Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Slovakia, sought review of the BIA's order denying her motion to reopen removal proceedings, and petitioned for review of the BIA's order denying her motion to reconsider and to reopen her removal proceedings. The court dismissed the petitions for review for lack of jurisdiction because the BIA's battered spouse determination under 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii) was discretionary and the court similarly lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's order denying petitioner's subsequent motion to reconsider and reopen. View "Butalova v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal from the IJ's order of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Petitioner argued that his Florida state conviction for aggravated fleeing was not an aggravated felony. The court concluded that, under relevant Florida law and considering the factual circumstances of the proceedings related to petitioner's aggravated fleeing offense, the probation revocation and resentencing resulted in a prison term of at least one year, in satisfaction of the aggravated felony statute, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F). Further, the Florida state conviction was a crime of violence where, by fleeing from law enforcement, defendant has already resorted to an extreme measure to avoid arrest, signaling that he is likely prepared to resort to the use of physical force. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Dixon v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's order of removal on the ground that he failed to file an application for an adjustment of status concurrently with his application for a waiver. The court concluded that the BIA's interpretation of the waiver provision in 8 U.S.C. 1182(h) - which Congress amended after the BIA decided Matter of Sanchez, to require that an alien seek a waiver of inadmissibility when he applies for a visa, admission to the United States or an adjustment of status - was reasonable. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review.View "Rivas v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of the Congo, appealed the BIA's dismissal of her appeal from the IJ's denial of her application for withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). At issue was whether an alien must contest her status as an aggravated felon in an expedited removal proceeding before raising that argument before a federal court of appeals. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner's argument that her conviction for simple battery does not qualify as an aggravated felony because she failed to contest the only ground for her removal before the department; the court explained that it will not review alleged errors by the immigration judge that the BIA did not expressly adopt; the REAL ID Act, Pub.L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302, barred the court from considering issues of fact raised by petitioner, a criminal alien; the BIA committed no legal error when it rejected petitioner's application for withholding of removal; and the BIA committed no legal error when it rejected petitioner's application for protection under the CAT. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review.View "Malu v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Albania, sought review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's finding that she was subject to removal and ineligible for relief from deportation because she knowingly filed a frivolous application for asylum. The court denied the petition for review where petitioner received notice consistent with the Immigration and Naturalization Act's, 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(6) and (d)(4), requirement that she be notified of the consequences of filing a frivolous asylum application at the time of its filing.View "Ruga v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, became a lawful permanent resident of the Untied States in 1990. At issue was whether the BIA correctly found petitioner removable as an aggravated felon, even though the Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles had earlier pardoned petitioner for the conviction that rendered him removable. The court concluded that petitioner's pardon did not reinstate his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, a privilege he lost under Georgia law as a result of his conviction. Therefore, petitioner did not receive a "full" pardon, and 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi) does not apply. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review.View "Castillo v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, husband and wife, filed suit challenging the USCIS's revocation of I-140 visa petitions filed on the husband's behalf. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's dismissal of their complaint based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for lack of constitutional standing where the regulatory definition of "affected party" does not preclude the beneficiary from having standing in the district court, as it relates to who has the ability to challenge the administrative denial of a petition, and under the test for constitutional standing, plaintiffs suffered an injury in fact from the revocation of the visa petitions. In regards to prudential standing, the court concluded that the husband fell within the zone of interests and may challenge the visa petition revocation. The court also concluded that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) because the complaint raises a question of law. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kurapati, et al. v. USCIS, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Sri Lanka, sought review of his recent order of removal and an earlier order of removal. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the earlier order where the order was final and petitioner declined to pursue a timely petition for its review, as well as failed to exhaust his earlier arguments in his second appeal to the Board. In regards to the recent order, at issue was whether silence in a report of the Department of State about torture of asylum seekers on return to an alien's home country may rebut affirmative evidence of that torture presented by the alien. The court concluded that the silence of a State Department report cannot, without more, rebut the affirmative evidence petitioner presented. Accordingly, the court vacated the Board's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gaksakuman v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner and her husband, natives and citizens of China, sought review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and her husband's application for asylum and withholding of deportation. The court concluded that petitioner and her husband failed to show that the IJ and BIA erred in determining that the 2006 Tingjian Document- which ordered the sterilization of either petitioner or her husband when they returned to China - was unauthenticated, and therefore, the IJ and BIA did not err in giving it little or no weight; substantial evidence supported the BIA's conclusion that petitioner failed to show a well-founded fear of persecution where the BIA distinguished between U.S.-born and Chinese-born children for the purposes of enforcing China's family planning policy; and the court could not say that the record compelled a conclusion that there was a reasonable possibility that petitioner would face economic persecution if she returned to China. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Wu v. US Attorney General" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a native of Brazil, sought to adjust her immigration status to become a legal permanent resident. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of DHS. The court concluded that the remarriage bar in the second sentence of the "intermediate relatives" definition of 8 U.S.C. 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) did not apply to plaintiff's renewed application to adjust her status under the recently enacted section 1154(l). Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff. View "Williams v. Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, et al." on Justia Law