Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Defendant of illegally structuring two separate land-sale contract payments of around $270,000 each. On appeal, Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Defendant asserts that the court should vacate his conviction due to a plainly erroneous jury instruction.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that in reviewing the record to determine how a jury might reasonably conclude that he structured deposits to avoid the $10,000 reporting requirement, it appears that Defendant made 22 cash deposits below $10,000 over seven days to satisfy the first payment. Then, Defendant made 38 cash deposits under $10,000 over the course of around seven and a half months to satisfy the second payment. there is sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions. The court explained that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, it concludes that a “reasonable construction of the evidence would have allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”   Further, the court concluded that the instructions properly listed the statutory elements for structuring in violation of 31 U.S.C. Section 5324(a)(3), and the jury concluded that the government satisfied its burden of proof on these points. That the government could not prove Bird intended to evade Form 4789 specifically does not undermine the soundness of the verdict. Finally, the court explained that Defendant and the government jointly proposed the jury instructions that the district court ultimately used. By supplying the instructions, Defendant invited any purported error. Consequently, the court declined to review his challenge to the jury's instructions. View "USA v. Zachary Bird" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from a multiple-count indictment against dozens of members of the Gangster Disciples. Five of them, Alonzo Walton, Kevin Clayton, Donald Glass, Antarious Caldwell, and Vancito Gumbs, appeal their convictions and sentences following a joint trial. Some argue that the district court should have suppressed wiretap evidence against them. Some argue that their enhanced sentences under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act violate the Sixth Amendment because the jury failed to find that the conspiracy involved murder. Several argued that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to play a video about unconscious bias, excluded a professor of social work’s expert opinion testimony, secured the defendants with ankle restraints at trial, allowed the prosecution to store evidentiary firearms in the courtroom, and questioned a witness. And they also brought individual procedural and sentencing challenges.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated one of Caldwell’s convictions and his sentence due to an intervening precedent but otherwise affirmed the convictions and sentences. The court explained that Count 17 of the indictment contemplated that the offense of attempted Hobbs Act robbery is a “crime of violence” within the meaning of the Armed Career Criminal Act. But the Supreme Court recently held in Taylor that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” under section 924(c).  Thus, the court held that it must vacate Caldwell’s conviction. The court remanded or the district court to resentence Caldwell for his remaining counts of conviction. View "USA v. Antarious Caldwell, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He had a two-day trial at which he testified, asserting a justification defense. The jury rejected that defense, finding him guilty. The district court denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial. After calculating a guidelines range of 100 to 120 months, the court sentenced him to 80 months imprisonment. He challenged his conviction and his sentence.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Defendant had not established self-defense as a justification for shooting the victim. The court explained that the evidence showed that Defendant escalated the situation and interposed himself when his girlfriend was attempting to handle it. He claimed his actions were justified because he had to defend himself, but it was Defendant who had insisted that his girlfriend get her gun when she did not want to; she wanted to see who was outside and resolve the situation herself. The court reasoned that Defendant also could have called 911 and asked that law enforcement officers be sent to the house. It wasn’t clear error for the district court to find that Defendant, a convicted felon, had possessed a firearm in connection with another felony offense. View "USA v. Hannibal Moore" on Justia Law

Defendant filed an Application for Naturalization (Form N-400), on which she certified under penalty of perjury that she had never “committed a crime or offense for which she was NOT arrested.” Defendant was charged in 2012 with healthcare fraud and conspiracy crimes. In 2012, Lopez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering. In 2021, the United States filed a complaint in the district court to revoke Defendant’s naturalization. The complaint alleged   had illegally procured her naturalization on the ground that she had failed to meet the requirement of “good moral character.” The government moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that Defendant had illegally procured her naturalization because she had committed a crime of moral turpitude during the statutory period. The district court granted that motion. It concluded that the conspiracy crime to which Defendant pleaded guilty overlapped with the statutory “good moral character.”   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that structuring a transaction to avoid a reporting requirement, as defined by 18 U.S.C. section 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii), is also not a crime categorically involving moral turpitude. The offense does not necessarily involve fraud. And, although the crime arguably involves deceit, it does not necessarily involve an activity that is “inherently base, vile, or depraved.” Thus, the court held that a violation of section 1956(a)(1)(B) is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude. View "USA v. Lisette Lopez" on Justia Law

Defendant appeals his sentence for possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin and 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. There are four issues on appeal: whether (1) the district court erred in imposing a two-level enhancement for maintaining a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance, under Section 2D1.1(b)(12) of the Sentencing Guidelines, (2) Defendant’s sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable, (3) technical malfunctions during Defendant’s sentencing hearing conducted remotely via videoconference violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a critical stage of criminal proceedings, and (4) the district court erred by imposing conditions of supervised release in the written judgment that were not orally pronounced at the sentencing hearing.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence in part, vacated in part, and remanded for limited resentencing as to the conditions of supervised release. The court held that the district court properly applied the enhancement for maintaining a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance. Further, the court held that the district court did not impose a sentence that was procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Moreover, the court held that Defendant is not entitled to resentencing because of the videoconference malfunctions. Finally, the district court erred by imposing conditions of supervised release not included in Defendant’s oral sentence. The court explained that the district court’s pronouncement here failed to reference the administrative order or otherwise indicate that the court was adopting conditions of supervised release beyond those mandated by statute. View "USA v. Jesus Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). ACCA imposes a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence on violators of Section 922(g)(1) if they have three previous qualifying felonies. Because Defendant has two other qualifying felonies, Defendant’s eligibility for ACCA’s mandatory minimum turns on whether his Florida conviction for unlawful possession of a listed chemical is a “serious drug offense” because it “involves manufacturing . . . a controlled substance.” The district court counted the Florida conviction and sentenced Defendant to the mandatory minimum sentence.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded this case for resentencing. The court held that a conviction under Florida Statutes Section 893.149(1) for possessing a listed chemical with reasonable cause to believe it will be used to manufacture a controlled substance is not a “serious drug offense” under ACCA. The court explained that possessing one ingredient to make a controlled substance with “reasonable cause to believe” that some person will use it to manufacture a controlled substance is too far removed from the conduct of manufacturing itself to satisfy the “necessarily entails” standard. View "USA v. Christopher E. Miles" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were arrested by Sheriff’s deputies for stashing their client’s cell phone in a bag only minutes before the police executed a search warrant for child pornography on that phone.  Plaintiffs alleged that District Attorney and Assistant District Attorney ordered the arrest. Following the arrest, the DA, in a statement to the press, and ADA, on the courthouse steps, publicly accused Plaintiffs of concealing evidence of a crime and knowingly possessing child pornography. After Plaintiffs were acquitted they filed this federal lawsuit for unlawful arrest. The district court entered judgment against the Deputies and denied the DA’s and ADA’s motion for summary judgment on the false arrest claim. The district court also denied the district attorneys’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ defamation claims.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded to the district court with instructions to enter judgment for Defendants on Plaintiffs’ false arrest claims. The court wrote that on remand, the district court should determine whether to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the defamation claims. The court held that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because they had arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs. The court explained it believes “a reasonable officer, looking at the entire legal landscape at the time of the arrests, could have interpreted the law as permitting the arrests here.” However, even if Defendants made their allegedly defamatory statements as part of their official duties, the Supreme Court of Alabama has held that state-agent immunity does not protect against intentional defamation. View "Megan Garcia, et al v. Pamela Casey, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner an Alabama prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. The district judge granted a Certificate of Appealability (COA) on whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to convey to Petitioner a favorable plea offer of thirty years’ imprisonment during his capital murder trial.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s habeas petition and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. The court found that Petitioner has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the state habeas court’s determinations that Petitioner would not have accepted the plea offer and that the state trial court would not have accepted an agreement between Petitioner and the District Attorney were unreasonable. The court also found that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeal’s (ACCA’s) determination that Petitioner received the plea offer was unreasonable. Because the court found that the state habeas court’s factual determinations were unreasonable, it held that Petitioner has cleared the hurdle created by AEDPA. Accordingly, because Petitioner cleared the AEDPA hurdle, the court found it best for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s claim. View "Brandon Washington v. Attorney General of the State of Alabama, et al" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling sentencing Defendant to 180 months e for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e). A federal grand jury indicted Defendant for unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e). In May 2021, Defendant pleaded guilty. Defendant’s PSR assigned him a base offense level of 24 pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(a)(2). Defendant appealed his 180-month sentence arguing that his sentence was erroneously enhanced because his prior conviction for aggravated assault under Florida law does not qualify as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. Section 924(e).   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that Defendant’s aggravated assault conviction under Fla. Stat. Section 784.021(1)(b) categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA because, as our precedent in Somers III confirmed, Florida’s aggravated assault statute requires an intentional threat to use violence against another person, regardless of whether it is committed under Section 784.021(1)(a) or (b). See id. at 892, 894, 896. Therefore, Defendant has the requisite three predicate offenses under the ACCA, and the district court did not err in sentencing him as an armed career criminal. View "USA v. Larry Lynn Gary" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is an Alabama death row inmate scheduled to be executed by lethal injection on July 20, 2023. Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 complaint asserting that the manner in which Alabama executes its lethal injection protocol violates the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, he takes issue with the manner in which the execution team attempted to secure IV access in the inmates during the preceding three executions that occurred in 2022. Relatedly, Plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Alabama from executing him by any method other than nitrogen hypoxia. Plaintiff appealed the denial of that motion.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.  The court focused its analysis on whether the district court clearly erred in determining that Plaintiff did not show that he faces a “substantial risk of serious harm” if executed by lethal injection. Plaintiff argued that Nance does not control and that the court should instead follow its unpublished decision in Smith. The court explained that the evidence established that since the allegedly “botched” executions, ADOC conducted a full review of its execution processes and procedures, and determined that no deficiencies existed with the protocol itself. Accordingly, based on the evidence presented, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the intervening changes made by the ADOC “have disrupted the pattern discussed in Smith,” rendering Plaintiff’s claim that the same pattern would continue to occur purely speculative. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Plaintiff did not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim. View "James Edward Barber v. Governor of the State of Alabama, et al" on Justia Law