Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, convicted in 1986 of three counts of malice murder and set for execution on March 15, 2018, sought permission to file a second habeas petition and a stay of execution, seeking to present claims that his execution would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because the state destroyed evidence in connection with a post-conviction DNA test of vaginal washings from one body and because he is actually innocent. The Muscogee County Superior Court denied Petitioner’s motion; the Georgia Supreme Court denied review. The Eleventh Circuit denied relief. The court declined to draw the adverse inference against the state that the DNA evidence exculpates the Petitioner. The Petitioner has not demonstrated that the state contaminated the sample in bad faith. The testimony at the evidentiary hearing demonstrated that the sample was contaminated with a specially used quality control sample, which was handled by another scientist who used shared the same lab area. Petitioner’s contamination claim is not based on an event that occurred during Petitioner’s prosecution for the murders. Petitioner’s claim that he is actually innocent of the murder, has been barred by the Supreme Court: Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding. View "In re: Carlton" on Justia Law

In 1995, Austin, with his two-year-old son in his car, was using a payphone when Welch approached and put a gun at Austin’s side. A struggle ensued. Welch escaped with Austin ’s car, which was recovered nearby (Austin’s money was gone); his son was found wandering the streets. Austin's gunshot wound resulted in his castration. Welch, on parole, later fired shots at a District Attorney Investigator, fled, and was arrested. His bag contained stolen firearms and jewelry. Welch confessed to shooting Austin. He was charged with conspiracy to commit carjacking, carjacking, using a firearm during a crime of violence, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of stolen firearms. Welch pleaded guilty without an agreement. Welch’s guidelines range was 188-235 months, reflecting a 15-year Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) enhancement, based on Alabama convictions for first-degree robbery and first-degree assault. The Eleventh Circuit rejected his pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A), to consider a successive motion to vacate or correct his life sentence. The motion was based on a new, retroactive, rule of law: the Supreme Court's "Johnson" holding that ACCA’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. The court applied the modified categorical approach to Alabama’s first-degree assault statute and examined Welch ’s indictments. The least of the acts criminalized by the statute includes the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person, as required by ACCA’s elements clause. View "In Re: Welch" on Justia Law

Vergara returned to Tampa, on a cruise ship from Cozumel, Mexico with three cell phones. Customs Officer Ragan searched his luggage and asked Vergara to turn a phone on and then looked through the phone for about five minutes. Ragan found a video of two topless female minors and called DHS investigators, who decided to have all three phones forensically examined. A forensic examination of two phones conducted that day revealed more than 100 images and videos, “the production of which involved the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” The phones were not damaged. Charged under 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(1), (b)(1) and 2252(a)(4)(B), (b)(2), Vergara unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence. The court Vergara’s argument that the Supreme Court’s 2014 holding, Riley v. California, required the agents to obtain a warrant before conducting the forensic search. Vergara was sentenced to 96 months of imprisonment followed by supervision for life. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The forensic searches occurred at the border, not as searches incident to arrest. Border searches never require a warrant or probable cause but, at most, require reasonable suspicion. Vergara has not argued that the agents lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a forensic search of his phones. View "United States v. Vergara" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's denial of cancellation of removal. In this case, petitioner satisfied the third requirement of eligibility for cancellation of removal where the Florida statute under which petitioner had been convicted, trafficking in cocaine, was neither divisible nor had a categorical match in the Controlled Substance Act (CSA). Therefore, the court vacated the BIA's decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Francisco v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant Skillern and Nelson's convictions for mail fraud, wire fraud, and associated conspiracies. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their efforts to peddle non-existent gold to the public through their company, Own Gold LLC. In this case, Skillern alleged that the district court deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel when, just before an overnight recess that occurred while Skillern was on the stand, the district court granted his lawyer's request to speak to him "about matters other than his testimony." The court held that the district court did not commit constitutional error in light of the court's en banc decision in Crutchfield v. Wainwright, 803 F.2d 1103 (11th Cir. 1986), because the record did not reflect that Skillern (or his lawyer) actually wanted or planned to discuss his testimony during the recess. The court rejected defendants' remaining contentions. View "United States v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions and sentences for two counts of using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during, in relation to, and in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The court held that defendant's guilty plea did not bar his challenge to the section 924(c) convictions; defendant's constitutional challenge to section 924(c)(3)(B) lacked merit because defendant did not deny that Hobbs Act robbery qualified as a crime of violence if that risk-of-force or residual clause in section 924(c)(3)(B) was constitutional; defendant's challenge to his first section 924(c) conviction failed because this court has already held that Hobbs Act robbery independently qualified as a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A)'s use-of-force clause; under the categorical approach, each of the means of committing Hobbs Act robbery qualified under the use-of-force clause in section 924(c)(3)(A); defendant's predicate offense of attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualified as a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A)'s use-of-force clause; and no matter the outcome of 18 U.S.C. 16(b)'s residual clause in Sessions v. Dimaya, defendant's section 924(c) convictions and sentences must be affirmed under both clauses in section 924(c)(3)(A) and (B). View "United States v. St. Hubert" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions and sentences for two counts of using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during, in relation to, and in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The court held that defendant's guilty plea did not bar his challenge to the section 924(c) convictions; defendant's constitutional challenge to section 924(c)(3)(B) lacked merit because defendant did not deny that Hobbs Act robbery qualified as a crime of violence if that risk-of-force or residual clause in section 924(c)(3)(B) was constitutional; defendant's challenge to his first section 924(c) conviction failed because this court has already held that Hobbs Act robbery independently qualified as a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A)'s use-of-force clause; under the categorical approach, each of the means of committing Hobbs Act robbery qualified under the use-of-force clause in section 924(c)(3)(A); defendant's predicate offense of attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualified as a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A)'s use-of-force clause; and no matter the outcome of 18 U.S.C. 16(b)'s residual clause in Sessions v. Dimaya, defendant's section 924(c) convictions and sentences must be affirmed under both clauses in section 924(c)(3)(A) and (B). View "United States v. St. Hubert" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The court held that defendant failed to show error in the district court's supplemental jury instruction or in declining to give defendant's requested instruction where the district court's response to the jury's question about possession of a firearm was a correct statement of the law and served to clarify the issue before the jury. The court also held that defendant's prior Florida convictions for attempted strong arm robbery and resisting an officer with violence were violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act. View "United States v. Joyner" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The court held that defendant failed to show error in the district court's supplemental jury instruction or in declining to give defendant's requested instruction where the district court's response to the jury's question about possession of a firearm was a correct statement of the law and served to clarify the issue before the jury. The court also held that defendant's prior Florida convictions for attempted strong arm robbery and resisting an officer with violence were violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act. View "United States v. Joyner" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's application of a fifteen year mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) and 924(e)(2)(B), to defendant's sentence. The court held that defendant's argument that aggravated assault under Fla. Stat. 784.021 and resisting an officer with violence under Fla. Stat. 843.01 were not violent felonies was foreclosed by circuit precedent. The court also held that a conviction for sexual battery with a deadly weapon under Fla. Stat. 794.011(3) was a conviction for a violent felony under the ACCA's elements clause. Therefore, defendant had the three qualifying prior felony convictions under the ACCA. View "United States v. Deshazior" on Justia Law