Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In August of 2020, Matthew Ostrander, a homeless fugitive, was arrested in Gainesville, Florida, for failing to register as a sex offender following a 2007 child pornography conviction. At the time of his arrest, Ostrander possessed four electronic devices, three of which contained 480 computer-generated images (CGI) of children involved in sexual activity. These images did not depict real children. Ostrander was charged with knowing possession of an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(b)(1), (d)(4).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida denied Ostrander's motion to dismiss the possession charge, ruling it was untimely and without merit. After a two-day trial, a jury found Ostrander guilty. Ostrander appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the statute and the sufficiency of the evidence and alleging prosecutorial misconduct.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the statute was not facially unconstitutional, as it was neither overbroad nor vague. The court found that the statute's legitimate sweep outweighed any potential unconstitutional applications. The court also determined that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Ostrander's conviction, as a reasonable jury could find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented. Finally, the court found no prosecutorial misconduct that would have affected the jury's verdict. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Ostrander's conviction. View "U.S. v. Ostrander" on Justia Law

Lucious Boyd, a Florida prisoner sentenced to death for first-degree murder, sexual battery, and armed kidnapping, filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after a series of unsuccessful state collateral attacks. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Boyd's claim that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated due to a juror's undisclosed criminal history. The juror, Tonja Striggles, admitted her criminal history and disclosed additional information, but Boyd did not amend his petition to include these new disclosures. The district court denied Boyd's habeas petition on the merits and granted a certificate of appealability, leading Boyd to appeal.While his appeal was pending, Boyd moved in the district court to amend his habeas petition under Rule 15(a)(2) or, alternatively, to reopen his habeas proceedings under Rule 60(b)(6), citing new evidence from Striggles's testimony. The district court characterized Boyd's motion as a second or successive habeas petition, requiring preauthorization from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which Boyd had not obtained. Consequently, the district court dismissed his motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that once a district court has entered a final judgment on a habeas petition, any new filing seeking to relitigate the same claims is considered a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). The court also noted that an appeal transfers jurisdiction to the appellate court, preventing the district court from amending the petition or reopening the case. Boyd's failure to obtain the necessary preauthorization from the appellate court meant that the district court correctly dismissed his motion. View "Boyd v. Secretary, Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Sarah Ritchie, a federal prisoner, appealed the district court's denial of her motion to vacate, set aside, or correct her sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Ritchie had pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the production of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e). She argued that her trial lawyer provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise her that the facts of her case might not support a conviction if the law developed in a particular way.The district court, after reviewing Ritchie's motion, concluded that her lawyer's failure to advise her on a "novel and unsettled point of law" did not amount to deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington. The court found that the existing legal precedent did not suggest that the facts of Ritchie's case were legally insufficient to support a conviction under § 2251(a). Consequently, the district court denied her motion and her request for an evidentiary hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Ritchie's lawyer was not constitutionally ineffective. The court noted that at the time of Ritchie's plea, there was no on-point decision suggesting that her conduct fell outside the scope of § 2251(a). The court emphasized that an attorney's failure to predict future legal developments does not constitute ineffective assistance. Given the state of the law at the time, the court found that it was not unreasonable for Ritchie's lawyer to advise her to accept the plea deal, which resulted in a significantly reduced sentence compared to the potential maximum.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Ritchie's lawyer's performance was not deficient and affirmed the district court's denial of her § 2255 motion. View "Ritchie v. United States" on Justia Law

Three owners and officers of a currency-exchange business, Sterling Currency Group, were involved in a scheme to defraud retail investors by promoting false rumors about the imminent revaluation of the Iraqi dinar. They also concealed their payments to advertise on dinar-discussion forums and falsely claimed plans to open currency-exchange kiosks. Two of the defendants lied to federal agents about their activities. The business sold over $600 million worth of currencies, and many investors lost significant amounts of money due to the fraudulent inducements.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia conducted a five-week trial, after which the jury convicted the defendants of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, and making false statements. The district court sentenced the defendants to prison terms ranging from 84 to 180 months. The defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, evidentiary admissions, and one defendant's sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the convictions and the sentence of one defendant, except for the refusal to grant a downward departure, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the fraud convictions, as the misrepresentations about the revaluation and the airport plan went to the core of the bargain with investors. The court also found that the district court properly instructed the jury and did not abuse its discretion in evidentiary rulings. The court upheld the sentencing enhancements applied by the district court, including those for sophisticated means, obstruction of justice, and substantial financial hardship. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law

In 2007, Luis Fernandez and others conspired to rob a fictional cocaine stash house set up by law enforcement. They were arrested en route to the stash house with loaded firearms. Fernandez was indicted on multiple charges, including conspiracy and attempt to possess cocaine, conspiracy and attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and carrying a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The jury found him guilty of the Hobbs Act charges and the § 924(c) charge but acquitted him of the drug-related charges. He was sentenced to 360 months in prison.Fernandez's direct appeal was unsuccessful. In 2016, he filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence, arguing that his § 924(c) conviction was invalid under Johnson v. United States, which invalidated the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The district court denied the motion as untimely and procedurally defaulted. In 2020, Fernandez sought to file a second § 2255 motion based on United States v. Davis, which invalidated § 924(c)’s residual clause. The Eleventh Circuit granted his motion, acknowledging that his conviction might be unconstitutional under Davis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed Fernandez's appeal. The court held that Fernandez could not prove that his § 924(c) conviction rested solely on the residual clause, as required by Beeman v. United States. The court noted that the jury's general verdict did not specify which predicate offense supported the § 924(c) conviction. Additionally, the court found that the legal landscape at the time of Fernandez's conviction did not clearly establish that only the residual clause could support his conviction. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Fernandez's § 2255 motion. View "Fernandez v. United States" on Justia Law

Jesse Guardado confessed to the Walton County Sheriff’s Office that he had robbed and murdered Jackie Malone. He pleaded guilty without a plea agreement or counsel, and was later appointed counsel for the penalty phase. A jury recommended the death penalty, and the state trial court sentenced him to death. Guardado filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence and for not challenging biased jurors.The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, finding no prejudice from counsel's performance. The court determined that the additional mitigating evidence presented during postconviction proceedings was cumulative of the evidence presented at trial. It also found no actual bias in the jurors that Guardado claimed should have been challenged.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Florida Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington by using a stricter "actual bias" standard instead of the reasonable probability standard for prejudice. However, upon de novo review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Guardado failed to show a substantial likelihood of a different outcome if the jurors had been challenged or if additional mitigating evidence had been presented. The court affirmed the denial of habeas relief. View "Guardado v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Xavier Rashad Brooks, a felon, pled guilty to possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He was sentenced to 100 months in prison by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Brooks appealed, arguing that the district court erred in determining his base offense level, applying a two-level enhancement for possessing a stolen firearm, and applying a four-level enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense.The district court determined Brooks's base offense level was 26 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1) due to his prior convictions for armed robbery and robbery. Brooks argued that his 2008 robbery conviction was not a "crime of violence." The court found that the statute under which Brooks was convicted was divisible and that Shepard documents showed he was convicted of robbery by force, which qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).The district court also applied a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) because Brooks possessed a stolen Smith & Wesson pistol in January 2021. Brooks contended that this possession was not relevant to his October 2020 conviction for possessing a Glock. The court found that the possession of the stolen Smith & Wesson was part of the same course of conduct as the possession of the Glock, thus qualifying as relevant conduct.Finally, the district court applied a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense, specifically theft by receiving stolen property. Brooks argued that the firearm did not facilitate the theft offense. The court held that the firearm, being the fruit of the theft, had the potential to facilitate the offense, thus justifying the enhancement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions on all counts, upholding Brooks's 100-month sentence. View "USA v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Frederick Bush was convicted of escaping from the Keeton Residential Reentry Center in Tallahassee, Florida, before completing his required stay. The government indicted him on a single count of knowingly escaping from custody by willfully failing to remain within the extended limits of his confinement, citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 751(a) and 4082(a). Bush argued that he left the center because an employee threatened him and that he did not know his actions were illegal.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida handled the initial trial. Bush represented himself after a Faretta hearing, with Joseph Debelder as standby counsel. Throughout the trial, Bush contended that the government needed to prove he knew his actions were illegal. The district court, however, instructed the jury that the government only needed to prove Bush knew he was not allowed to leave the facility without permission and that he intentionally left. The jury found Bush guilty, and the district court denied his motion for a new trial, sentencing him to 37 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court's jury instructions were erroneous because they did not include the requirement that Bush acted "willfully," as mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 4082(a). The appellate court held that the district court's instruction allowed the jury to convict Bush without proving he knew his actions were unlawful, which was a plain error likely responsible for an incorrect verdict. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit vacated Bush's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "United States v. Bush" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Commodities & Minerals Enterprise, Ltd. (CME) and CVG Ferrominera Orinoco, C.A. (FMO). CME sought to confirm a New York Convention arbitration award of $187.9 million against FMO. FMO opposed the confirmation, alleging that CME procured the underlying contract through fraud, bribery, and corruption, arguing that enforcing the award would violate U.S. public policy. The district court confirmed the award, ruling that FMO was barred from challenging the confirmation on public policy grounds because it failed to seek vacatur within the three-month time limit prescribed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially reviewed the case. CME moved to confirm the arbitration award in December 2019. FMO opposed the confirmation nearly two years later, citing public policy concerns. The district court granted CME’s motion, explaining that FMO was barred from opposing confirmation on public policy grounds due to its failure to seek vacatur within the FAA’s three-month time limit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, based on its recent en banc decision in Corporación AIC, SA v. Hidroélectrica Santa Rita S.A., FMO should have been allowed to assert its public policy defense in opposition to confirmation. The court clarified that the grounds for vacating a New York Convention arbitration award are those set forth in U.S. domestic law, specifically Chapter 1 of the FAA, which does not recognize public policy as a ground for vacatur. However, the court affirmed the district court’s confirmation of the award, concluding that FMO’s public policy defense failed on the merits because it attacked the underlying contract, not the award itself. View "Commodities & Minerals Enterprise, Ltd. v. CVG Ferrominera Orinoco C.A." on Justia Law

Three years after becoming a U.S. citizen, Melchor Munoz pleaded guilty to a drug-conspiracy offense, admitting under oath that he began trafficking marijuana in 2008. The government sought to denaturalize Munoz under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), alleging that his prior participation in the drug conspiracy made him ineligible for citizenship. The government moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Munoz was collaterally and judicially estopped from denying his 2008 involvement. The district court granted the motion and entered a judgment denaturalizing Munoz.Previously, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida accepted Munoz’s guilty plea, where he admitted to drug trafficking starting in 2008. Munoz later moved to vacate his conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, but the motion was denied. The government then filed the denaturalization action, and the district court granted the government’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, applying both collateral and judicial estoppel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It concluded that collateral estoppel was unavailable because the starting date of Munoz’s drug offense was unnecessary to his prior conviction. The court also found that the district court abused its discretion in applying judicial estoppel, as the findings lacked evidentiary support. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings, allowing Munoz to litigate the issue of when he began participating in the drug conspiracy. View "USA v. Munoz" on Justia Law