Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Jamaican citizen entered the United States unlawfully, claiming fear of political persecution in his home country. While in the United States, he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and battery, resulting in a 20-year prison sentence. After completing his sentence, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) detained him for administrative removal proceedings based on his aggravated felony convictions. The individual expressed fear of torture if returned to Jamaica, prompting referral to withholding-only proceedings to determine eligibility for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The immigration judge denied CAT relief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed that decision. DHS issued a final administrative removal order separately.The petitioner, acting pro se, filed for judicial review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, challenging only the denial of CAT relief and not the underlying removal order. He acknowledged the petition was untimely and cited procedural issues, such as not receiving necessary legal resources. Subsequently, appointed counsel raised additional due process claims and contested the adverse CAT determination. The Eleventh Circuit ordered supplemental briefing to address jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of CAT relief unless the petition for review also challenged a final order of removal. The court reasoned that under the relevant statutes, including the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, and the REAL ID Act, judicial review of CAT claims is only available as part of a review of a final removal order. Because the petition did not challenge the removal order, the court dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. View "Hayles v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

A Haitian citizen who became a lawful permanent resident of the United States was convicted in Florida of aggravated assault with a firearm and sentenced to imprisonment and probation. Following this conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, asserting that the conviction constituted an aggravated felony—a crime of violence—under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The individual, represented by counsel, conceded removability before an Immigration Judge and proceeded with applications for asylum and withholding of removal, which the judge denied. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the removal decision.After removal, the petitioner submitted pro se motions to the BIA: a motion to reopen proceedings and an emergency stay of removal. The motion to reopen argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge removability, contending that the Florida statute permitted convictions based on recklessness, which did not meet the federal “crime of violence” standard requiring intent. The BIA denied the motion to reopen, finding the petitioner’s arguments unpersuasive and concluding he was not prejudiced by any alleged deficient performance by counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial for abuse of discretion and legal error. The court held that precedent interpreting both the Armed Career Criminal Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act establishes that Florida’s aggravated assault statute requires at least knowing conduct, not mere recklessness. Thus, a conviction under this statute categorically qualifies as a “crime of violence” for removal purposes, even for convictions predating clarification by the Florida Supreme Court. The Eleventh Circuit denied the petition for review, concluding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion. View "Senatus v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Two individuals, both Mexican nationals who entered the United States without inspection and had resided in the country for several years with U.S. citizen children, were arrested by immigration authorities following traffic stops in Florida. After their arrests, they were placed in removal proceedings and detained without the possibility of a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which the Department of Homeland Security argued required mandatory detention of unadmitted aliens found in the interior of the United States. Each petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, challenging their detention without bond and arguing that they were eligible for bond under § 1226(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.The district court concluded that § 1226, not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governed their detention, finding that the petitioners were not “seeking admission” at the time of their arrest, and therefore were entitled to bond hearings. The court did not address their other claims. Following this ruling, both individuals received bond hearings and were released from custody. The government appealed, maintaining that all unadmitted aliens present in the United States are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to unadmitted aliens merely present in the country’s interior unless they are actively seeking lawful entry after inspection by an immigration officer. Instead, § 1226 governs the detention of such individuals, making them generally eligible for bond. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of habeas relief, finding no basis in the text, structure, or history of the INA to support the government’s broader reading of § 1225(b)(2)(A). View "Alvarez v. Warden, Federal Detention Center Miami" on Justia Law

State officials in Florida constructed an immigration detention facility at the Dade-Collier Training and Transition Airport, located in the Florida Everglades, using state funds and employees. The facility was built on state property and managed by state law enforcement, although federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials inspected the site and occasionally coordinated the transport and detention of individuals there. The state planned to seek federal reimbursement but had not received any federal funding at the time of the events in question. Several state agencies operated under agreements with the federal government, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g), allowing them to assist with immigration enforcement, but Florida retained control over the facility’s management and construction.The Friends of the Everglades, the Center for Biological Diversity, and the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. They alleged violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), claiming that officials failed to conduct a required environmental review before constructing and operating the facility. The district court issued a preliminary injunction halting further construction, requiring removal of certain structures, and prohibiting detention of additional individuals at the site. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits, concluding that the construction was a final agency action and a major federal action under NEPA, and that federal officials exercised substantial control over the project.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate either a final agency action under the APA or substantial federal control necessary to trigger NEPA, given that Florida constructed and controlled the facility without federal funding or operational authority. The court also found that the district court’s injunction violated a statutory prohibition against enjoining immigration enforcement. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a citizen of Sierra Leone and lawful permanent resident, was convicted in the District of Columbia in 2014 of attempted first-degree sexual abuse and kidnapping. The factual basis for his conviction included both forceful digital penetration and forceful penile penetration. After serving his prison sentence, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, alleging that his conviction qualified as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act, specifically as “rape” or “an attempt to commit an aggravated felony,” and also as a crime of violence.In removal proceedings before the Immigration Judge, the petitioner admitted the factual allegations but disputed that his conviction was an aggravated felony, arguing that the D.C. statute criminalized digital penetration, which he claimed was not covered by the generic federal definition of rape. The Immigration Judge ordered removal, finding the conviction constituted attempted rape. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, relying on its precedent that the generic definition of rape included digital penetration, and dismissed other removability grounds as unnecessary. The Board also denied the petitioner’s requests for a waiver of inadmissibility, but remanded for further consideration of his claim under the Convention Against Torture, directing the Immigration Judge to consider aggregate risks of torture. After additional hearings, the Immigration Judge again denied relief, and the Board affirmed, declining to revisit removability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed only the Board’s removability determination. It held that the generic federal definition of “rape” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) does not include digital penetration, joining other circuits. Consequently, the Board erred in concluding the petitioner’s conviction categorically matched the federal definition of rape. The court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded for further proceedings on other removability grounds. View "Barrie v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Javier Hernandez was a participant in a transnational criminal operation that smuggled Cuban migrants into Mexico for eventual entry into the United States. His primary role involved stealing boats from Southwest Florida, which he delivered to co-conspirators in Mexico. These vessels were used to transport migrants from Cuba or were sold to support the smuggling enterprise, including bribing law enforcement. Hernandez also transported stolen vehicles to Mexico for similar purposes. He was compensated for each delivery and admitted to earning substantial profits from these activities.Federal authorities identified Hernandez through investigative techniques including cell-site location tracking and the recovery of his cell phone, which had been seized by Mexican authorities. The government obtained and executed a warrant to search his phone, extracting relevant data. After initial technical difficulties, a second extraction was performed after the warrant’s nominal expiration date but while the phone was still in government custody. Hernandez was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on five counts, including conspiracy to encourage unlawful entry, transportation of stolen vessels, trafficking in vehicles with altered VINs, and money laundering. He moved to suppress the evidence from the second extraction, but the district court denied the motion, applied several sentencing enhancements, and imposed a sentence of ninety-five months.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the second extraction did not violate Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 or the Fourth Amendment, as Rule 41(e)(2)(B) allows for off-site copying and review of electronic information after the warrant period. The court also found that even if there were a procedural violation, suppression would not be warranted due to the agents’ good faith and lack of prejudice. The court determined that the evidence was sufficient to sustain all convictions and found no reversible error in the sentencing calculations or guideline enhancements. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

A married couple, both citizens of Mexico, have lived in the United States for over twenty years without legal status. They have two U.S.-born children, one of whom, I.L., has a learning disability, ADHD, and requires ongoing medical and educational support. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against the couple, who conceded inadmissibility but sought cancellation of removal, arguing that deportation would cause their son an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” due to his special needs and the alleged lack of adequate services in Mexico.An immigration judge found both parents credible and agreed they met the first three statutory requirements for cancellation of removal, but concluded they did not satisfy the hardship requirement. The judge acknowledged the difficulties I.L. would face but determined these did not rise to the high threshold set by the statute. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the judge’s decisions in separate, but materially identical, rulings, agreeing that the hardship standard was not met.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the Board’s application of the hardship standard under the substantial-evidence standard, as clarified by recent Supreme Court precedent. The court held that the Board’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, given the record showed that some medical and educational services were available in Mexico and that the Board applied the correct legal standard. The court denied the petitions for review, holding that the Board’s application of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) is reviewable for substantial evidence, and that the Board’s decisions in these cases met that standard. View "Lopez-Martinez v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Walmart, Inc. faced allegations from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for 11,103 violations of immigration-related recordkeeping requirements at 20 locations. These cases were assigned to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in the Department of Justice’s Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO). Before the ALJ could rule on the merits, Walmart filed a lawsuit in federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of the "good cause" removal procedure for ALJs under 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Walmart argued that this removal procedure infringed upon the President’s executive power under Article II of the Constitution.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia ruled in favor of Walmart, declaring § 7521(a) unconstitutional and permanently enjoining the Department and its Chief ALJ from adjudicating ICE’s complaints against Walmart. The district court refused to sever § 7521(a) from the rest of the statute.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The Eleventh Circuit held that the APA’s § 7521(a) is constitutional as applied to the Department’s ALJs in OCAHO. The court reasoned that the ALJs perform purely adjudicative functions, have limited duties, and lack policymaking or administrative authority. Additionally, the decisions of the ALJs are subject to plenary review by the Attorney General, who is removable at will by the President, ensuring sufficient executive control.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s permanent injunction and reversed its entry of summary judgment for Walmart. The court also noted that even if § 7521(a) were unconstitutional, the proper remedy would be to sever the "good cause" removal restriction, leaving the rest of the APA intact. View "Walmart, Inc. v. King" on Justia Law

Sunshine State Regional Center, Inc. (Sunshine State) is an EB-5 regional center that was designated in 2014. The EB-5 program allows immigrants to obtain visas by investing in job-creating enterprises in the U.S. The EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act of 2022 (the Act) introduced an annual fee for regional centers to fund the EB-5 Integrity Fund, aimed at preventing fraud. Sunshine State, which is not currently sponsoring new investment projects, argued that it should not be subject to this fee because it was designated before the Act was passed.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Sunshine State’s motion for summary judgment and granted, in part, the motion to dismiss filed by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The district court found that the Act’s text did not exempt pre-Act regional centers from the Integrity Fund Fee and that the structure of the Act suggested the opposite.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Act’s language and structure indicate that all regional centers, regardless of when they were designated, are subject to the Integrity Fund Fee. The court reasoned that the term “designated under subparagraph (E)” includes both pre- and post-Act regional centers because the Act governs the entire EB-5 program, and any designation for that program must now operate under subparagraph (E). The court also rejected Sunshine State’s argument that imposing the fee would be retroactive, stating that the fee is prospective and applies to the ongoing status of being a designated regional center.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, upholding the imposition of the Integrity Fund Fee on Sunshine State. View "Sunshine State Regional Center, Inc. v. Director, US Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

Maria Fatima Mejia Ponce sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Ponce claimed she faced persecution in Honduras due to her membership in a particular social group, specifically Honduran business owners perceived as wealthy and targeted by criminal gangs.The Immigration Judge (IJ) initially denied Ponce's application, finding that her proposed social group was not sufficiently particular or socially distinct. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that Ponce's proposed group did not meet the criteria for a particular social group under U.S. asylum law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that to qualify for asylum, an applicant must demonstrate persecution based on membership in a particular social group, which must be defined by common, immutable characteristics, and be socially distinct within the society in question. The court referenced its prior decision in Perez-Zenteno v. U.S. Attorney General, which held that a particular social group must be narrowly defined and not overly broad.The Eleventh Circuit found that Ponce's proposed social group of Honduran business owners perceived as wealthy was too broad and lacked the necessary immutability, identity, visibility, homogeneity, and cohesiveness. The court concluded that Ponce's proposed group did not qualify as a particular social group for asylum purposes. Consequently, the court denied Ponce's petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision. View "Ponce v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law