Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Putu Indrawati appealed a Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) order that affirmed an Immigration Judge's (IJ) decision that she was barred from adjustment status because she knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application. Petitioner was attacked in her native Indonesia while visiting family on break from college in the US. The incident convinced petitioner to apply for asylum in the US. Her closest friend was successful in gaining asylum in the US, and petitioner relied on her friend's advice to petition for asylum too. Though she should read and write in English, petitioner relied on third parties to complete her application. Petitioner signed blank forms and gave them to the third parties to present her application on her behalf. On appeal, petitioner argued: (1) the IJ denied her a sufficient opportunity to account for any discrepancies or implausible aspects of her claim; (2) the IJ's reliance on three documents prepared for her violated her right to due process; and (3) the BIA's decision reflected a lack of reasoned consideration. Upon review of the BIA's decision, the Eleventh Circuit concluded it was without jurisdiction to consider the first two arguments petitioner made on appeal. As to the third, the Court concluded petitioner's claim was without merit. View "Indrawati v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China, sought review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's denial of his petition for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that the BIA's explanation of why it reached the determination that petitioner had not endured past persecution reflects only that it considered his physical harm, not all forms of religious abuse that petitioner suffered. Therefore, the court cannot tell whether the BIA actually took into account the non-physical abuse to petitioner when it rejected his claim of past persecution. Consequently, the court remanded to the BIA to clarify its decision. View "Min Yong Huang v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife, natives and citizens of India, appealed from the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of their complaint challenging USCIS's revocation of I-140 visa petitions filed on plaintiff's behalf. Plaintiff and his wife challenged the district court's conclusion that, because plaintiff was a beneficiary, instead of the petitioner, of an I-140 visa petition, he and his wife lacked standing to bring their claims. In this case, the district court concluded that 8 C.F.R. 103.3(a)(1)(iii)(B) precluded constitutional standing because it specifically excludes immigrant beneficiaries such as plaintiff in its definition of parties with standing to challenge I-140 visa petition revocations. The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of constitutional standing where the regulatory definition of "affected party" does not preclude the beneficiary from having standing in the district court, as it relates to who has the ability to challenge the administrative denial of a petition. Therefore, it is not a binding statement of constitutional standing. The court also concluded that a beneficiary of an I-140 visa petition who has applied for adjustment of status has attempted to port under 8 U.S.C. 1154(j) falls within the class of plaintiffs Congress has authorized to challenge the denial of that I-140 petition. Consequently, plaintiff falls within the zone of interests and may challenge the I-140 visa petition revocation. Further, applying the analysis in Bonillo v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the court concluded that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims raised in the complaint. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Kurapati v. USCIS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a native and citizen of Venezuela and citizen of Cuba, appealed the dismissal of his complaint challenging the USCIS's determination that he was statutorily ineligible to adjust status under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (CAA), Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161. The court concluded that any arguments plaintiff may have had regarding the district judge's dismissal of his request for mandamus relief for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted and any claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA), 28 U.S.C. 2201, has been abandoned by plaintiff's failure to raise them on appeal. Because the BIA lacked authority to review the USCIS CAA-eligibility determination, plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies prior to commencing his proceedings before the IJ. Therefore, the district judge erred when he determined that plaintiff's failure to exhaust available administrative remedies deprived him of jurisdiction over plaintiff's complaint. The court reversed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, remanding for further proceedings. View "Perez v. USCIS" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Slovakia, sought review of the BIA's order denying her motion to reopen removal proceedings, and petitioned for review of the BIA's order denying her motion to reconsider and to reopen her removal proceedings. The court dismissed the petitions for review for lack of jurisdiction because the BIA's battered spouse determination under 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii) was discretionary and the court similarly lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's order denying petitioner's subsequent motion to reconsider and reopen. View "Butalova v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal from the IJ's order of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Petitioner argued that his Florida state conviction for aggravated fleeing was not an aggravated felony. The court concluded that, under relevant Florida law and considering the factual circumstances of the proceedings related to petitioner's aggravated fleeing offense, the probation revocation and resentencing resulted in a prison term of at least one year, in satisfaction of the aggravated felony statute, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F). Further, the Florida state conviction was a crime of violence where, by fleeing from law enforcement, defendant has already resorted to an extreme measure to avoid arrest, signaling that he is likely prepared to resort to the use of physical force. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Dixon v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's order of removal on the ground that he failed to file an application for an adjustment of status concurrently with his application for a waiver. The court concluded that the BIA's interpretation of the waiver provision in 8 U.S.C. 1182(h) - which Congress amended after the BIA decided Matter of Sanchez, to require that an alien seek a waiver of inadmissibility when he applies for a visa, admission to the United States or an adjustment of status - was reasonable. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review.View "Rivas v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of the Congo, appealed the BIA's dismissal of her appeal from the IJ's denial of her application for withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). At issue was whether an alien must contest her status as an aggravated felon in an expedited removal proceeding before raising that argument before a federal court of appeals. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner's argument that her conviction for simple battery does not qualify as an aggravated felony because she failed to contest the only ground for her removal before the department; the court explained that it will not review alleged errors by the immigration judge that the BIA did not expressly adopt; the REAL ID Act, Pub.L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302, barred the court from considering issues of fact raised by petitioner, a criminal alien; the BIA committed no legal error when it rejected petitioner's application for withholding of removal; and the BIA committed no legal error when it rejected petitioner's application for protection under the CAT. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review.View "Malu v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Albania, sought review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's finding that she was subject to removal and ineligible for relief from deportation because she knowingly filed a frivolous application for asylum. The court denied the petition for review where petitioner received notice consistent with the Immigration and Naturalization Act's, 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(6) and (d)(4), requirement that she be notified of the consequences of filing a frivolous asylum application at the time of its filing.View "Ruga v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, became a lawful permanent resident of the Untied States in 1990. At issue was whether the BIA correctly found petitioner removable as an aggravated felon, even though the Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles had earlier pardoned petitioner for the conviction that rendered him removable. The court concluded that petitioner's pardon did not reinstate his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, a privilege he lost under Georgia law as a result of his conviction. Therefore, petitioner did not receive a "full" pardon, and 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi) does not apply. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review.View "Castillo v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law