Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff was ordered removed, he remained in ICE custody from November 25, 2008 until October 21, 2009 - an amount of time greatly exceeding the 90-day statutory period for removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(1)(A). Plaintiff filed a Bivens action, arguing that various government officials, knowing that his removal order could not be executed, made false statements in order to unconstitutionally prolong his detention. The district court dismissed his complaint. Although the court held that section 1252(g) does not bar it from considering the merits of plaintiff's claim, the court also found no Bivens remedy available to him, because the INA sets out sufficient meaningful remedies for plaintiff and similarly situated aliens, and because numerous special factors counsel against supplementing this scheme with a new judicially created cause of action. The court noted that Congress did not provide an avenue by which plaintiff can seek monetary relief. The court deferred its judgment and held that no Bivens remedy is available to a plaintiff. View "Alvarez v. ICE" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought review of defendants' denial of plaintiff's application for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. 1421(c). The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court concluded that plaintiff cannot establish that he was lawfully admitted for permanent residence because he was a crewman when he entered the United States. Consequently, plaintiff does not meet the statutory requirements for naturalization under section 1427(a). Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. View "Reganit v. Secretary, DHS" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Peru, seeks review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's order of removal, finding that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 229b(a), based on his conviction and sentence for a burglary offense. The Board reasonably concluded that house arrest, as a punitive measure that involves a “serious restriction of liberty,” constitutes confinement and is a “term of imprisonment” under the Act. In this case, petitioner's burglary offense, for which he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least one year, qualified as an aggravated felony and made him ineligible for cancellation of removal. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Herrera v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Haiti, seeks review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's denial of his request that he not be removed from the United States. Because petitioner failed to assert before the BIA arguments that he now makes challenging the IJ's finding of no past persecution, he has failed to exhaust that claim, and the court has no jurisdiction to consider it. Petitioner’s status as a criminal alien deprives the court of jurisdiction to consider whether he produced sufficient evidence to prove the likelihood of future persecution. After careful review, the court concluded that the agency committed no legal error and gave “reasoned consideration” to petitioner's claims. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review as to petitioner's claim of past persecution and denied his claim of future persecution. View "Jeune v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner Drew Walker, a citizen of Jamaica, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1990. In 2001, Walker pleaded no contest to three counts of uttering a forged instrument in Florida. One of the counts involved an amount over $10,000. In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings against Walker. The Department alleged that Walker was removable because he committed a crime involving deceit or fraud in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000. The Department later alleged that Walker was also removable because he had been convicted of multiple crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. Walker admitted his convictions but argued that they did not qualify as removable offenses. An immigration judge ruled that Walker was removable on both grounds. Walker appealed that decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which held that Walker’s convictions were aggravated felonies and crimes of moral turpitude. The Board dismissed Walker’s appeal. After its review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the offense of uttering a forged instrument necessarily involves an act of deceit. It was both an aggravated felony offense and a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court, therefore, denied Walker’s petition for review. View "Walker v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant Rodolfo Hernandez pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute at least 1,000 kilograms of a substance containing marijuana, and three counts of possession with intent to distribute at least 100 kilograms of a substance containing marijuana. After Hernandez entered his plea, but before his conviction became final, the Supreme Court decided "Padilla v. Kentucky," holding that counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation. Hernandez later moved to vacate his sentence based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court concluded counsel did not render ineffective assistance and denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The issue this case presented for the Eleventh Circuit's review was whether the district court abused its discretion when it refused that evidentiary hearing. Concluding that it did, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's judgment, and remanded the case with instructions to conduct the evidentiary hearing. View "Hernandez v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner Putu Indrawati appealed a Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) order that affirmed an Immigration Judge's (IJ) decision that she was barred from adjustment status because she knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application. Petitioner was attacked in her native Indonesia while visiting family on break from college in the US. The incident convinced petitioner to apply for asylum in the US. Her closest friend was successful in gaining asylum in the US, and petitioner relied on her friend's advice to petition for asylum too. Though she should read and write in English, petitioner relied on third parties to complete her application. Petitioner signed blank forms and gave them to the third parties to present her application on her behalf. On appeal, petitioner argued: (1) the IJ denied her a sufficient opportunity to account for any discrepancies or implausible aspects of her claim; (2) the IJ's reliance on three documents prepared for her violated her right to due process; and (3) the BIA's decision reflected a lack of reasoned consideration. Upon review of the BIA's decision, the Eleventh Circuit concluded it was without jurisdiction to consider the first two arguments petitioner made on appeal. As to the third, the Court concluded petitioner's claim was without merit. View "Indrawati v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China, sought review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's denial of his petition for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that the BIA's explanation of why it reached the determination that petitioner had not endured past persecution reflects only that it considered his physical harm, not all forms of religious abuse that petitioner suffered. Therefore, the court cannot tell whether the BIA actually took into account the non-physical abuse to petitioner when it rejected his claim of past persecution. Consequently, the court remanded to the BIA to clarify its decision. View "Min Yong Huang v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife, natives and citizens of India, appealed from the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of their complaint challenging USCIS's revocation of I-140 visa petitions filed on plaintiff's behalf. Plaintiff and his wife challenged the district court's conclusion that, because plaintiff was a beneficiary, instead of the petitioner, of an I-140 visa petition, he and his wife lacked standing to bring their claims. In this case, the district court concluded that 8 C.F.R. 103.3(a)(1)(iii)(B) precluded constitutional standing because it specifically excludes immigrant beneficiaries such as plaintiff in its definition of parties with standing to challenge I-140 visa petition revocations. The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of constitutional standing where the regulatory definition of "affected party" does not preclude the beneficiary from having standing in the district court, as it relates to who has the ability to challenge the administrative denial of a petition. Therefore, it is not a binding statement of constitutional standing. The court also concluded that a beneficiary of an I-140 visa petition who has applied for adjustment of status has attempted to port under 8 U.S.C. 1154(j) falls within the class of plaintiffs Congress has authorized to challenge the denial of that I-140 petition. Consequently, plaintiff falls within the zone of interests and may challenge the I-140 visa petition revocation. Further, applying the analysis in Bonillo v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the court concluded that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims raised in the complaint. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Kurapati v. USCIS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a native and citizen of Venezuela and citizen of Cuba, appealed the dismissal of his complaint challenging the USCIS's determination that he was statutorily ineligible to adjust status under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (CAA), Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161. The court concluded that any arguments plaintiff may have had regarding the district judge's dismissal of his request for mandamus relief for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted and any claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA), 28 U.S.C. 2201, has been abandoned by plaintiff's failure to raise them on appeal. Because the BIA lacked authority to review the USCIS CAA-eligibility determination, plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies prior to commencing his proceedings before the IJ. Therefore, the district judge erred when he determined that plaintiff's failure to exhaust available administrative remedies deprived him of jurisdiction over plaintiff's complaint. The court reversed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, remanding for further proceedings. View "Perez v. USCIS" on Justia Law