Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Black Warrior Riverkeeper and Defenders of Wildlife appealed a district court’s grant of final summary judgment to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, as well as to the Alabama Coal Association and several other intervenor mining companies. Riverkeeper challenges the 2012 version of Nationwide Permit 21 (“NWP 21”), a general permit that allowed surface coal mining operations to discharge dredged or fill materials into navigable waters. Riverkeeper argued that the Corps arbitrarily and capriciously found that NWP 21 would have no more than minimal environmental effects, in violation of both the Clean Water Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. After deciding Riverkeeper has standing to sue, the district court held that Riverkeeper’s lawsuit was, nonetheless, barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. After thorough review, however, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the intervenors have shown neither inexcusable delay on the part of Riverkeeper nor prejudice resulting from Riverkeeper’s alleged delay. To the extent that Riverkeeper lagged in filing suit, its delay was slight and excused by its need to adequately investigate and prepare its claims in this complex case. Moreover, the Intervenors’ modest showing of harm, stated only at the highest order of abstraction, does not outweigh the potential environmental benefits of allowing Riverkeeper to proceed. As for the merits of Riverkeeper’s environmental claims, the district court concluded, after thorough deliberation, that the Corps’ determinations that NWP 21 would have only “minimal cumulative adverse effect” on the environment, pursuant to the Clean Water Act, and “no significant impact” on the environment, pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act, were neither arbitrary nor capricious. However, literally on the eve of oral argument before the Eleventh Circuit, the Corps admitted that it had underestimated the acreage of waters that would be affected by the projects authorized under the permit. In the face of this change in facts, the Eleventh Circuit ordered the parties to provide supplemental briefing on the implications of the Corps’ error. The Corps then conceded that the district court’s decision must be reversed and the matter remanded to the Corps for further consideration based on a more accurate assessment of the potential impacts of NWP 21. The Eleventh Circuit agreed. View "Black Warrior Riverkeeper, Inc., et al v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner Putu Indrawati appealed a Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) order that affirmed an Immigration Judge's (IJ) decision that she was barred from adjustment status because she knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application. Petitioner was attacked in her native Indonesia while visiting family on break from college in the US. The incident convinced petitioner to apply for asylum in the US. Her closest friend was successful in gaining asylum in the US, and petitioner relied on her friend's advice to petition for asylum too. Though she should read and write in English, petitioner relied on third parties to complete her application. Petitioner signed blank forms and gave them to the third parties to present her application on her behalf. On appeal, petitioner argued: (1) the IJ denied her a sufficient opportunity to account for any discrepancies or implausible aspects of her claim; (2) the IJ's reliance on three documents prepared for her violated her right to due process; and (3) the BIA's decision reflected a lack of reasoned consideration. Upon review of the BIA's decision, the Eleventh Circuit concluded it was without jurisdiction to consider the first two arguments petitioner made on appeal. As to the third, the Court concluded petitioner's claim was without merit. View "Indrawati v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

In August 2012, the United States filed a civil suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., alleging that the failure of the Florida to provide a kosher diet program to all of its prisoners with sincere religious grounds for keeping kosher was a substantial burden on those prisoners' religious exercise. The complaint requested both injunctive and declaratory relief under the statute. After the district court denied Florida's motion to dismiss the complaint, the State issued a new policy in March 2013, formally titled "Procedure 503.006" and informally referred to as "the Religious Diet Program." In addition to outlining the contents of the meals, Procedure 503.006 contains a number of provisions that determine a prisoner's eligibility for the program. When the United States learned about Procedure 503.006 in April 2013, it filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The preliminary injunction the court entered required Florida to provide the kosher diet, and prevented the State from enforcing the eligibility provisions of Procedure 503.006. The court's order did not, however, mention the need-narrowness-intrusiveness criteria for preliminary injunctions established by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). While this interlocutory appeal was pending, the district court held monthly status conferences between the parties. But the court did not make any need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings regarding the preliminary injunction, nor did it issue an order finalizing the preliminary injunction. As a result, the preliminary injunction expired by operation of law on Thursday, March 6, 2014. "The preliminary injunction in the present case passed on to injunction heaven [. . .] And with it died this appeal," unless there existed an exception to the mootness doctrine. Finding no exception, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the mooted issue, and vacated the portion of the district court's order that addressed it. View "United States v. Sec'y, Florida Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act (UOCAVA), Pub. L. No. 111-84, Subtitle H, 575-589, 123 Stat. 2190, 2322, amended the Uniformed and Overseas Citizen Absentee Voting Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. 1973ff. The UOCAVA now requires a state, absent a hardship waiver, to transmit an absentee ballot to the voter "not later than 45 days before the election[.]" Georgia and Alabama appealed the district court's grant of preliminary injunctive relief, summary judgment, and permanent injunctive relief in a suit brought by the United States against Georgia and Alabama. The district court ruled that the 45-day transmittal requirement applies to runoff elections for federal office, and that the runoff election schemes in these two states violated UOCAVA. After the district court had issued its ruling and after the briefs in this appeal were filed, the Georgia Legislature passed H.B. 310, which in relevant part amends Georgia's election calendar and voting procedures to comply with the 45-day transmittal requirement. In light of H.B. 310, the court dismissed Georgia's appeal as moot. View "United States v. State of Georgia" on Justia Law

LabMD appealed the district court's dismissal of its challenges to the FTC's ability to regulate and conduct enforcement proceedings in the area of healthcare data privacy, arguing that the FTC's enforcement action violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 704; is ultra vires; and is unconstitutional. The court held that the FTC's order denying LabMD's motion to dismiss was not a "final agency action," as required of claims made under the APA and, therefore, those claims were properly dismissed. The court also concluded that LabMD's other claims are intertwined with its APA claim for relief and may only be heard at the end of the administrative hearing. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "LabMD, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission" on Justia Law

These six consolidated appeals arose out of a Congressional exemption from taxation granted to the federal entities. Appellants contend that the state taxes normally imposed on real estate transfers apply when the federal entities transfer real property in their respective states. The federal entities have not paid the transfer taxes based on their Congressional charter exemptions from "all taxation." The district courts found that the statutory exemptions do apply to preclude taxation and are constitutional. The district court also found that statutory exceptions for taxation of real property contained in the federal statutes did not apply to allow appellants to impose the transfer tax. The court affirmed and agreed with its sister circuits, who have held that the charter exemptions do apply in this context, and are constitutional under the Commerce, Necessary and Proper, and Supremacy Clauses. View "Montgomery Cnty. Comm'n v. FHFA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a native and citizen of Venezuela and citizen of Cuba, appealed the dismissal of his complaint challenging the USCIS's determination that he was statutorily ineligible to adjust status under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (CAA), Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161. The court concluded that any arguments plaintiff may have had regarding the district judge's dismissal of his request for mandamus relief for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted and any claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA), 28 U.S.C. 2201, has been abandoned by plaintiff's failure to raise them on appeal. Because the BIA lacked authority to review the USCIS CAA-eligibility determination, plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies prior to commencing his proceedings before the IJ. Therefore, the district judge erred when he determined that plaintiff's failure to exhaust available administrative remedies deprived him of jurisdiction over plaintiff's complaint. The court reversed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, remanding for further proceedings. View "Perez v. USCIS" on Justia Law

Redus filed a foreclosure complaint against the Zagames and the parties entered into a settlement agreement that resulted in a joint stipulation for Entry of Final Judgment of Foreclosure. At issue on appeal was what a Marshal collects when he auctions a public judicial sale pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1921(c)(1). The district court calculated the Marshal's commission based only on the amount of the judgment lien because the judgment creditor failed to establish the property's appraisal value. The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for proceedings because the court found that the plain meaning of "collected" in section 1921(c)(1) refers to the amount of the accepted winning bid. The court noted that this decision does not abolish the Marshal's commission. View "Redus Florida Commercial v. College Station Retail Center" on Justia Law

In 2010 the Georgia Department of Banking and Finance closed Community Bank & Trust. St. Paul, which provided liability coverage to the Bank’s officers and directors, sought a declaratory judgment in response to a separate lawsuit (underlying action) brought by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as receiver for the Bank, against Miller and Fricks, former Bank officers. In that action, the FDIC alleged gross negligence and breaches of fiduciary duty related to the Bank’s Home Funding Loan Program and claimed more than $15 million in damages. Finding the policy’s an “insured-versus-insured” exclusion unambiguous, the district court held that there was no coverage. The exclusion precludes coverage only for actions brought “by or on behalf of any Insured or Company in any capacity.” Neither the exclusion nor the defined terms make any reference to the FDIC, regulators, or any liquidating entity. St. Paul argued that the FDIC “steps into the shoes” of the bank, as a receiver. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding the provision ambiguous. View "St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the State, challenging the constitutionality of Fla. Stat. 414.0652, which requires suspicionless drug testing of all applicants seeking Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). The court granted a preliminary injunction barring the application of the statute against plaintiff and the State stopped the drug-testing program. Then the district court granted final summary judgment to plaintiff, declaring the statute unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The court concluded that the State failed to meet its burden of establishing a substantial special need to drug test all TANF applicants without any suspicion; even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the State has not demonstrated a more prevalent, unique, or different drug problem among TANF applicants than in the general population; the ordinary government interests claimed in this case are nothing like the narrow category of special needs that justify blanket drug testing of railroad workers, certain federal Customs employees involved in drug interdiction or who carry firearms, or involve surpassing safety interests; and the State cannot circumvent constitutional concerns by requiring that applicants consent to a drug test to receive TANF payments. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Lebron v. Secretary of the FL Dept. of Children and Families" on Justia Law