Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Environmental Law
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Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the EPA and the Corps' joint promulgation of the Clean Water Rule, which defines the term “Waters of the United States” for purposes of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. The district court subsequently denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1) gives courts of appeals exclusive original jurisdiction over challenges to the rule. Plaintiffs appealed the denial of preliminary injunctive relief. Plaintiffs in this case also filed in this court what they termed a “protective” petition for direct review of their Clean Water Rule challenge. The court concluded that, because of the Sixth Circuit’s nationwide stay of the Clean Water Rule, those opposing the rule are not being harmed by it in the interim. And, if the Sixth Circuit holds that the rule is invalid, that will end the matter, subject (as all panel decisions are) to the possibility of en banc and certiorari review. In any event, the decision of that court will likely narrow and refine, if not render moot, at least some of the issues this court asked the parties to brief. For all of these reasons, the court exercised its discretion to stay its hand in this case pending a decision of the Sixth Circuit or further developments. Accordingly, the court held the appeal in abeyance and ordered the district court to stay all further proceedings. View "State of Georgia v. McCarthey" on Justia Law

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The County petitioned for review of the Board's ruling reversing the ALJ's findings and conclusions in a proceeding under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 1367. The parties agreed that the Board incorrectly applied a de novo rather than substantial-evidence standard to the ALJ's findings. The court denied the petition for review, concluding that reviewing for substantial evidence would not have changed the result because the Board reversed the ALJ on matters of law, not fact. View "DeKalb Cnty. v. U.S. Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

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Two separate groups brought pre-enforcement challenges to the MSHA's final rule, entitled Lowering Miners’ Exposure to Respirable Coal Mine Dust, Including Continuous Personal Dust Monitors (New Dust Rule). On the first challenge, the court concluded that, consistent with the plain language of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act), 30 U.S.C. 801 et seq., and with the earlier precedent of this court, the statute as amended clearly evinces a congressional intent that, although it must consider the advice of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), MSHA has the sole responsibility to issue regulations covering the subjects addressed by this rule. On the second challenge, the court concluded that MSHA’s decades-long effort, culminating in the publication of this rule, adequately took into account the scientific evidence of record and arrived at conclusions which, given MSHA’s expertise, are worthy of deference. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "National Mining Ass'n v. Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

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Petitioners filed petitions with the EPA seeking to withdraw Alabama's authorization to administer the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), as part of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. On appeal, petitioners challenged the EPA's findings on some of the 22 alleged deficiencies that did not warrant the initiation of program withdrawal proceedings. The court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, concluding that it does not have jurisdiction to review the interim report with which petitioners disagreed because EPA has not made a "determination" within the meaning of section 1396(b)(1)(D). View "Cahaba Riverkeeper v. EPA" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Black Warrior Riverkeeper and Defenders of Wildlife appealed a district court’s grant of final summary judgment to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, as well as to the Alabama Coal Association and several other intervenor mining companies. Riverkeeper challenges the 2012 version of Nationwide Permit 21 (“NWP 21”), a general permit that allowed surface coal mining operations to discharge dredged or fill materials into navigable waters. Riverkeeper argued that the Corps arbitrarily and capriciously found that NWP 21 would have no more than minimal environmental effects, in violation of both the Clean Water Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. After deciding Riverkeeper has standing to sue, the district court held that Riverkeeper’s lawsuit was, nonetheless, barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. After thorough review, however, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the intervenors have shown neither inexcusable delay on the part of Riverkeeper nor prejudice resulting from Riverkeeper’s alleged delay. To the extent that Riverkeeper lagged in filing suit, its delay was slight and excused by its need to adequately investigate and prepare its claims in this complex case. Moreover, the Intervenors’ modest showing of harm, stated only at the highest order of abstraction, does not outweigh the potential environmental benefits of allowing Riverkeeper to proceed. As for the merits of Riverkeeper’s environmental claims, the district court concluded, after thorough deliberation, that the Corps’ determinations that NWP 21 would have only “minimal cumulative adverse effect” on the environment, pursuant to the Clean Water Act, and “no significant impact” on the environment, pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act, were neither arbitrary nor capricious. However, literally on the eve of oral argument before the Eleventh Circuit, the Corps admitted that it had underestimated the acreage of waters that would be affected by the projects authorized under the permit. In the face of this change in facts, the Eleventh Circuit ordered the parties to provide supplemental briefing on the implications of the Corps’ error. The Corps then conceded that the district court’s decision must be reversed and the matter remanded to the Corps for further consideration based on a more accurate assessment of the potential impacts of NWP 21. The Eleventh Circuit agreed. View "Black Warrior Riverkeeper, Inc., et al v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, et al" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671-2680, against the United States, alleging that they experienced various health problems after being exposed to toxic substances in the drinking water while living at Camp Lejeune, a military base in North Carolina. The United States argued that the North Carolina statute of repose, N.C. Gen. Stat. 1-52(16), precluded plaintiffs from bringing the case. The district court disagreed and certified two questions for interlocutory appeal. The court held that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9568, does not preempt North Carolina's statute of repose. The court also held that North Carolina's statute of repose applies to plaintiffs' claims and does not contain an exception for latent diseases. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Bryant, et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

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Dr. Hinchee, who resides in Florida, and Chevron appeal the district court's discovery order compelling production of Dr. Hinchee's documents to the Republic of Ecuador. Dr. Hinchee served as a testifying expert for Chevron in a related proceeding. The discovery dispute at issue stemmed from a suit brought by Ecuadorian plaintiffs alleging that Texaco's oil exploration in the Amazonian rain forest polluted private and public lands in Ecuador and that Texaco was responsible for plaintiffs' oil-related health problems and the environmental contamination of plaintiffs' property. The court concluded that Dr. Hinchee's notes and email communications with non-attorneys, including other experts, were relevant within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), and the Republic was thus entitled to discover these materials. Neither the text of Rule 26(b)(3)(A) nor its structure, history, and rationale support extending the work-product doctrine to all testifying expert materials. To the extent any attorney core opinion work-product was embedded in the 1,200 documents at issue here, Chevron and Dr. Hinchee could appropriately redact such portions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order compelling discovery. View "Republic of Ecuador v. Hinchee, et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, several citizens of Alabama, filed suit against Black Warrior Minerals, which operates a coal mine in Alabama, for violations of the new source performance standards. Congress has provided citizens a limited role in the enforcement of the Clean Air Act, 33 U.S.C. 1365(b), and ordinarily a citizen must provide notice of alleged violations to a discharger and federal and state authorities and wait 60 days before filing suit against a discharger. The Act required a citizen who sues a permit holder to sue for a violation of that permit and wait 60 days after giving notice of that violation before filing suit. Here, plaintiffs failed to wait the required 60 days before they filed suit against Black Warrior Minerals. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Black Warrior Minerals. View "Black Warrior Riverkeeper, et al. v. Black Warrior Minerals, Inc." on Justia Law

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This appeal concerned the district court's summary judgment order validating a majority of the water nutrient standards established by the EPA's rule and setting a deadline for the EPA to publish new rules, or explain its reasons for not doings so, pursuant to the terms of an existing consent decree. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the order because it was not a final judgment under Rule 54(b); the collateral order doctrine did not apply; and the order was not an immediately appealable injunction under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). Accordingly, the court granted the EPA's motion to dismiss and dismissed this appeal with prejudice for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Gulf Restoration Network, Inc., et al. v. Administrator, EPA" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit against the Navy under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.; the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.; and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701-706. Plaintiffs challenged the Navy's decision to install and operate an instrumented Undersea Warfare Training Range (the range) in waters adjacent to the only known calving grounds of the endangered North Atlantic right whale, and the NMFS's biological opinion assessing the impact of the range on threatened and endangered species. The court concluded that plaintiffs have not pointed to any provision in NEPA requiring an agency to authorize all phases of a proposed action evaluated in an environmental impact statement (EIS) at the time it issued a record of decision (ROD). Therefore, the court found that it was not an independent violation of NEPA, warranting reversal of the district court's judgment, for the Navy to enter into a construction contract after it signed an ROD authorizing construction and after having its NEPA analysis upheld by the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment that the Navy complied with NEPA. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Navy as to plaintiffs' remaining claims. View "Defenders of Wildlife, et al. v. U.S. Dept. of the Navy, et al." on Justia Law