Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of 33 crimes stemming from his receipt of federal worker’s compensation from July 2011 through March 2013. The district court calculated defendant's advisory guidelines range as 18–24 months imprisonment but did not sentence him to any incarceration time. Both parties appealed. The court affirmed defendant's convictions on Counts 1 and 9-12 because a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant caused his treating physician to submit materially false information to DOL and the Postal Service; the court affirmed defendant's convictions on Counts 2-4 because a reasonable jury could have found that defendant’s materially false statements were made “in connection with” his receipt of benefits; and the court affirmed defendant's conviction on Count 33 because a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that driving was no longer “bothering” defendant during the offense period, and that, by knowingly concealing this fact from his physician, he obtained worker’s compensation to which he was not entitled. The parties and the court agree that the district court miscalculated the special assessment imposed on defendant. Therefore, the district court will need to correct the error on remand. Further, the district court erred in calculating the total loss amount and, on remand, should use the sentencing guidelines' net loss approach, U.S.S.G. 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(ii), and order defendant to pay restitution in that amount. The district court must resentence defendant without relying on findings that contradict what the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "United States v. Slaton" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, and four counts of filing false individual income tax returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7206(1). The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that defendant was guilty of conspiracy to defraud the United States where she and her husband owned two medical schools in the Caribbean, made millions of dollars from operating and selling them, and then, instead of reporting and paying taxes on any of that money, the couple followed "a common design" to hide it in multiple offshore accounts. Further, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to convict defendant of the four counts of filing false individual income tax returns where she failed to disclose her financial interest in foreign bank accounts. Finally, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a new trial, the district court properly admitted the husband's out-of-court statements, e-mails, and other correspondence under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), and the district court did not clearly err by including in the loss amount the tax she owed on the interest, dividends, and capital gains in those accounts. However, the district court should have made a foundational finding as to whether the two entities defendant owned are properly treated as partnerships for the purpose of federal tax purposes. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions, vacated the sentence, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Hough" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions and sentences for three counts of submitting false claims, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 287, and one count of attempting to evade or defeat a tax imposed by the Internal Revenue Code, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7201. The district court ordered defendant to pay restitution to the IRS in the amount of $296,246. Although defendant still owes the Government money in the amounts of his 2001–2003 deficiencies, the Government conceded at oral argument that such amounts do not constitute actual losses caused by conduct underlying a Title 18 offense and that a remand is in order so that the district court can determine the proper amount of restitution. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's restitution order and remanded for further proceedings as to restitution. The court rejected defendant's remaining contentions and affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Hesser" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). On appeal, defendant objected to the district court's reliance on the 2003 Presentencing Report. Defendant argued that the Supreme Court's decisions in Shepard v. United States and Descamps v. United States precluded the Government from relying on the report. The court agreed and reversed and remanded for resentencing, holding that the Government failed to prove that two of the four felonies - aggravated battery on a pregnant woman and battery on a law enforcement officer - on which the Government relies were violent felonies. On remand, defendant may not be sentenced under the ACCA. View "United States v. Braun" on Justia Law

Defendant conditionally pled guilty to one count of manufacturing counterfeit United States currency in violation of 18 U.S.C. 471. On appeal, defendant contends that the officers who found counterfeit bills in his home did not comply with the “knock and talk” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and acted unreasonably by going to his house at 5:04 a.m. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence of counterfeit currency found in the home where the officers' conduct was reasonable where they did not exceed the scope of the knock and talk exception. In this case, the officers' behavior did not objectively reveal a purpose to search, and approaching defendant's vehicle parked inside of his open-sided carport, instead of going to his front door, did not exceed the geographic limit on the knock and talk exception. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 875(c) for knowingly transmitting a threatening communication. Defendant then appealed to this court, asserting first that her indictment was deficient because it did not allege she subjectively intended to convey a threat to injure others, and second that section 875(c) was unconstitutionally overbroad if it did not require subjective intent. The court rejected both arguments, relying on its prior decision in United States v. Alaboud. The case comes before the court again for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Elonis v. United States. In Elonis, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the defendant’s conviction under section 875(c), holding a jury instruction providing “that the Government need prove only that a reasonable person would regard [the defendant’s] communications as threats” was error. In this case, the indictment fails to allege defendant’s mens rea or facts from which her intent can be inferred, with regard to the threatening nature of her e-mail. In light of Elonis, the court concluded that its holdings in defendant's case and in Alaboud are overruled. Accordingly, the court vacated defendant's conviction and sentence, and remanded. View "United States v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Defendant, originally sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment for failure to register as a sex offender, was sentenced to 24 months' imprisonment after the third revocation of his supervised release. On appeal, defendant contends that his revocation sentence was illegal because it exceeded the 14 months remaining on his then existing term of supervised release. The court followed its sister circuits and held that upon each revocation of supervised release a defendant may be sentenced to the felony class limits contained within 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3) without regard to imprisonment previously served for revocation of supervised release. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm and the Government cross-appealed. The court affirmed the conviction, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s request to modify the jury instruction for constructive possession. However, the court vacated defendant's sentence, concluding that defendant's prior Florida conviction for resisting an officer with violence constitutes a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Hill" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of seven felony counts of theft of public money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 641, asks the court to hold that her seven felony convictions are actually misdemeanor convictions because each separate conviction involves a sum that does not exceed $1,000. Defendant also argued that the district court committed legal error and that it clearly erred when it imposed the sophisticated means enhancement in determining her guidelines level. The court concluded that the unambiguous language of the statute designates all section 641 convictions felonies first and reduces them to misdemeanors second only if the sum of the amounts charged in all of the section 641 convictions in the defendant’s case equals $1,000 or less. The court also concluded that the district court correctly determined defendant's section 641 convictions to be felonies and it did not err or clearly err in applying the sophisticated-means enhancement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Feaster" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Honduras, appealed the district court's dismissal of his pro se federal habeas petition challenging his conviction for illegal reentry after deportation. The court concluded that the district court’s judgment must be affirmed, because petitioner raised his claim in an improper procedural vehicle. Rather than filing a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, the usual way for a federal prisoner to challenge a federal conviction, petitioner chose to file a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241. In the court's view, the district court wisely declined to recharacterize his section 2241 petition as a section 2255 motion. The district court was not obliged to recast petitioner’s section 2241 petition over his express wishes, especially in light of the adverse consequences that can stem from filing a section 2255 motion. Nor did the district court err in dismissing petitioner's section 2241 petition. View "Zalaya v. Secretary, FL Dep't of Corrections" on Justia Law