Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Maria Fatima Mejia Ponce sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Ponce claimed she faced persecution in Honduras due to her membership in a particular social group, specifically Honduran business owners perceived as wealthy and targeted by criminal gangs.The Immigration Judge (IJ) initially denied Ponce's application, finding that her proposed social group was not sufficiently particular or socially distinct. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that Ponce's proposed group did not meet the criteria for a particular social group under U.S. asylum law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that to qualify for asylum, an applicant must demonstrate persecution based on membership in a particular social group, which must be defined by common, immutable characteristics, and be socially distinct within the society in question. The court referenced its prior decision in Perez-Zenteno v. U.S. Attorney General, which held that a particular social group must be narrowly defined and not overly broad.The Eleventh Circuit found that Ponce's proposed social group of Honduran business owners perceived as wealthy was too broad and lacked the necessary immutability, identity, visibility, homogeneity, and cohesiveness. The court concluded that Ponce's proposed group did not qualify as a particular social group for asylum purposes. Consequently, the court denied Ponce's petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision. View "Ponce v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Nakia Courtney Hamilton, a Jamaican citizen, was ordered removed from the United States in 2017 following a conviction for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. Hamilton, who was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 2009, has filed three motions to reopen his removal proceedings. His most recent motion sought to apply for a waiver of the immigration consequences of his conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied Hamilton’s third motion to reopen, finding it untimely and procedurally barred. Hamilton argued that the procedural limitations should be equitably tolled based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Niz-Chavez v. Garland, which held that a notice to appear must be a single document containing all required information to trigger the stop-time rule for cancellation of removal. The BIA concluded that Niz-Chavez did not affect Hamilton’s eligibility for a § 1182(h) waiver and thus did not justify reopening the proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA’s decision. The court found that the stop-time rule in § 1182(h) is triggered by the initiation of removal proceedings, not by the issuance of a compliant notice to appear as required by § 1229(a). The court determined that Hamilton’s removal proceedings were validly initiated when the Department of Homeland Security filed the notice to appear with the immigration court, regardless of whether it included the date and time of the hearing. Consequently, the court held that Hamilton was not eligible for a § 1182(h) waiver and that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen. The petition for review was denied. View "Hamilton v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

John Doe, using multiple aliases, had a long history with U.S. immigration authorities dating back to 1985. He was twice caught trying to enter the U.S. with fraudulent documents and was deported. In 1988, he was found in Texas and deported again. In 2018, he was detained in Florida, and despite a final deportation order, he refused to cooperate with immigration officials, leading to his indictment on three counts of willfully failing to leave the U.S. under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1).The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied Doe's request for a jury instruction that would require the government to prove he had been lawfully admitted to the U.S. to convict him under § 1253(a)(1). The court also denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the same grounds. Doe was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 51 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that § 1253(a)(1) does not require a noncitizen to have been lawfully admitted to the U.S. to be subject to its penalties. The court found that the statutory text and context did not support Doe's interpretation that only admitted noncitizens could be penalized under § 1253(a)(1). The court affirmed the district court's decisions, upholding Doe's convictions and sentence. View "USA v. Doe" on Justia Law

Jordan Pulido developed an online relationship with a 14-year-old Croatian girl, I.G., and, with the help of his father, Roberto Jimenez, traveled to Croatia to have sex with her. They later brought her to the United States, where Pulido continued to have sex with her. Pulido was indicted on multiple counts, including using the internet to entice a minor, traveling with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct, and transporting a minor for sexual activity. Jimenez was indicted for conspiring to transport a minor for sexual activity.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied Pulido's pre-trial motions to dismiss the indictment, suppress evidence, and exclude testimony. Both defendants were convicted on all counts after a nine-day trial. Post-trial motions for acquittal, a new trial, and a mistrial were also denied. Jimenez received sentence enhancements for exercising undue influence and having custody or supervisory control over I.G.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decisions on most counts but vacated Pulido's conviction on the enticement count, finding the indictment duplicitous. The court held that the enticement count was not harmless and remanded for resentencing. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of Pulido's motion to suppress evidence from his electronic devices, holding that the border search exception applied. Additionally, the court found no fundamental unfairness in the translation irregularities during I.G.'s mother's testimony.For Jimenez, the court affirmed the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, finding sufficient evidence of his intent to transport I.G. for sexual activity. The court also upheld the denial of his motion for a mistrial based on Agent Garcia's testimony about his immigration status, concluding that the curative instruction mitigated any potential prejudice. Finally, the court affirmed the application of the sentencing enhancements for undue influence and custody or supervisory control. View "U.S. v. Pulido" on Justia Law

The appellants, Madhu Sudhan Kanapuram and Swathi Pillarisetty, are Indian citizens legally residing in the United States on temporary employment-based visas. They filed Form I-485 applications for adjustment of status to obtain EB-2 immigrant visas. Their applications were initially within the priority date cutoff, but due to a retrogression policy, the Final Action Date was pushed back, placing their applications outside the priority cutoff date. After waiting 19 months without a decision, they filed a lawsuit alleging that the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the Department of State violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by unlawfully withholding and unreasonably delaying the adjudication of their applications.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed the case, concluding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) barred judicial review of claims asserting delays in the adjudication of pending Form I-485 applications. The appellants then sought review of this dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Eleventh Circuit held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes judicial review of challenges to USCIS delays in adjudicating Form I-485 applications because the statute grants the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and USCIS broad discretion over the adjustment of status process. The court concluded that the decision to delay adjudication due to the retrogression policy falls within this discretionary authority. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order of dismissal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the appellants' APA claims. View "SudhanKanapuram v. Director, US Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

Fu Jing Wu and Wai Lam set up investment funds for foreign investors, promising opportunities to immigrate to the United States through the EB-5 visa program. They fraudulently diverted millions of dollars from these funds. An investor, Chun Liu, sued them in a Florida court. Wu and Lam removed the case to federal court and moved to compel arbitration based on a purchase agreement. The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration and remanded the case to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida reviewed the case. The court found that Wu was not a signatory to the purchase agreement containing the arbitration clause and thus could not enforce it. Consequently, the court ruled that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Federal Arbitration Act and remanded the case to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) barred appellate review of the district court's order that both denied the motion to compel arbitration and remanded the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that the denial of the motion to compel arbitration was intrinsic to the jurisdictional decision and could not be reviewed separately. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Wu and Lam’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Wu v. Liu" on Justia Law

Marvin Laguna Rivera, a Nicaraguan citizen, petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order affirming the Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Laguna Rivera claimed that his political activities against the Nicaraguan government put his life in danger if he returned. The IJ found his testimony about recent threats not credible and determined that past persecution of his family members was too remote to establish a future threat to him. The BIA upheld the IJ's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. Laguna Rivera argued that the court had jurisdiction to review the denial of his asylum petition despite its untimeliness and that the BIA's adverse credibility finding was not supported by substantial evidence. However, the court found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the asylum petition's timeliness due to controlling precedent. The court also determined that substantial evidence supported the BIA's adverse credibility finding and the denial of withholding of removal and CAT relief.The Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's determination that Laguna Rivera's asylum application was untimely. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the BIA's conclusion that Laguna Rivera did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution, as his claims were based on dated incidents and unsubstantiated rumors. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition for review of the asylum claim and denied the petition for review of the withholding of removal and CAT claims. View "Rivera v. United States Attorney General" on Justia Law

Sheldon Turner, born in Jamaica to Jamaican parents Desmond and Roslyn Turner, entered the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1990. His parents divorced in 1987, and his mother remarried twice, including a remarriage to Desmond in 1994. Roslyn naturalized as a U.S. citizen in 1999 while still married to Desmond. Turner was convicted of a felony in 2016, leading to removal proceedings initiated by the Department of Homeland Security.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Turner’s motion to terminate removal proceedings, finding that Turner did not derive U.S. citizenship from his mother’s naturalization because his parents were married at the time of her naturalization, thus not meeting the legal separation requirement under former 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3). The IJ’s decision was based on the statute’s plain language and the rationale explained in Levy v. U.S. Attorney General. Turner’s appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) was dismissed, with the BIA agreeing that the statute requires a continuing legal separation at the time of naturalization.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the BIA’s interpretation. The court held that former 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3) imposes a continuing requirement of legal separation that must exist at the time all other conditions of derivative citizenship are satisfied. Since Turner’s mother was married to his father at the time of her naturalization, Turner did not derive automatic citizenship. The court denied Turner’s petition for review. View "Turner v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Hector Diaz-Arellano, a Mexican national, entered the U.S. illegally in 1989. In 2017, the Department of Homeland Security charged him as a removable alien. Diaz-Arellano conceded removability but sought cancellation of removal, claiming it would cause "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to his U.S.-citizen daughter, who was under 21 at the time. However, by the time of his final removal hearing, his daughter had turned 21, making her ineligible as a qualifying relative under the statute.The Immigration Judge (IJ) initially warned Diaz-Arellano that his daughter's upcoming 21st birthday could affect his eligibility for cancellation of removal. Despite this, Diaz-Arellano delayed filing his application and did not object to a hearing date set after his daughter's birthday. At the final hearing, the IJ denied his application, noting that his daughter no longer qualified as a "child" under the statute. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision, citing Matter of Isidro-Zamorano, which holds that a child must be under 21 at the time of the final adjudication.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court held that the statute unambiguously requires a qualifying relative to be under 21 at the time of the final decision on cancellation of removal. The court rejected Diaz-Arellano's argument that the BIA's interpretation was incorrect and found no undue or unfair delay in his proceedings that would warrant an exception. Consequently, the court denied Diaz-Arellano's petition for review, affirming that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal because his daughter was no longer a qualifying child. View "Diaz-Arellano v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, citizens of the Dominican Republic, requested records from three federal agencies under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) related to the revocation of their U.S. visas. The agencies produced some records but withheld others, citing FOIA exemptions, including Exemption 3 and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 222(f). The plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of the searches and the exemptions claimed by the agencies.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida reviewed the case. The government filed declarations from FOIA officials explaining the searches and the withheld records. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government, concluding that the agencies conducted adequate searches and properly invoked FOIA Exemption 3 to withhold and redact documents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the agencies conducted reasonable searches and properly invoked Exemption 3. The court found that INA § 222(f) qualifies as a withholding statute under Exemption 3 and that visa revocation records fall within its scope. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the agencies' declarations violated the best evidence rule and that the searches were inadequate because they did not include alien number searches or routing requests to other DHS components. The court concluded that the agencies' actions were reasonable and in compliance with FOIA requirements. View "Jimenez v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law