Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant Tony Denson, a pro se federal prisoner, appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The district court granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on the issue of whether Denson’s attorney rendered ineffective assistance at sentencing by failing to object to treating Denson’s Florida conviction for possession of a short-barreled shotgun, in violation of Florida Statute § 790.221(1), as a “crime of violence” for career offender guidelines calculations under U.S.S.G. sections 4B1.1 and 4B1.2. After review, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Denson’s section 2255 motion. On August 3, 2015, the United States Supreme Court entered an order granting Appellant's petition for a writ of certiorari and vacated the Eleventh Circuit's prior decision, issued in 2014, and remanded this case for further decision in light of "Johnson v. United States," (135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)). The Eleventh Circuit Court requested supplemental briefs by the parties addressing the impact, if any, of "Johnson" on this appeal. Having concluded that Johnson has no impact on the issues in this appeal, the Court reinstated its prior decision. View "Denson v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2006, Nivis Martin and her ex-husband participated in a scheme in which the pair lied on a series of mortgage applications relating to property they held in Florida. After a trial by jury, Martin was convicted of multiple counts of bank and wire fraud, sentenced to a prison term of 46 months, and ordered to pay close to $1 million in restitution. On appeal, Martin challenged her convictions, contending that the district court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal on all counts because the evidence was insufficient. She also challenged her sentence, arguing that her offense level should have been reduced pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines section 3B1.2 to reflect her minimal or minor role in the offense. Finally, she contended that the trial court erred when it imposed an order of restitution. After thorough review, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed her convictions and sentence, but vacated the restitution award and remand for a new determination of the victims’ losses. View "United States v. Martin" on Justia Law

Defendant Jacques Maddox appealed his 78-month sentence, which was imposed after a jury convicted him of aiding and abetting an attempted armed robbery of a Walgreens drug store in 2013. That jury, however, also acquitted Defendant of aiding and abetting the use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in imposing: (1) a five-level enhancement based on his accomplice’s brandishing of a firearm during the attempted robbery; and (2) a two-level enhancement based on injuries inflicted on a victim by this accomplice. After careful review, the Eleventh Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed Defendant’s sentence. View "United States v. Maddox" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 seeking to prevent the State of Georgia from executing her, claiming that the execution will violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment for a number of reasons. The court agreed with the district court's order and opinion and attached a copy of it as part of the court's opinion. The court added a few comments: first, plaintiff's attorneys ignored the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and the district court would have been well within its discretion to strike the document; second, plaintiff's position that her Eighth Amendment rights have been or will be violated cannot be squared with Glossip v. Gross; third, the document plaintiff filed as a complaint does not allege the other element of an Eighth Amendment execution protocol claim, which is “an alternative that is feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduces a substantial risk of severe pain[,]" and finally, it is noteworthy that the lethal injection drug that Georgia uses in its single-drug protocol is pentobarbital, which, the Supreme Court has recognized, opponents to capital punishment have made largely unavailable through open channels. View "Gissendaner v. Commissioner" on Justia Law

Defendant, Commissioner of the City of Margate, Florida, was acquitted of one count, and convicted of two counts, of bribery in programs receiving federal funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B) and (2). The court rejected the government's argument that the district court erred in granting defendant's post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal and concluded that there is much too large of an inference to conclude that 1) federal stimulus funds were used; 2) each bus shelter costs $40,000; 3) there were six shelters built; and 4) that at least $10,000 in federal funds must have been used. The court also concluded that the decision to classify assistance as a federal benefit was properly submitted to the jury. Finally, the district court was well within its discretion to consider the government's brief in order to make a fully informed decision on the merits of defendant’s sufficiency challenge. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. McLean" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of trafficking cocaine and serving a thirty-year sentence, appealed the denial of his petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to perfect a motion to suppress key evidence. The court concluded that reasonable jurists could agree that counsel was not deficient when she did not perfect a motion to suppress because she thought petitioner lacked standing. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the petition because the Georgia Court of Appeals reasonably determined that trial counsel rendered sufficient performance. View "Pineda v. Warden" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession and subsequently challenged the denial of his motion to suppress the firearm and the calculation of his sentence. This appeal presents an issue of first impression: whether the vagueness doctrine of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to the advisory Sentencing Guidelines. The court held that the vagueness doctrine applies only to laws that prohibit conduct and fix punishments, not advisory guidelines. The court concluded that the district court did not err when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress. Further, the district court properly determined that defendant's previous convictions for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling were crimes of violence and that defendant’s resistance created a substantial risk of death or bodily injury in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer. The court rejected defendant's argument that the definition of “crime of violence” in the Sentencing Guidelines is unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson v. United States. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Matchett" on Justia Law

Petitioner's attorney did not call any witnesses or present any evidence during the penalty phase of his trial, in mitigation or otherwise. Counsel's strategy was to present petitioner’s case solely via his closing argument to the jury. The court found both deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland v. Washington and held that petitioner did not receive effective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his trial, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Therefore, the court agreed with the district court that petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus setting aside his capital sentence and, unless the State provides him with a new penalty phase, requiring the imposition of a life sentence. View "Hardwick v. Secretary, FL Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted for possession with intent to distribute 500 grams of cocaine and the district court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months' imprisonment because he had two prior felony drug convictions. Petitioner argued that the district court erroneously admitted evidence and that the evidence presented was insufficient to support his conviction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. Petitioner then filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, but he was denied relief and denied a certificate of appealability (COA). In this appeal, petitioner challenged the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court committed no error when it dismissed the petition after determining that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the section 2241 petition. View "Harris v. Warden" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of 33 crimes stemming from his receipt of federal worker’s compensation from July 2011 through March 2013. The district court calculated defendant's advisory guidelines range as 18–24 months imprisonment but did not sentence him to any incarceration time. Both parties appealed. The court affirmed defendant's convictions on Counts 1 and 9-12 because a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant caused his treating physician to submit materially false information to DOL and the Postal Service; the court affirmed defendant's convictions on Counts 2-4 because a reasonable jury could have found that defendant’s materially false statements were made “in connection with” his receipt of benefits; and the court affirmed defendant's conviction on Count 33 because a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that driving was no longer “bothering” defendant during the offense period, and that, by knowingly concealing this fact from his physician, he obtained worker’s compensation to which he was not entitled. The parties and the court agree that the district court miscalculated the special assessment imposed on defendant. Therefore, the district court will need to correct the error on remand. Further, the district court erred in calculating the total loss amount and, on remand, should use the sentencing guidelines' net loss approach, U.S.S.G. 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(ii), and order defendant to pay restitution in that amount. The district court must resentence defendant without relying on findings that contradict what the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "United States v. Slaton" on Justia Law