Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Florida Secretary of State, arguing that Florida was violating the 90 Day Provision of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A), by conducting a program to systematically remove suspected non-citizens from the voter rolls within 90 days of a federal election. The 90 Day Provision requires states to "complete, not later than 90 days prior to the date of primary or general election for Federal office, any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters." Concerned about people who are not citizens casting ballots in Florida elections, the Secretary engaged in two separate programs to identify and remove non-citizens from the Florida voter rolls. Determining that the issue was not moot even if the 2012 elections have passed, the court concluded that the plain meaning of the 90 Day Provision indicates that the Secretary's actions fall under the category of "any program...to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters." Further, the statutory context and policy of the NVRA supported the court's conclusion that the plain meaning of "any program...to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters" was intended by Congress to include programs like the Secretary's. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Arcia, et al. v. Florida Secretary of State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the City's Ordinance No. 2886-12, which generally prohibits targeted picketing within 50 feet of a residential dwelling. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's grant of the City's motion to dismiss. At issue are sections 62-79 and 62-77. The court concluded that the Ordinance's ban on targeted picketing, section 62-79, was content-neutral, furthered a significant government interest, was narrowly tailored, and left open ample alternate channels for speech. Therefore, section 62-79 was facially constitutional and the district court dismissed plaintiff's challenge as to section 62-79. The court concluded however, that section 62-77 granted private citizens unbridled discretion to invoke the City's power to regulate speech in public fora abutting private residences. Accordingly, the court concluded that the loitering provision was facially unconstitutional and invalid. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Bell, et al. v. City of Winter Park, FL, et al." on Justia Law

Relator filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, against the District, alleging that the District violated the FCA by fraudulently claiming FEMA reimbursements for ineligible canal repairs. The court held that, as an arm of the State of Florida, the District was not a "person" that could be subjected to suit by a qui tam relator under the FCA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of relator's claims. View "Lesinski v. South Florida Water Mgmt." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the district court's summary judgment order validating a majority of the water nutrient standards established by the EPA's rule and setting a deadline for the EPA to publish new rules, or explain its reasons for not doings so, pursuant to the terms of an existing consent decree. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the order because it was not a final judgment under Rule 54(b); the collateral order doctrine did not apply; and the order was not an immediately appealable injunction under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). Accordingly, the court granted the EPA's motion to dismiss and dismissed this appeal with prejudice for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Gulf Restoration Network, Inc., et al. v. Administrator, EPA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Officer Seymour and Sergeant Parker under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for false arrest. Plaintiff was arrested in the parking lot of a bar after Officer Seymour, who was working off-duty but in full uniform, asked her to move her car before it was towed. Plaintiff responded by cursing and speaking loudly. The court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Officer Seymour because the facts viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff showed that Officer Seymour lacked arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred in denying qualified immunity to Sergeant Parker, who was not present during the alleged false arrest. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment in regards to Sergeant Parker. View "Wilkerson v. Seymour" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Navy under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.; the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.; and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701-706. Plaintiffs challenged the Navy's decision to install and operate an instrumented Undersea Warfare Training Range (the range) in waters adjacent to the only known calving grounds of the endangered North Atlantic right whale, and the NMFS's biological opinion assessing the impact of the range on threatened and endangered species. The court concluded that plaintiffs have not pointed to any provision in NEPA requiring an agency to authorize all phases of a proposed action evaluated in an environmental impact statement (EIS) at the time it issued a record of decision (ROD). Therefore, the court found that it was not an independent violation of NEPA, warranting reversal of the district court's judgment, for the Navy to enter into a construction contract after it signed an ROD authorizing construction and after having its NEPA analysis upheld by the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment that the Navy complied with NEPA. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Navy as to plaintiffs' remaining claims. View "Defenders of Wildlife, et al. v. U.S. Dept. of the Navy, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the City and others after he was fired from the police department for violating department policies. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court concluded that the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff failed to establish that any of the personnel, internal affairs, or disciplinary decisions about which he complained was made by a final policy maker for the City such that municipal liability attached; plaintiff's First Amendment claims failed because he could not establish that his speech played a substantial part in the police department's decision to conduct internal affairs investigations or terminate him; and plaintiff's false arrest, imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims also failed because he has not presented any evidence that he was arrested without probable cause and the evidence could not be read to establish that there was a causal connection between either of the individual defendants' actions and plaintiff's arrest, imprisonment, and prosecution. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to all defendants. View "Carter, Jr. v. City of Melbourne, FL, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the City of Milton's decision to deny T-Mobile's applications for permits to build three cell phone towers. At issue was the writing requirement of the Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), which stated that "[a]ny decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless services shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record." The court concluded that T-Mobile had access to documents - including transcripts of the planning commission's hearings, letters the city sent to T-Mobile, and detailed minutes of the city council hearings- before its deadline for filing the lawsuit and collectively, these documents they were enough to satisfy the writing requirement of section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Milton, Georgia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, in his official capacity as the Director of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities (APD), bringing a facial challenge to the constitutionality of Florida's statutory scheme for involuntarily admitting intellectually disabled persons to residential services, Florida Statutes 393.11. The court certified questions to the Supreme Court of Florida regarding the scope of the APD's obligations under the statute. View "J.R. v. Hansen" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, male inmates, filed suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., challenging an ADOC policy that forbids them from wearing their hair unshorn in accordance with the dictates of their Native American religion. The United States intervened on plaintiffs' behalf. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the ADOC because the ADOC carried its burden of demonstrating that its hair-length policy was the least restrict means of furthering its compelling governmental interests of prevention of contraband, facilitation of inmate identification, maintenance of good hygiene and health, and facilitation of prison discipline through uniformity. View "Knight, et al. v. Thompson, et al." on Justia Law