Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case involved the City of Atlanta's compliance with two consent decrees which resolved complex, multi-party litigation arising from Atlanta's violation of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. The court held that the district court exceeded the scope of its authority by exercising jurisdiction over the state service delivery proceedings. The district court's order enjoining Fulton County and Sandy Springs from pursuing the state service delivery proceedings in state court was vacated and remanded for the district court to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction Atlanta's Amended Third-Party Complaint against Sandy Springs. View "City of Atlanta v. City of Sandy Springs, et al" on Justia Law

In these three consolidated appeals, the court must decide issues about the enforceability of German bonds issued during the period between World War I and World War II. The court concluded that the district court had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1302-1311, over the complaint against Germany filed by Sovereign Bonds regarding its Agra bonds issued in the territory that later became East Germany; all the bonds were subject to the 1953 Validation Treaty and must be validated before they could be enforced in American courts; the complaint filed by World Holdings to enforce its validated bonds was untimely; and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied discovery to Sovereign Bonds on the issue of validation. View "World Holdings, LLC v. Federal Republic of Germany" on Justia Law

Leon County appealed the dismissal of its complaint against the FHFA, it's acting director, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, Leon County argued that by directing Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks to refrain from purchasing mortgages encumbered with certain first-priority lien obligations, some of which were held by Leon County, the FHFA engaged in rulemaking without providing notice and comment pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 12 U.S.C. 4526(b). The court agreed with the district court that, under the specific facts in this case, the FHFA's directive not to purchase Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) encumbered mortgages was within the FHFA's broad powers as conservator. Accordingly, because 12 U.S.C. 4617(f) provided that "no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the [FHFA] as a conservator or receiver," the district court held that section 4617(f) barred Leon County's claims. View "Leon County Florida, et al v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, et al" on Justia Law

In this matter, the court must decide whether it had original subject matter jurisdiction over several petitions for review of an administrative rule that exempted transfers of waters of the United States from the requirements for a permit under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., or whether the court could avoid deciding that question and instead exercise hypothetical jurisdiction to decide the merits of the petitions. The court held that, under the plain language of the governing statute, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the petitions and could not exercise hypothetical jurisdiction over them. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petitions. View "Friends of the Everglades v. United States Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Petitioner Odulene Dormescar, a native and citizen of Haiti, appealed a removal order issued by an immigration judge because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal of that order. He has petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for review. His petition presented three issues: (1) whether the Eleventh Circuit had subject matter jurisdiction; if it did, then the second (2) issue was whether res judicata barred the Department of Homeland Security’s proceedings against Petitioner based on the aggravated felony conviction. If it did not, the third (3) issue was whether the Department had the authority to amend the notice to appear to charge Petitioner as "admitted to the United States, but . . . removable" when he was originally charged as an inadmissible "arriving alien." Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it had jurisdiction over this case, res judicata did not apply, and that the Department had the authority to amend the notice to appear to charge Petitioner as admitted but removable. View "Dormescar v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

The issue before the Eleventh Circuit centered on the grant of qualified immunity to two social workers who violated clearly established federal rights during an investigation of alleged child abuse. After Plaintiff-Appellant Stephen Loftus petitioned a Florida court to help him protect his two children from his allegedly abusive former wife, social worker and Defendant-Appellee Ester Clark-Moore, investigated the safety and welfare of Loftus's children, Savonna and Dylan. In the course of her investigation, Clark-Moore allegedly interviewed Savonna without Loftus's consent, and Clark-Moore's supervisor, Myra Ferguson, allegedly twice threatened to remove both children from Loftus's care. Loftus filed a civil complaint that the social workers had violated Savonna's right to be free from unreasonable seizures and the family's right to be free from governmental interference. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that because the social workers did not violate any clearly established federal civil rights in the investigation that Loftus had invited, it affirmed the dismissal of Loftus's complaint against them. View "Loftus v. Clark-Moore" on Justia Law

In a consolidated appeal, Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad appealed the District Court's denial of its asserted right to victim status under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) and sought restitution. In December 2010, the United States filed a criminal information against Alcatel-Lucent, charging it with violating provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The government simultaneously filed criminal informations against three subsidiaries of Alcatel-Lucent (Alcatel-Lucent France, Alcatel Lucent Trade International, and Alcatel Centroamerica) charging them with conspiracy to violate the FCPA's accounting and anti-bribery provisions. In 2011, Alcatel-Lucent entered into a deferred prosecution agreement and factual proffer with the United States. The agreement deferred prosecution for three years, subject to Alcatel-Lucent's compliance with specific reforms in its accounting and oversight controls, and required Alcatel-Lucent to pay a penalty of $92 million. The facts proffered in Alcatel-Lucent's deferred prosecution agreement identified Appellant Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE). Alcatel-Lucent admitted that it hired and paid unusually large fees to "consultants," who in turn curried favor with ICE officials and board members to secure telecommunications contracts by offering direct bribes or kickbacks from any contracts awarded by ICE to Alcatel-Lucent or its subsidiaries. After thorough review of the record, and with the benefit of oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. View "United States v. Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad" on Justia Law

In late 2008, Lou Ann Cassell inherited $220,000 from her aunt. At that time, both Cassell and her wholly owned company, J&L Arborists, LLC, were insolvent. After consulting with attorneys and accountants, she used her $220,000 inheritance to purchase a single-premium fixed annuity. She began receiving monthly payments, and under the annuity contract she is scheduled to receive those payments for the rest of her life. The contract also guarantees the payments for ten years regardless of when Cassell dies. She designated her children as the beneficiaries of the payments if she dies within the ten-year guarantee period. A year after she had purchased the annuity, Cassell and her company filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. She included the annuity as an asset in her Schedule B disclosures, and listed it as exempt under Georgia law on Schedule C. The trustee objected, contending that Cassell's annuity is nonexempt because it does not meet the requirements of the statute. The bankruptcy court held that Cassell's annuity was an "annuity" within the meaning of the Georgia bankruptcy exemption statute. The district court affirmed as to the issues that the bankruptcy court had addressed but remanded the case, leaving it for the bankruptcy court to decide in the first instance whether the annuity payments were reasonably necessary for Cassell's support. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit certified the question pertaining to the Georgia exemption to the Georgia Supreme Court. View "Silliman v. Cassell" on Justia Law

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as receiver for Darby Bank & Trust Co., appealed an order of the district court that remanded the underlying case the action to state court. The district court determined that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because the FDIC had not been formally substituted as a party in the state court action prior to removal. After review, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's remand order. The Court held that, as a matter of federal law, the FDIC is "substituted as a party" in a state court proceeding under 12 U.S.C. 1819(b)(2)(B) once it is appointed receiver and files a notice of substitution, and may at that point remove the action to federal court." View "North Savannah Properties, LLC, et al v. FDIC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Cristobal Ramirez brought a Title VII employment discrimination case and represented himself in district court. He survived summary judgment (in part) and proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the presentation of his evidence, Defendant, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), orally moved for judgment as matter of law. The district court granted the motion on the sole ground that Plaintiff's claim was time-barred because he did not contact an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Counselor within forty-five days of the alleged discrimination. Plaintiff, still appearing in the case pro se, appealed to the Eleventh Circuit where he was appointed counsel. Upon review, and with the benefit of counseled briefing and oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court. Because the EEOC found that there was a satisfactory reason for Plaintiff's delay in making initial contact with the EEO Counselor, and because the DOT did not challenge that finding, but, instead, undertook investigation and conciliation, the DOT and the district court were bound by the EEOC’s finding. View "Ramirez v. U.S. Dept. of Trans." on Justia Law