Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, has lived in the United States since 1972 and in April 2004, he pleaded guilty to, and was sentenced to 96 months imprisonment for, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. At issue was whether the district court properly denied his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion as successive and whether Padilla v. Kentucky announced a retroactively applicable new rule of law. The court held that the district court failed to issue Castro v. United States warnings when it recharacterized petitioner's July 2008 motion as a section 2255 petition. However, the court affirmed the district court on the ground that petitioner's July 2010 petition for post-conviction relief was untimely under section 2255. Accordingly, the court affirmed. View "Figuereo-Sanchez v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner and his wife, natives and citizens of China, petitioned for review of the denial of their third motion to reopen removal proceedings. After the Board denied their motion, petitioners had 30 days to file their petition for review in the court but they filed their petition one day late. Petitioners urged the court to rule that their petition was timely because they paid a commercial parcel service to provide overnight delivery 29 days after the Board issued its decision and, but for a delay caused by inclement weather, the petition would have reached the court on the day it was due. The government argued that the Board did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioners' third motion to reopen. Because the court lacked jurisdiction to consider an untimely petition for review and the court was accessible on the day the petition was due, the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Lin v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of the Ukraine, sought review of a final order of removal issued by the BIA dismissing her appeal of an IJ's ruling denying her application for asylum and withholding of removal, as well as protection under the CAT, based on a finding of adverse credibility. The court concluded that, based on the totality of the circumstances, both the IJ and the BIA weighed the evidence of authenticity and determined that the State Department's Report was more credible than petitioner's testimony and the claims of her family. Their determinations were not based on any single source or inconsistency, but on substantial record evidence. Therefore, the court found no reason to disturb these rulings. The court also concluded that petitioner did not overcome the presumption of regularity afforded to government investigations. Therefore, the court affirmed the BIA's finding that petitioner's right to confidentiality in the asylum application process was not breached. View "Lyashchynska v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the decision of the BIA affirming an order that denied his motion to terminate removal proceedings based on his prior convictions. In 1994, the government first charged petitioner with removeability based on multiple convictions for child molestation and the IJ terminated those proceedings after finding that his convictions did not fall within the INA's definition of "aggravated felony." The government again charged petitioner with removability based on his 1993 convictions after Congress changed the law, codifying an expanded definition of aggravated felony to include "sexual abuse of a minor." The court agreed with the district court and held that res judicata did not bar the current removal proceedings against petitioner because they were based on a ground for removal that did not exist when the prior proceedings were terminated. Accordingly, the petition for review was denied.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Senegal, petitioned for review of the BIA's final order, which affirmed an IJ's decision to deny her application for withholding of removal. Petitioner claimed that if she returned to Senegal, it was more likely than not that she would be beaten or killed for attempting to protect her U.S. citizen daughter from being subjected to female genital mutilation (FGM). The court granted the petition for review because the BIA failed to give reasoned consideration to petitioner's application when it found that she could relocate within Senegal to avoid persecution. Accordingly, the court vacated the BIA's decision and remanded for further proceedings.

Migrant workers who worked for defendant appealed a summary judgment in favor of defendant and against their complaint that defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (Act), 29 U.S.C. 203(m). At issue was whether an employer that hired migrant farm workers through the H-2A visa program was entitled to wage credits under the Act for housing and meals that federal law required the employer to provide the workers. The court deferred to the Secretary of Labor's interpretation that defendant could not credit the cost of housing in the wages paid to the workers and agreed with defendant that it was entitled to wage credits for the costs of meals for the workers. The court also concluded that defendant was not liable under principles of agency law for the fees that third parties charged the workers related to their efforts to obtain employment with defendant. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Petitioner, a Peruvian citizen, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's decision that she was removable, and the IJ's denial of her applications for a waiver of removability and cancellation of removal. The court held that the plain language of 8 U.S.C. 1256(a) did not apply to removal proceedings; substantial evidence supported the IJ's and the BIA's finding that petitioner was removable under INA 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i); to the extent an interpreter was not present at the hearings addressing petitioner's applications for waiver of removability and cancellation of removal, petitioner had no cognizable due process interest because those forms of relief were discretionary; petitioner's claim that she was denied a full and fair hearing due to the IJ's purported bias was rejected; the court lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's discretionary denial of petitioner's application of removability; and the court also lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's denial of petitioner's application for cancellation of removal under INA 240A, 8 U.S.C. 1229b.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Cuba and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, petitioned for review of the decision of the BIA affirming the IJ's order of removal rendered on the ground that he was inadmissible to the United States because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude due to his conviction for false imprisonment under section 787.02, Florida Statutes. The court held that the BIA and the IJ erred by considering evidence beyond the record of petitioner's false imprisonment conviction to determine that he had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The court held, however, that because the BIA and IJ assumed without deciding that the Florida offense of false imprisonment was not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, the court must remand to the BIA to determine in the first instance whether petitioner's false imprisonment conviction qualified as a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Therefore, the court granted the petition and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's judgment dismissing his petition for a writ of mandamus and his complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. Plaintiff's complaint requested the district court to mandamus the defendants (1) to determine as a matter of law that plaintiff had been "admitted" to the United States for purposes of his application for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. 1255(a) and (2) to re-open and re-adjudicate plaintiff's application for adjustment of status, which was previously denied. The court held that plaintiff could not satisfy the requirements for mandamus relief and that he had not demonstrated that he lacked an adequate remedy for obtaining relief. In fact, plaintiff had sued under the APA, which provided an adequate remedy. Therefore, the court held that because plaintiff had an adequate remedy available to him, the district court properly dismissed his request for mandamus relief. The court also held that the plain language of section 1255(a) limited eligibility for status adjustment to an alien who had been inspected and admitted or paroled. That an alien with Temporary Protected Status had lawful status as a nonimmigrant for purposes of adjusting his status did not change section 1255(a)'s threshold requirement that he was eligible for adjustment of status only if he was initially inspected and admitted or paroled. Accordingly, the court held that the district court's ruling was consistent with the plain language of the statute. Furthermore, even if the statutory language was ambiguous, the court deferred to the Department of Homeland Security's consistent and well-reasoned interpretation of the interplay between section 1255(a) and section 1254a(f)(4). Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the petition and complaint.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Venezuela, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision, affirming the IJ's finding that petitioner's testimony was not credible. At issue was whether substantial evidence supported the BIA's decision. The court held that substantial evidence supported the IJ's and the BIA's finding that petitioner's testimony was not credible where the IJ and BIA offered specific and cogent reasons for the finding and where they cited numerous material inconsistencies between petitioner's testimony and the documentary evidence introduced in support of his asylum application. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review.