Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Eleventh Circuit centered on the grant of qualified immunity to two social workers who violated clearly established federal rights during an investigation of alleged child abuse. After Plaintiff-Appellant Stephen Loftus petitioned a Florida court to help him protect his two children from his allegedly abusive former wife, social worker and Defendant-Appellee Ester Clark-Moore, investigated the safety and welfare of Loftus's children, Savonna and Dylan. In the course of her investigation, Clark-Moore allegedly interviewed Savonna without Loftus's consent, and Clark-Moore's supervisor, Myra Ferguson, allegedly twice threatened to remove both children from Loftus's care. Loftus filed a civil complaint that the social workers had violated Savonna's right to be free from unreasonable seizures and the family's right to be free from governmental interference. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that because the social workers did not violate any clearly established federal civil rights in the investigation that Loftus had invited, it affirmed the dismissal of Loftus's complaint against them. View "Loftus v. Clark-Moore" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of her two-count complaint alleging interference and retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., against defendant. It was undisputed that plaintiff, at the time she requested leave, was not eligible for FMLA protection because she had not worked the requisite hours and had not yet experienced a triggering event, the birth of her child. It is also undisputed that she would have been entitled to FMLA protection by the time she gave birth and began her requested leave. The court held that because the FMLA required notice in advance of future leave, employees were protected from interference prior to the occurrence of the triggering event; a pre-eligible employee had a cause of action if an employer terminated her in order to avoid having to accommodate that employee with rightful FMLA leave rights once that employee became eligible; a pre-eligible request for post-eligible leave was protected activity because the FMLA aimed to support both employees in the process of exercising their FMLA rights and employers in planning for the absence of employees on FMLA leave; and because plaintiff engaged in protected activity by discussing her maternity plans with her employer, she has alleged a valid cause of action for retaliation.

The Florida Department of Revenue (Florida DOR) and the Virginia Department of Social Services (Virginia DSS) appealed the district court's decision affirming an order of the bankruptcy court holding the agencies in contempt and awarding debtor compensatory and punitive damages for the agencies' alleged violations of the automatic stay and discharge injunction issued by the bankruptcy court. The court held that state sovereign immunity shields the the Florida DOR and the Virginia DSS from debtor's claims for violations of the automatic stay. The court also held that, although sovereign immunity did not bar debtor's claims for violations of the discharge injunction, neither the Florida DOR nor the Virginia DSS violated the discharge injunction. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to vacate the bankruptcy court's order and dismiss the action.

Defendant appealed his 30 month sentence for removing a child from the United States with intent to obstruct the lawful exercise of parental rights in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1204(a). At issue was whether the district court erred by applying the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3C1.2 for recklessly endangering another in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer. The court held that the district court erred in applying section 3C1.2 where defendant did not endanger his son while knowingly fleeing a law enforcement officer when defendant was unaware of the pursuit by the Coast Guard agents until the pursuit was over and defendant immediately cooperated with the first law enforcement officers he encountered. The court also held that the error was not harmless because the district court expressly stated that it was sentencing defendant in the middle of the guideline range and defendant's 30 month sentence exceeded the guideline range applicable without the section 3C1.2 enhancement. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for re-sentencing.