Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

LabMD appealed the district court's dismissal of its challenges to the FTC's ability to regulate and conduct enforcement proceedings in the area of healthcare data privacy, arguing that the FTC's enforcement action violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 704; is ultra vires; and is unconstitutional. The court held that the FTC's order denying LabMD's motion to dismiss was not a "final agency action," as required of claims made under the APA and, therefore, those claims were properly dismissed. The court also concluded that LabMD's other claims are intertwined with its APA claim for relief and may only be heard at the end of the administrative hearing. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "LabMD, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission" on Justia Law

These six consolidated appeals arose out of a Congressional exemption from taxation granted to the federal entities. Appellants contend that the state taxes normally imposed on real estate transfers apply when the federal entities transfer real property in their respective states. The federal entities have not paid the transfer taxes based on their Congressional charter exemptions from "all taxation." The district courts found that the statutory exemptions do apply to preclude taxation and are constitutional. The district court also found that statutory exceptions for taxation of real property contained in the federal statutes did not apply to allow appellants to impose the transfer tax. The court affirmed and agreed with its sister circuits, who have held that the charter exemptions do apply in this context, and are constitutional under the Commerce, Necessary and Proper, and Supremacy Clauses. View "Montgomery Cnty. Comm'n v. FHFA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a native and citizen of Venezuela and citizen of Cuba, appealed the dismissal of his complaint challenging the USCIS's determination that he was statutorily ineligible to adjust status under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (CAA), Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161. The court concluded that any arguments plaintiff may have had regarding the district judge's dismissal of his request for mandamus relief for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted and any claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA), 28 U.S.C. 2201, has been abandoned by plaintiff's failure to raise them on appeal. Because the BIA lacked authority to review the USCIS CAA-eligibility determination, plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies prior to commencing his proceedings before the IJ. Therefore, the district judge erred when he determined that plaintiff's failure to exhaust available administrative remedies deprived him of jurisdiction over plaintiff's complaint. The court reversed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, remanding for further proceedings. View "Perez v. USCIS" on Justia Law

Redus filed a foreclosure complaint against the Zagames and the parties entered into a settlement agreement that resulted in a joint stipulation for Entry of Final Judgment of Foreclosure. At issue on appeal was what a Marshal collects when he auctions a public judicial sale pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1921(c)(1). The district court calculated the Marshal's commission based only on the amount of the judgment lien because the judgment creditor failed to establish the property's appraisal value. The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for proceedings because the court found that the plain meaning of "collected" in section 1921(c)(1) refers to the amount of the accepted winning bid. The court noted that this decision does not abolish the Marshal's commission. View "Redus Florida Commercial v. College Station Retail Center" on Justia Law

In 2010 the Georgia Department of Banking and Finance closed Community Bank & Trust. St. Paul, which provided liability coverage to the Bank’s officers and directors, sought a declaratory judgment in response to a separate lawsuit (underlying action) brought by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as receiver for the Bank, against Miller and Fricks, former Bank officers. In that action, the FDIC alleged gross negligence and breaches of fiduciary duty related to the Bank’s Home Funding Loan Program and claimed more than $15 million in damages. Finding the policy’s an “insured-versus-insured” exclusion unambiguous, the district court held that there was no coverage. The exclusion precludes coverage only for actions brought “by or on behalf of any Insured or Company in any capacity.” Neither the exclusion nor the defined terms make any reference to the FDIC, regulators, or any liquidating entity. St. Paul argued that the FDIC “steps into the shoes” of the bank, as a receiver. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding the provision ambiguous. View "St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the State, challenging the constitutionality of Fla. Stat. 414.0652, which requires suspicionless drug testing of all applicants seeking Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). The court granted a preliminary injunction barring the application of the statute against plaintiff and the State stopped the drug-testing program. Then the district court granted final summary judgment to plaintiff, declaring the statute unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The court concluded that the State failed to meet its burden of establishing a substantial special need to drug test all TANF applicants without any suspicion; even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the State has not demonstrated a more prevalent, unique, or different drug problem among TANF applicants than in the general population; the ordinary government interests claimed in this case are nothing like the narrow category of special needs that justify blanket drug testing of railroad workers, certain federal Customs employees involved in drug interdiction or who carry firearms, or involve surpassing safety interests; and the State cannot circumvent constitutional concerns by requiring that applicants consent to a drug test to receive TANF payments. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Lebron v. Secretary of the FL Dept. of Children and Families" on Justia Law

Kawa filed suit challenging the Treasury's decision to postpone the enforcement of the employer mandate provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), 26 U.S.C. 4980H, and sought a declaratory judgment and injunction setting aside the Treasury's transition relief. Kawa had expended time and money to determine how to comply with the employer mandate between early 2013 and the end of June 2013. After Kawa incurred these expenses, the Treasury announced it would not enforce the mandate for a transition period of one year - until the end of 2014. The Treasury then extended the transition relief for certain employers, including Kawa, for a second year. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint because Kawa lacked Article III standing where Kawa failed to allege an injury in fact, a causal connection, and a likelihood of success. View "Kawa Orthodontics, LLP v. Secretary, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, et al." on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the Jefferson County Board of Education and the Madison City Board of Education ask the court to recede from its opinion in Stewart v. Baldwin Cnty. Bd. of Educ., which held that school boards in Alabama are not arms of the state and therefore not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court declined to read Versiglio II in a way which violates the court's prior panel precedent rule and creates interpretive problems for panels in the future; although the court recognized the principle of state sovereign immunity law in Stewart, the court did not find it determinative, and held that Alabama school boards could not assert Eleventh Amendment immunity; the court's precedent does not provide a basis for it to conclude that Stewart has been abrogated; the court noted that the Alabama courts do not view state sovereign immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity as one and the same; and the Alabama Supreme Court's Ex Parte Madison Cnty. Bd. of Educ. decision agrees with Stewart. The court concluded that both cases before it concern employment-related decisions and under Stewart, local school boards in Alabama are not arms of the state with respect to such decisions. Consequently, the Jefferson County Board of Education and the Madison City Board of Education are not immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suits challenging those decisions under federal law; the district court's dismissal of the complaint in Walker (Case Nos. 13-14182 and 13-14927) is reversed; and the district court's denial of the motion of dismiss in Weaver (Case No. 13-14624) is affirmed. View "Walker, et al. v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., et al." on Justia Law

This dispute arose from violations issued by the Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration. At issue was whether the word "corporation" includes limited liability companies (LLCs) for purposes of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (the Mine Act), 30 U.S.C. 801 et seq. The court concluded that the terms "corporation" and "corporate operator" in the Mine Act are ambiguous. Applying Chevron deference, the court concluded that the Secretary's interpretation is reasonable where, most importantly, construing section 110(c) to include agents of LLCs is consistent with the legislative history. Therefore, the court held that an LLC is a corporation for purposes of the Mine Act and that section 110(c) can be used to assess civil penalties against agents of an LLC. Because substantial evidence supported the ALJ's decision to hold petitioners personally liable for the order at issue, the court affirmed on this issue. Finally, the order underlying their civil penalties was not duplicative. Accordingly, the court affirmed the ALJ's decision.View "Sumpter, et al. v. Secretary of Labor, et al." on Justia Law

The Hospital filed suit against various federal agencies and officials, seeking a declaratory judgment that 18 U.S.C. 4006(b)(1), where Congress has elected to impose the Medicare rate as full compensation for medical services rendered to federal detainees, is unconstitutional as applied. The court concluded that the Hospital voluntarily opted into the Medicare program and is, as a result, required to provide emergency services to federal detainees. Consequently, the Hospital was foreclosed from challenging this compensation scheme as an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. The court noted that the Hospital's most effective remedy may lie with Congress rather than the courts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action.View "Baker County Medical Services v. U.S. Attorney General, et al." on Justia Law