the application of a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice under USSG 3C1.1. View "United States v. Guevara" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and 15 year sentence for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that an occupant of the house intelligently and voluntarily gave her consent to search the house and that she had authority to do so without defendant's consent. Therefore, the district court did not err by denying the motion to suppress. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant and the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. Finally, the court held that the application of the armed career criminal enhancement and the application of a sentencing enhancement under USSG 4B1.4 did not violate defendant's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Defendant abandoned any challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. View "United States v. Luis Morales" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for fifty counts of making false statements in connection with the delivery of, or payment for, healthcare services and for one count of knowingly and willfully making a materially false statement to a federal agent. The court held that defendant's convictions were supported by legally sufficient evidence. The court also held that the district court did not clearly err by applying a sentencing enhancement for a theft offense involving the conscious or reckless risk of death or serious bodily injury pursuant to USSG 2B1.1(b)(15)(A). View "United States v. Henderson" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and life sentence for attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction and attempting to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions where he had the requisite intent to coordinate with ISIS and direct his services to ISIS, and he took substantial steps to do so. The court also held that defendant's life sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment because it was not disproportionate to his crimes, and was procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Suarez" on Justia Law

The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages provides global notice to the world that the hostage taking criminalized by 18 U.S.C. 1203 can be prosecuted in any signatory nation of which the hostage is a citizen or a national, notwithstanding that the crime occurred elsewhere. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for conspiracy to seize or detain, and threaten to kill, injure, or continue to detain, a national of the United States in order to compel a third person to pay ransom (count 1), and hostage taking (count 2). The court held that the relevant statute's requirement that the victim be Americans is jurisdictional only and there was no mens rea requirement for that part of the statute; the conduct of which defendant was convicted clearly fell within the plain meaning of the statutory language of the hostage taking statute; and the court rejected defendant's constitutional challenges to section 1203 where his empowerment argument and due process argument were without merit. View "United States v. Noel" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for conspiring to exchange counterfeit currency, and dealing in counterfeit currency. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that defendant knew the unlawful object of the conspiracy and intended to deal in counterfeit money. In this case, defendant had ample opportunity to discover that he was dealing in counterfeit money, he shared substantial contacts with a government informant which was enough to facilitate defendant's collaboration with the informant, defendant plainly demonstrated awareness of the transaction's unlawful nature, and defendant was instrumental to the transaction's success. Finally, under the prudent smuggler doctrine, the jury in this case could reasonably infer that the informant would not entrust defendant to close a deal for $632,300 in counterfeit currency without telling defendant not only that he was buying counterfeit currency but also how much he was to receive in exchange for $5,000 in non-counterfeit currency. View "United States v. Cobena Duenas" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of violating 18 U.S.C. 115(a)(1)(B) by threatening to assault an immigration judge with the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with that judge while she was engaged in the performance of official duties. The court held, as a matter of first impression, that an immigration judge was a "United States judge" within the meaning of section 115(a)(1)(B). The court reasoned that an immigration judge was a "judicial officer of the United States" and thus a "United States judge." View "United States v. McLean" on Justia Law